Paracel and Spratly Islands Forum

Online mapping error fixed by National Geographic Society

2010-01-01T01:00:00.000+07:00

Thanh Nien News

3 April 2010

The National Geographic Society has removed a label on one of its online maps that insinuated that the Paracel Islands were part of China, after admitting that the previous label could be misinterpreted.

On its website (natgeomaps.com), the archipelago is now simply referred to by its conventional name – Paracel Island, and the label “China” has been deleted.

The Washington-based organization announced last week that it would change naming conventions for the Paracel Islands on future map printings.

“We have carefully reviewed the situation and recognize that simply denoting the archipelago with the Chinese name and the word ‘China’ in parenthesis without further explanation can be misleading and misinterpreted,” it said in a statement.

The Vietnamese government said on March 13 that the National Geographic Society was wrong to put the note “Paracel Is. China” to refer to Vietnam’s Hoang Sa archipelago on its world map and requested the mistake be corrected.

In related news, Vietnam last month also requested that Google Maps, the online map service of Google Inc., correct its mistakes concerning the borderline between Vietnam and China.

In the map published by Google, many areas that belong to Vietnam totaling thousands of square kilometers have been presented as belonging to China.

Kate Hurowitz, a spokesperson for Google, was quoted by local news website VietNamNet on Wednesday as saying the issue was still being considered. It may take a few more weeks before the final decision is made, she said.

Beijing beefs up South China Sea patrol amid friction with Vietnam

2010-01-01T00:59:00.003+07:00

Earth Times

1 April 2010

Beijing - China on Thursday sent two ships to patrol disputed areas of the South China Sea amid friction with Vietnam over fishing rights.

The two fisheries administration ships set off from the southern island of Hainan to mount China's first dual-vessel patrol of areas close to the disputed Spratly islands, which are known as the Nansha in Chinese, the semi-official China News Service said.

The "Nansha patrol united action" is designed crack down on piracy and protect the "normal production and life of Chinese fishermen," the agency quoted officials as saying. The officials said the dual patrol would initially last one month but could be extended.

The two patrol vessels include the fisheries administration's largest and fastest vessel, a converted naval ship weighing 4,450 tons. The agency said Chinese fishing vessels had been attacked or seized in the area more than 300 times since 1994, resulting in the death of 25 Chinese citizens and the detention of some 1,800 others.

The launch of the new patrol follows a protest by Vietnam to China on Tuesday over the seizure of a Vietnamese fishing boat and its crew by Chinese naval patrol boats on March 22 close to the nearby Paracels, or Xisha in Chinese.

Vietnam has accused China of repeatedly detaining Vietnamese fishing boats near the islands over the past year. The Paracels belonged to the former South Vietnam until China seized them in 1974. Tensions over sovereignty in the South China Sea have been rising since May when regional nations submitted maritime territorial claims to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

At a November workshop on regional maritime territorial disputes in Hanoi, experts said the disputes were likely to drag on for decades. The area surrounding the Spratly and Paracel Islands is believed to contain substantial undersea oil and mineral deposits.

[Press Release] Speaking engagement with Dr. Nguyen Nha, a well-known scholar on the topic of Hoang Sa & Truong Sa

2010-01-01T00:59:00.002+07:00

Vietwill.org
29 March 2010

Event: Speaking engagement with Dr. Nguyen Nha, a well-known scholar on the topic of Hoang Sa & Truong Sa.
Date: Friday, April 2, 2010
Time: 12:00pm - 3:00pm
Location:
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Library
150 East San Fernando Street
San Jose, CA 95112
(408) 808-2000

Agenda/Schedule:
12:00-12:15 Welcome reception/Meet & Greet
12:15-12:30 Introduction / Opening remark
12:30-1:00 Dr. Nguyen Nha presentation
1:00 - 1:15 Special Guest(s) presentation*
1:15 - 1:45 Panel discussion / Q&A
1:45 - 2:45 Networking Lunch
2:45 - 3:00 Wrap Up

*Special guest will be announced later, or day of event.
Information about Dr. Nguyen Nha:
BBC-Vietnamese: http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2010/03/100326_biendong_conference.shtml
RFI-Vietnamese: http://www.rfi.fr/actuvi/articles/111/article_2979.asp
VNN-English: http://english.vietnamnet.vn/interviews/2009/05/845679/

Space is limited. Please RSVP with the person who invited you or send email to info@vietwill.net

Vietnam protests Chinese ship seizure Read more: http://www

2010-01-01T00:58:00.001+07:00

Earth Times
29 March 2010

Hanoi - Vietnam protested to China over the seizure and continued detention of a Vietnamese fishing boat and its crew by Chinese naval patrol boats in the South China Sea, local press reported Tuesday.

The newspaper Thanh Nien reported that Vietnam had asked China to release the boat and its crew, which were seized March 22 near the disputed Paracel Islands.

According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga, the Vietnamese government met with Chinese representatives, affirmed Vietnam's claim to the Paracels and asked China "to immediately and unconditionally release the boat and its crew."

Nga did not specify on what day the meeting had taken place.

Over the past year, Chinese forces have repeatedly detained Vietnamese fishing boats near the islands, which both countries claim. The Paracels belonged to the former South Vietnam until China seized them in 1974.

Nguyen Thanh Hung, deputy chairman of the commune of Binh Chau, home of the fishermen being held, said China has demanded a fine of 180 million dong (10,000 dollars) for the release of the fishermen.

The families are too poor to pay the fine, Hung said. The fishermen are being held on Woody Island, the largest of the Paracels.

Hung said the boat seized has an 80-horsepower engine and is worth 13,500 dollars.

In August and October, China seized several fishing boats and their crews when they tried to shelter in the disputed Paracel Islands during storms.

On February 2, a Vietnamese fishing boat owner reported that a Chinese patrol had stopped and boarded his boat and seized 500 kilograms of fish, a navigation device, spare parts and tools.

Tensions over sovereignty in the South China Sea have been rising since May when regional nations submitted maritime territorial claims to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. At a November workshop on regional maritime territorial disputes in Hanoi, experts said the disputes were likely to drag on for decades.

The area surrounding the Spratly and Paracel Islands is believed to contain substantial undersea oil and mineral deposits.

Copyright DPA

China kidnaps more Vietnamese citizens off Paracel Islands

2010-01-01T00:55:00.000+07:00

Thanh Nien News
27 March 2010

A boat of Vietnam fishermen was seized by China in the waters surrounding the Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago, coastal guards in the central province of Quang Ngai said Friday.

Chinese authorities have asked for US$7,860 in ransom for release of the people.

Tieu Viet La, a Quang Ngai local resident and captain of the boat, informed the guards via radio that he and his 12 member crew, mostly relatives, was captured on Wednesday, local newswire Vietnamnet reported.

La said they were about to leave Hoang Sa’s Phu Lam Island Sa after a night diving for holothurian when they were detained by the Chinese. Chinese guards were now keeping them at Phu Lam island and were asking for VND150 million in return for the fishermen and the boat.

This was the first time La sailed with the boat, a second-hand one he bought early this year after his other boat was seized by China in similar situation.

Vietnam has proved its historic sovereignty over Hoang Sa, but Chinese boats are detected in its waters almost every day.

Last year the Chinese captured 17 fishing boats with some 210 fishermen from Quang Ngai while they were fishing or taking shelter during storms off the Hoang Sa islands, according to the provincial coast guard.

Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to China last year asking them to stop such harassment and abuse.

National Geographic to revise Paracel naming convention

2010-01-01T00:50:00.001+07:00

After the Nguyen Thai Hoc Foundation sent a petition to National Geographic as well as receiving numerous complaints from Vietnamese scholars, organizations, and individuals, National Geographic Society has given its response in regarding the naming convention for the Paracel Islands. Below is the latest update on the statement from NGS regarding this matter:

UPDATE, March 25, 2010:

The National Geographic Society's Map Policy Committee has recently met to discuss this matter in greater detail. Based on the best information and research available, the Map Policy Committee seeks to make independent judgments about future changes or clarifications on its maps, as well as to correct any errors.

The naming conventions of the Paracel Islands on our maps will be revised as follows:

Smaller-scale world maps: Use conventional name - Paracel Islands; omit possession label.
Larger-scale regional, continental, and sectional maps: Use conventional name - Paracel Islands. Expand possession qualifier: Occupied by China in 1974, which calls them Xisha Qundao; claimed by Vietnam, which calls them Hoàng Sa.

These conventions will apply on future printings of our maps, and will be reflected online in short order.

###
Contacts:
Cindy Beidel
National Geographic
202-862-5286
cbeidel@ngs.org

National Geographic maps support occupation of Vietnamese islands

2010-01-01T00:45:00.001+07:00

Thanh Nien Daily
23 March 2010

A recent set of maps published by the National Geographic Society has implicitly endorsed China’s illegal occupation of the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands, which have been the sovereign territory of Vietnam for centuries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga on March 13 reaffirmed Vietnam’s sovereignty over the [Paracel] Islands and asked the Washington-based society, which publishes the popular National Geographic Magazine, to correct the mistake.

“Vietnam’s sovereignty over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa [Spratly] Islands is indisputable. The map showing the Paracel Islands as part of China is incorrect. We request that National Geographic [Society] correct this error,” she said.

In either defiance or ignorance of history and international conventions that deem the islands either part of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam or at least as “disputed” by both Vietnam and China, the maps show the word “China” printed in red letters below “Paracel Is”, which is written in parenthesis. At least one map also refers to the Paracel Islands by their Chinese name, “Xisha Qundao.”

The collection of world maps can be found at http://www.natgeomaps.com/worldma ps.html.

On March 12, the US Embassy in Vietnam said the map’s error did not reflect the US Government’s point of view.

National Geographic Society is a private entity that has no connection with the US Government and thus its documents don’t reflect the US Government’s policy, the US Embassy in Vietnam told Tuoi Tre.

Public ire

Lawyer Hoang Viet in Ho Chi Minh City said the general public in Vietnam was visibly upset with the maps.

“Many people, including me, are frustrated because a prestigious scientific organization has issued unscientific, subjective information,” he said.

Duong Danh Huy, a Vietnamese expert on the East Sea who is working in the UK, said he thought the map error was an honest mistake because the agency usually doesn’t take sides in political disputes.

However, he said “it is a mistake that should be criticized” because even though such maps don’t have any legal value “this could lead to similar error in many other maps.”

“If more and more maps show the islands as China’s territory, it could affect the thinking of many people in the world,” he said.

Tran Cong Truc, former head of Vietnam’s Government Border Committee, echoed Huy’s criticism, saying scholars had often talked about “map wars” when discussing island sovereignty disputes.

“Many countries, especially China, have published maps with new border lines, and names of places in their languages with the intention of legalizing their sovereignty there,” he said.

‘Misleading’

Thanh Nien wrote to the Board of Editors of National Geographic Maps to ask for a correction of the mapping error and to ask for an explanation. Thanh Nien asked National Geographic Maps to reclassify the islands and put them under the correct status as being disputed by Vietnam and China.

NGS responded to Thanh Nien in a statement Wednesday: “With respect to the Paracel Islands (the traditional name), National Geographic has recognized that this archipelago has been occupied and administered by the Chinese government since 1974, and as a result, the Society recognizes the Chinese name Xisha Qundao as the primary name.”

NGS said on regional and other maps, they had designated the alternative Vietnamese name Hoang Sa, and included a note indicating that while China occupies and administers the archipelago, Vietnam claims the archipelago as its own. The society said the scale of its World Map made it difficult to include detailed information about such a small land mass.

NGS conceded that “simply denoting the archipelago with the Chinese name and the word ‘China’ in parenthesis without further explanation can be misleading and misinterpreted.” The group made one important concession: “In the future, we will either provide the additional explanation that is included on our other maps as described above, or we will omit any designation.”

However, inconsistencies can still be found on the maps, despite the NGS explanation.

The World Decorator map, for example, labels islands disputed by the UK and Argentina as Falkland/Malvinas – the former is the British name and the other is the name Argentina uses. However, this map sub-labels the Paracel Islands as Xisha Quandao, the Chinese name, while failing to include the Vietnamese name, Hoang Sa.

In recognizing both disputed names of the Falkland/Malvinas islands on all its maps, NGS appears to be applying a double-standard when it lists only the Chinese name for the Hoang Sa Islands.

On the Asia map, NGS named the islands disputed by Vietnam and China as “Xisha Qundao” with “Paracel Is.” in parentheses and a note reading “Administered by China” and “Claimed by Vietnam”. However, this map still fails to indicate the Vietnamese name.

History

Over the past several decades, Vietnam has exhibited legal documents, historical proof and archeological evidence demonstrating that Vietnamese have long inhabited and administered the Paracel Islands, along with the Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelago, also in the East Sea.

No other countries claimed ownership of the islands until rich oil and gas deposits were discovered around the archipelagos in 1968.

In 1974, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American troops from the Vietnam War, China invaded the Paracel Islands. A brief but bloody naval battle with the forces of the then Republic of Vietnam ensued and China was victorious. Vietnam’s behemoth northern neighbor has illegally occupied the islands ever since.

A post-1975 united Vietnam never relinquished ownership of the Paracel Islands and continues to keep military bases and other facilities on the Spratly Islands. Vietnam has vigorously protested the illegal Chinese occupation of the Paracel Islands as well as some of the Spratly Islands, not only in discussions with China, but also at meetings of the United Nations.

LOCAL FISHING BOAT RAMMED, SUNK IN HOANG SA

Quang Ngai Province’s Ly Son District authorities have requested that central authorities ask China to investigate an unidentified ship that rammed and sunk a local fishing boat last week.

Vo Xuan Huyen, chairman of Ly Son People’s Committee, said the fishing boat was rammed March 9 while it was anchored near the Hoang Sa Islands. The assailant vessel then fled, leaving the 17 Vietnamese sailors to drown on the sinking boat, he said.

The fishermen abandoned ship on coracles and were luckily rescued by a Vietnamese fishing boat that passed by half an hour later. They arrived home safely at Ly Son Island on March 12.

“The strange boat deliberately rammed us,” said Duong Thanh Phu, owner of the sunk boat, adding that material damages were about VND2 billion (US$104,766).

Press Release fron NG about Paracel Islands

2010-01-01T00:30:00.000+07:00

PARACEL ISLANDS STATEMENT

In pursuit of a consistent and accurate Map Policy over the National Geographic Society's 122-year history as a not-for-profit scientific and educational institution, we strive to be apolitical, to consult multiple authoritative sources, and to make independent decisions based on extensive research. We do not seek to resolve or take sides in recognized disputes regarding territory or names, but to pursue a de facto policy — that is, to portray for any reader or viewer to the best of our judgment the current reality of a situation.

With respect to the Paracel Islands (the traditional name), National Geographic has recognized that this archipelago has been occupied and administered by the Chinese government since 1974, and as a result, the Society recognizes the Chinese name Xisha Qundao as the primary name. This is consistent with our Map Policy. On our regional and other maps of sufficient scale, we specifically also recognize and designate the alternative Vietnamese name Hoàng Sa, and the traditional name Paracel Islands, and include a note indicating that while China occupies and administers the archipelago, Vietnam claims the archipelago as its own. We believe that is the current reality from everything we know.

We have recently received complaints about the particular depiction on our World Map, the scale of which makes it difficult to include detailed information about a small land mass such as the Paracel Islands. We have carefully reviewed the situation and recognize that simply denoting the archipelago with the Chinese name and the word "China" in parenthesis without further explanation can be misleading and misinterpreted. In the future, we will either provide the additional explanation that is included on our other maps as described above, or we will omit any designation. We hope this better clarifies the de facto situation that is described on our other maps in greater detail.

###
Contacts:
Cindy Beidel
National Geographic
202-862-5286
cbeidel@ngs.org

Petition: Removal of the label “China” at the Paracel Island Feed

2010-01-01T00:25:00.000+07:00

Click here to sign petition

Mr. Chris Jones, Editor in Chief
The National Geographic Society
1145 17th St, NW
Washington, DC 20036-4688
nationalgeographic.com/magazine
pressroom@ngs.org
maps@ngs.org

March 10, 2010

Ref: The petition for removal of the label “China” at the Paracel Islands on NGS’s online world map

Dear Mr. Jones:

We are writing this letter concerning the label “China” at the disputed Paracel Islands on the online world map edition published by the National Geographic Society. (*)

The fact is that the islands located in the South China Sea have never been recognized as part of Chinese territory by the international community.

In this letter, we do not have any ambition to convince you the Paracel Islands belong to a specific country. Instead, we are requesting you to review the current status of the islands based on reliable, third-party source for correctly labeling the islands on your map.

The sovereignty disputes over the islands remain unresolved for nearly a century. Over the years, the United Nations have also received many complaints from Vietnam and China regarding these features. In fact, the latest submissions to the United Nations from these countries happened in May 2009. The United Nations have classified the Paracel Islands as “the disputed islands” and have never confirmed them belong to neither country.

It is no doubt that the National Geographic Society is a trusted and reliable source of important information for many people around the globe, including researchers and young students.

Therefore, in preventing the public from being misled, we call upon you to immediately review and change the label based on the true status of the Paracel Islands to reflect both the point of view of the international community as well as the neutral point of view policy of the National Geographic Society. Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Your name

(*) Link to the said online world map by National Geographic Society
http://www.natgeomaps.com/world_decorator_zoomify.html?zoomifyImagePath=assets/files/zoomify/re00622077/re00622077_1_img&zoomifyNavigatorVisible=false

USEFUL INFORMATION

1. The International Court of Justice of the United Nations has recorded the Paracel Islands as the disputed islands between Vietnam and China.
http://www.munfw.org/archive/45th/icj.htm

2. On May 6, 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia formally filed a joint submission with the United Nations’ Commissions on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to claim their territorial sea, including the Paracel Islands.
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0652009.pdf

3. On 6 August, 1998, at the request of the Government of Viet Nam, the protest was circulated to all States Members of the United Nations.
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0652009.pdf

Source:
http://www.petitionspot.com/petitions/ParacelIslands/

Vietnamese citizens protest National Geographic mapping error

2010-01-01T00:20:00.000+07:00

Thanh Nien News
12 March 2010

A group of Vietnamese citizens has sent a letter to the National Geographic Society opposing the latter’s publishing of a map that shows the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands as belonging to China.

“We urge you to reclassify the islands and put them under the correct status as being disputed by Vietnam and China,” the group said in a letter to the society’s Editor-in-Chief Chris Johns. The letter was also forwarded to the government, the National Assembly and many newspapers in Vietnam.

The letter, signed by the group’s representatives including Nguyen Hung, Ngo Khoa Ba and Le Quang Long, asks the society to reconsider several points “in the interest of scholarship and fairness.”

The letter pointed out that “the islands in question, as well as those of the Spratlys Archipelago, historically belong to Vietnam. We have legal documents and human habitation to claim sovereignty. No other country has claimed ownership of these islands until recent discoveries of rich oil and gas deposits around the islands.

“In 1974, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American troops from the war theater in Vietnam, China invaded the Paracel Islands and after a brief but bloody naval battle with the forces of the then Republic of Vietnam, has occupied the Paracel Islands. United Vietnam after 1975 has never relinquished ownership of the Paracel Islands as well as that of Spratly Islands. It has vigorously protested the illegal Chinese occupation of the Paracel Islands as well as some parts of the Spratly Islands not only directly to China, but also the United Nations.”

The letter also cited a National Geographic issue on China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from the Vietnamese.

“Here is what you said on page 10 of the Dec 1998 issue: ‘In 1988, China sank Vietnamese ships, killing at least 70 sailors, before taking several of the Spratlys islands - the most serious clash since it seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974. Tensions fuelled a local arms race as well as fears that China aims to dominate all of Asia by controlling the sea,’” it said.

“Your classification of the Paracel Islands as part of China is seen as putting a non-governmental seal of approval on a matter which is under dispute. This action could cloud legal international interpretations for many years to come,” the letter said.

“We are writing this letter because National Geographic Society is a respectable organization and its maps are widely consulted as reference,” it added.

Vietnam To Publish Book On Sovereignty Over Spratly And Paracel Archipelagos

2010-01-01T00:14:00.000+07:00

9 March 2010
Bernama

HANOI, March 9 (Bernama) -- Vietnam is about to publish a geographic anthology offering data and important historical evidence to illustrate the nation's sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, according to Vietnam news agency on Tuesday.

The Vietnam Geographic Anthology, to be circulated by the Youth Publishing House, has four chapters that include 40 of the most famous works on geography, starting with the Tran dynasty of the 13th century through 1954.

The writings were composed by the giants of Vietnamese letters and history, such as Nguyen Trai, Le Quy Don, Phan Huy Chu, Truong Vinh Ky, Dao Van Hoi, Bui Duong Lich, Vuong Duy Trinh, Ngo Vi Lien and Dao Duy Anh.

The publication also offers up an ancient map of the Le dynasty and the "Phu bien tap luc" a miscellany compiled by the 18th century scholar Le Quy Don that identifies the locations, and cites legal documents related to the Vietnamese people's sovereignty over the two groups of islands that have been preserved through many different feudal dynasties.

According to Chief Author Bui Van Vuong, the anthology is a set of very important and reliable historic data that helps reaffirm Vietnam's sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos.

Vuong and his associates have spent ten years collecting, researching and compiling the Vietnam Geographic Anthology.

China's contradictory policies in island disputes (vs. Japan and vs. Vietnam)

2010-01-01T00:13:00.000+07:00

By Peter J Brown
4 March 2010
Asia Times Online

Japan's Okinotori Island, which has a Tokyo postal address even though it lies roughly 1,770 kilometers south of the capital and it is actually a pair of tiny islets, has become a bone of contention for China.

Among other things, China refuses to grant it island status, and refers to it instead as an atoll, reef or simply a rock. By doing so, China hopes to throttle back Japan's plan to create an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) there. The dispute over Okinotori, which Japan calls Okinotorishima, persists because it involves strategic concerns and rights to undersea resources over an area that is roughly equivalent to the entire land mass of the four main Japanese islands.

At an undersea resource development conference hosted by Kyushu University last December that was attended by experts from China, Japan and South Korea and elsewhere, the cobalt-rich manganese crusts around Okinotori were highlighted. Although "rich natural resources" in the area are frequently mentioned as well by China, details are lacking.

At the East Asian Seas Congress in Manila last November, Japan's submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in March 2009 was discussed. This document addressed seven regions between Japan and the Philippines comprising 740,000 square kilometers. Besides potential overlapping claims with the United States and the Republic of Palau - not involving Okinotori - Japan is confronted by both China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), which filed complaints last year with the CLCS concerning Japan's actions on Okinotori. [1]

When the Democratic Party of Japan-led government headed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama came to power last year, it wasted no time in declaring that Japan is allocating US$7 million in 2010 to create a facility on Okinotori in a bid to firmly establish yet another foothold there. This may seem like a large sum, but it represents less than 3% of the total amount spent thus far by Japan to sustain this remote island. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been allocated by the Japanese over the past two decades.

Japan now finds itself indebted to Vietnam, albeit indirectly. Vietnam is exposing curious contradictions that it has detected in China's case against Japan in this instance.

Vietnam, along with other Southeast Asian nations, has a territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea. Last year, the Vietnamese government submitted a national report on the limits of its continental shelf "which lie 200 nautical miles beyond the country's baselines in the northern part of the East Sea [Vietnam's name for the South China Sea]" to the CLCS. This took place in late August.

Together, Vietnam and Malaysia also presented another joint report to the CLCS on the continental shelves of both countries, "which extend out over 200 nautical miles from their baselines in the southern part of the East Sea".

The Vietnamese national report and the Vietnam-Malaysia joint report preceded the approval by the Japanese Diet (parliament) of a law in 2010 that authorizes the central government - not local government - to manage and control both Okinotori and the even more remote Minamitori Island, southeast of Tokyo - and about 290 kilometers more distant than Okinotori.

While China dismisses all of these actions by Japan as illegal, it is anxiously looking over its shoulder at the emboldened Vietnamese.

"The construction of infrastructure will not change Okinotori Reef's legal position," said China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu at a press briefing in January, adding that this violates international maritime law. [2]

Japan claimed Okinotori, also known as Douglas Reef or Parece Vela, in 1931 as part of Ogasawara village in the prefecture of Tokyo, and officially named it Okinotorishima.

"The Japanese claim to an EEZ and continental shelf around Okinotorishima is based on several factors," said Associate Professor Peter Dutton of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. "First, Japanese scholars claim that Okinotorishima is an island that qualifies under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for an EEZ and continental shelf in that it sustains economic activity, even though it is apparently not much more than 10 square meters in size at high tide.

"This argument has only the most tenuous support under the current state of international law. The Japanese seem to recognize this fact and have set out a second legal basis, namely that Japan has longstanding historic interests in Okinotorishima, the adjacent waters, and the resources of the surrounding seabed. In Japan's view, these interests have consolidated over time into legally protected rights."

China points to Article 121 of UNCLOS, which defines an island as "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide". China designates it as a rock under the same article - rocks cannot sustain human habitation or economic life - because a rock by itself cannot be used to claim either an EEZ or by extension a continental shelf submerged in a relatively shallow sea.

By acting as if it has legal standing under UNCLOS, China has suddenly opened the door for Vietnam, and Vietnam has seized the opportunity.

The strategic importance of Okinotori cannot go unnoticed as it sits halfway on a line between the huge US military base on the island of Guam and Taiwan. While divergent Chinese and Japanese strategic interests are driving this dispute, China's need to navigate freely is increasing.

"China has staked legal positions that have de-legitimized foreign military operations in a coastal country's EEZ. China's objections to US military activities in its EEZ are based on these legal perspectives," said Dutton. "On the other hand, as China's naval power has grown over the last couple of decades, China's strategy for controlling the outcome of events throughout East Asia in times of crisis has also evolved. During times of crisis, China now has aspirations of challenging outside naval powers for control of the waters between the first and second island chain." (The first island chain encompasses the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The second encompasses the Japan Sea, the Philippines Sea and the Indonesia Sea.)

This puts China in an awkward position to say the least.

"To be consistent with its demand that the US cease performing military operations in and above China's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake military operations in the waters of Japan's EEZ surrounding Okinotori. As such, to preserve their own security interests, China refuses to recognize Japan's claim," said Dutton.

Prior to Vietnam's move, the chief objective here for Japan had been to politely ignore China's protests and to ensure that, above all else, Okinotori should not somehow sink beneath the sea.

"There is no change in the nature of the dispute. Japan has been planting coral on Okinotori to secure its status as an 'island', while China keeps criticizing [and asserting that] it is a 'rock', so as not to allow Japan's EEZ," said Yukie Yoshikawa, senior research fellow at the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies in Washington, DC.

Planting coral there is just one of the latest Japanese measures, which have included pouring tons of concrete, at a cost of $280 million, to encase both of the islets, as well as covering them with a titanium net which cost another $50 million.

In 2005, Japan mounted a large address plaque there so that everyone would immediately know on arrival that they had reached "1 Okinotori Island, Ogasawara Village, Tokyo." Soon after this was put in place, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara was photographed kissing the plaque and waving the Japanese flag over it. He kept his life jacket on at the same time. [4]

As China attempts to convince the rest of Asia that what Japan is now undertaking actually harms its neighbors, Vietnam shakes its head.

"If Japan's efforts succeed, other countries will not be allowed to fish or share other rich natural resources in a region that is currently regarded as international high seas," said Wang Hanling, an expert in maritime affairs and international law at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "Besides, for some neighbors such as China and the Republic of Korea, the fleets' freedom of navigation along some key routes in the area will also be hampered. That will pose risks to their national security."

In its dealings with Japan, China has even raised the issue of fairness at times, a tactic which must amuse Hanoi.

"Japan's claim over Okinotori, which lies between Taiwan and Guam, is in a strategically important position for Japan's benefit," said Jin Yongming, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. "But the move has harmed other countries' navigation interests and marine survey in the sea waters around Okinotori, and is contrary to the principle of fairness." [4]

Why China is beginning to realize that the stance it has adopted here might backfire is becoming increasingly apparent. Vietnam still claims sovereignty over the Paracel Islands - China's Xisha Islands - in the South China Sea, while the Spratlys, or Nansha Islands as China calls, them are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia.

In early 2009, or perhaps earlier, Vietnam started picking apart the "reefs and islands" argument raised by China supposedly under UNCLOS rules in its case against Japan, and said in effect, "Wait a minute, China, you are arguing the exact opposite regarding our claims in the East Sea."

One minute, argues Vietnam, China asserts that Okinotori cannot have an exclusive economic zone or determine the limits of a continental shelf because it is an atoll, reef or rock and does not have an independent economic life, and the next minute China asserts that so-called "islands" in the East Sea all have independent economic life so they can support a claim to exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of 200 nautical miles covering 80% of the East Sea.

None of this rings true, or not to the extent that it allows China to proceed down the path it is taking. Ownership of the islands in the East Sea is really not central to the outcome because Vietnam contends that "no country can claim up to 80% of the East Sea on the basis of a claim to ownership of these islands". [5]

In other words, look closely and one can detect dozens of little "Okinotoris" dotting the South China Sea. China is just hoping that the rest of the world - at least the rest of the world which has been following China's attempt to derail Japan - will overlook them.

"It seems as though Vietnam is signaling that it would be satisfied with sovereignty over the islands and to leave most of the South China Sea as high seas. The implication of Vietnam's perspective, were Vietnam to consolidate its claims at China's expense, is that most of the South China Sea would remain open for all states to fish and extract seabed resources," said Dutton. "That is not the effect of China's claims over the South China Sea."

At the same time, if China is attempting to counter this clever tactic by Vietnam, it is not doing a very effective job. In fact, China appears to be turning a blind eye to Vietnam here.

"This position presents China with an additional dilemma that it has not yet publicly begun to reconcile," said Dutton.

Beijing's decision to build a luxury resort in the Paracels in the South China Sea has not helped the situation.

"[Vietnam] demanded in early January 2010 that China abandon the project, which [it] said causes tension and further complicates the situation," said Yoshikawa.

Still, when Chen Bingde, chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and a member of the Central Military Commission, met with Nguyen Chi Vinh, Vietnam's deputy defense minister, in Beijing in early March, there was no mention of this dispute, not publicly anyway.

China has been diligent in other maritime matters despite any protests elsewhere. Just last month, for example, China finished work on the last of 13 permanent facilities on islands and reefs in the East China Sea as part of another intensive EEZ extension and development process. A new lighthouse at Waikejiao is the latest addition.

"Because Japan and China tend to look at foreign policy in a more relationship-oriented manner - rather than Washington's event-driven policies - if both countries are on good terms, which you can say for now, the Okinotori Island issue will be taken care of so that it does not dampen the relationship," said Yoshikawa.

Japan is not likely to suffer any consequences as it proceeds with its plans on Okinotori.

"I do not see that happening for the foreseeable future as this is a peripheral issue which is more likely to be affected by overall Sino-Japanese relations," said Yoshikawa.

Nevertheless, China has a very good reason for persisting in its efforts here, regardless if it annoys Japan or not.

"There is not much that China can do about Japan's claim, given China's own claims in the South China Sea," said Dutton. "However, China will probably continue to diplomatically object to Japan's claim in order to preserve Chinese freedom of military action in the waters surrounding Okinotori."

Notes: 1.) EAS CONGRESS 2009 HIGHLIGHTS , Nov 24, 2009
2.)Beijing slams Tokyo move on atoll, China Daily, Jan 8, 2010
3.)Japan and China Dispute a Pacific Islet , New York Times, July 10, 2005
4.) Japan atoll expansion 'hurts neighbors', China Daily, Feb 11, 2010
5.) Vietnam delimits its continental shelf in UN report. Vietnamnet, Aug 2009
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine.

Boat services suspended as level of Mekong plunges

2010-01-01T00:12:00.000+07:00

Asia One News
4 March 2010

Many large boats and ferries have had to suspend services on the Mekong River due to the extremely low water level.

No cargo ships have cruised up and down the stretch of the Mekong in Chiang Rai for several weeks.

"Big boats can only sail along the river with a depth of at least 2 metres but the Mekong is now running dry," Sanyan Piyanont, a 53-year-old boat operator, said yesterday.

Wassana Mongkhonklee, an executive of a transport company in Chiang Rai, said some products could not be shipped out.

"I believe the damage to the export sector is well over Bt100 million (S$4.28 million ) during the past month," she said.

Apisit Khampilo, Chiang Rai marine chief, said he had received many complaints that the Mekong was running so low that ship navigation was impossible.

"We're going to petition the Committee on Coordination of Commercial Navigation on the Lancang-Mekong River among China, Laos, Myanmar [Burma] and Thailand [JCCN] for help," he said.

He expects the JCCN to arrange negotiations to ensure that ship movements are possible along the entire stretch of the Mekong throughout the year.

Many people suspect that China-based dams are the main reasons the Mekong's water level has been getting so low this year.

Kanokwan Manorom, a lecturer at Ubon Ratchathani University, said the sinking water level in the Mekong had both economic and social repercussions.

"When farmers cannot rely on water from the Mekong, many of them will have to seek new jobs and change their way of life," she said.

China should think about the peoples of down-river countries too, she said.

If China agreed to become a member of the Mekong River Commission, all countries involved might be able to find solutions to the water-level crisis in the Mekong, she said.

Only Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are members of the commission.

"We have to hold forums to inform China that people down river are suffering. China should understand that the Mekong is an international level. It does not belong to China alone," she said.

On February 21, leisure cruises between Thailand's Chiang Rai and Laos' Luang Prabang also came to a halt.

"Some operators have continued their service by making extra efforts. They have to carefully avoid low spots. Instead of spending just 30 or 45 minutes in the river, their trip takes up to two hours," said Somsuk Khutakaphan, the Nakhon Phanom-based deputy chief of the Bueng Kan Customs Checkpoint.

If the Mekong continues to drop like this, motorised ferryboats will vanish from this international waterway within five years, he said.

Mongkhon Tansuwan, chairman of the Nakhon Phanom Chamber of Commerce, said the Mekong was just 35-centimetres deep in some places.

"This is the worst in three decades," he said.

Riverside resorts, which usually offer beds in floating rooms, now see their facilities resting on the exposed riverbed instead.

-The Nation/Asia News Network

Vietnamese boat attacked, robbed by Chinese

2010-01-01T00:11:00.000+07:00

7 February 2010
VietnamNet Bridge

VietNamNet Bridge - Fishermen in the central province of Quang Ngai have complained that a Chinese boat robbed and mistreated them as they were fishing off the Hoang Sa (Paracel) islands early this week, a local newswire reported Sunday.

According to the complaint submitted to Ly Son District’s Coast Guard Headquarters by fisherman Nguyen Chin, he and his crew of 15 were fishing in Vietnamese waters when a boat with a Chinese flag chased them on Tuesday.

When the Chinese boat caught up with Chin’s boat, around 20 people in army uniforms boarded the boat and pushed the Vietnamese fishermen to the prow before taking away over 500 kilograms of seafood.

“They also threw two drums of water to the sea, poured cold water on our rice container and asked us to go back to Vietnam’s coast,” Chin said, adding that they arrived home more than one day later.

A representative of the coast guard headquarters told the newswire they were verifying Chin’s allegations, and that the Quang Ngai coast guard had already reported the incident to provincial authorities.

Last year, more than a dozen boats in Quang Ngai were illegally stopped, robbed and mistreated in three attacks by the Chinese when they were fishing in Vietnamese waters, according to the news source.

In the meantime, the central province of Da Nang reported many Chinese boats continued fishing off Vietnam’s coast, local newspaper Tuoi Tre said on Saturday.

At least 130 boats were found illegally casting nets off the coast of Da Nang, Thua Thien-Hue, and Quang Tri provinces between last Saturday and Tuesday, it said.

The boats were chased off the waters, the Da Nang Coast Guard reported.

Early last month the coast guard headquarters had complained about the Chinese boats’ encroachment of Vietnamese waters, saying they detected the boats almost every day since late last year.

NGOs push for talks with Beijing on dam impact

2010-01-01T00:10:00.000+07:00

Bangkok Post
23 February 2010

The government has been urged to hold talks with Beijing on the impact of Chinese dams on the upper Mekong River following recent sharp drops in the river's water flow.

The Save the Mekong Coalition - an alliance of environmental groups and riverside communities monitoring ecological changes in the Mekong River - believes the unusually low level of the river is caused by Chinese dams.

"It's time for the Thai government to look into the impact of [Chinese] dams on downstream communities," the group said in a statement issued yesterday.

The group said a large number of people had been affected by the unusual river flow patterns since 1993 when Manwan, the first dam built on the upper Mekong, began to operate.

The Chinese government has built four mega-dams on the Mekong. The fourth - Xiaowan, which is the world's highest arch dam and the second largest hydroelectric power station in China after the Three Gorges Dam - was completed and began to store water last October.

Peerasak Intayos, of the Chiang Rai-based Mekong Conservation Group, said water levels in the Mekong had dropped sharply since Saturday, prompting tour boat operators to suspend services such as those between Chiang Rai and Luang Prabang in Laos.

The Royal Irrigation Department yesterday reported that water levels measured in Loei, Nong Khai and Nakhon Phanom provinces were at a "critical low".

Pianporn Deetes, of the Southeast Asia Rivers Network, urged the government to hold talks with Beijing on the situation.

"The Thai authorities must ask Beijing to disclose the amount of water stored by the dams to see if the water shortage has been caused by the dams' operations," she said.

"The government must also work with other Mekong countries to map out measures to help riverside folk."

China Reverts to Aggressive Stance in the South China Sea

2010-01-01T00:09:00.000+07:00

Epoch Times
Gary Feuerberg
22 February 2010

WASHINGTON—At an all-day hearing Feb. 4 on Capitol Hill, U.S. Congress Members and experts from the State and Defense Departments, and academia and non-government organizations, gave testimony on China’s activities in Southeast Asia, and the economic, strategic and security implications for the United States. Concerns by China’s mainland and maritime southern neighbors were discussed regarding China’s increasing willingness to use force and threats to back up its territorial claims.

The hearing was conducted by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), which advises the Congress on China’s activities.

“Especially in the South China Sea, China has become increasingly assertive—even provocative—towards its neighbors in regard to maritime issues,” said Dr. Richard Cronin, Henry L. Stimson Center. Dr. Cronin testified that it appears that China is switching back to its pre-1995 stance when it takes up military action to back up its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

“Since the 1950s, the PRC has claimed most of the South China Sea as Chinese maritime territory,” said Dr. Andrew Scobell, Texas A&M University.

“[Since late 2007] China has increased naval patrols, pressured foreign energy companies to halt operations in contested waters, [taken steps to appropriate the Paracel and Spratly islands,] and unilaterally imposed fishing bans in parts of the sea,” said Bronson Percival, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). Mr. Percival said that China insists that disputed claims are “bilateral issues,” i.e., between China and a weaker nation, and cannot be handled by “multilateral mechanisms.”

Last year China displayed highly aggressive conduct against US Navy vessels. In March 2009 the U.S. navy ship Impeccable in the South China Sea—in international waters—was interfered with by Chinese vessels and told to leave the area or “suffer the consequences,” testified Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). A similar incident occurred in June with the destroyer USS John S. McCain.

“There can be no mistaking what these moves mean. The [People’s Republic of China] is aggressively signaling through their actions, claiming dominance and control over the South China Sea,” said Rohrabacher. He adds that if China acts in this belligerent way to the U.S., one can only imagine what the threat must be to the countries in the region.

Robert Scher (l), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Southeast Asia, U.S. Department of Defense, and Robert Shear (r), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eastern Asia and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State. (Gary Feuerberg/Epoch Times)

“We strongly object to behavior that puts at risk the safety of our vessels and is a clear violation of international norms of behavior in ocean waters outside territorial seas,” stated Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher. He asserted that the U.S. rejects any attempt to restrict the freedom of the seas in EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones). Nearly 40 percent of the world’s oceans lie within the 200 nautical mile EEZs. Consequently, navigational rights must be preserved, according to Scher, for the sake of global economy and international peace.

Even though no standing army threatens China, it is building a massive military, which we ignore at our peril, said Congressman Rohrabacher. He referred to the anti-satellite missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles that China is developing, with the intention of denying us the ability to come to the aid of our regional allies.

According to Commissioner Larry M. Wortzel, who co-chaired this hearing, China’s growing naval capabilities is seen as a potential threat to the countries that have maritime territorial disputes with China—Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan. He said that during the Commission’s visit to Vietnam last December, they heard several times Vietnam’s concerns over China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea regarding territories claimed by both nations.

The consensus of all participants at the hearing was that the U.S. should be more engaged in the region and has a vital role in preventing China’s domination of the South China Sea and maintaining free passage of U.S. Armed forces and energy supplies.

ASEAN fears as China trade grows

In the 1990s, the Southeast Asian countries had fearful expectations of what China might do, especially with regard to territories in the South China Sea that China claims. Walter Lohman, director, Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, gave the examples of China’s confrontational actions with the Philippines over the disputed Spratly Islands and the 1995-96 missile crisis in the Taiwan traits. However, China in the late 1990s and in the early years after 2000, began to reverse its image by going on a “charm offensive,” becoming less ideological and emphasizing trade relations over territorial claims.

The five founders of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in 1967 were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, joined later by Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam. The aim was to bring about the economic, political and cultural integration of the region.

Dr. Ellen L. Frost (l) and Professor Donald E. Weatherbee (r) answer questions on Capitol Hill on China economic and strategic interests in SE Asia and the South China Sea. (Gary Feuerberg/Epoch Times)

China-ASEAN economic ties are growing each year and are likely to grow further under the China-ASEAN Free Trade (CAFTA) Agreement that became effective this year on Jan.1. Two-way trade between China and the 10 ASEAN countries reached $193 billion in 2008, which passed the U.S.’s $181 billion, and makes China now ASEAN’s third largest trading partner behind the European Union and Japan. “In terms of market size, the CAFTA ranks only behind the European Community and NAFTA,” said Professor Donald E. Weatherbee, University of South Carolina.

“According to the ASEAN Secretariat, trade between ASEAN and China has maintained an average growth of 26 percent a year since 2003,” said Walter Lohman from the Heritage Foundation. “…it can be expected that China’s trade will continue to grow at a faster rate than that of ASEAN’s other trading partners….China is already the largest trading partner of Malaysia and Vietnam and the second largest partner of the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Myanmar,” Prof. Weatherbee said.

The increased trade is on the whole welcomed by these nations, but China’s dominance in Asia has made these nations wary of its motives. Because the RMB is undervalued and China is unwilling to revalue it, “ASEAN exports [are] less competitive in global markets and Chinese imports—which will increase with CAFTA—more competitive in ASEAN domestic markets. Vietnam has already found it necessary to devalue its currency and other ASEAN countries, especially Thailand may have to follow suit,” said Professor Weatherbee. He also said that voices in Indonesia, ASEAN largest market, worry that cheaper Chinese imports will lead to massive job loss in the industrial, agricultural and fishery sectors.

The increased involvement of China in trade and investments gives China leverage that it didn’t have before. For example, China’s second ranking official, Xi Jinping, was in Phnom Penh for signing 14 economic assistance agreements between China and Cambodia when the latter country two days later forcibly repatriated 20 ethnic Uyghur refugees, who had been under UNHCR protection, said Professor Weatherbee.

Secretary Clinton: 'the United States is back'

All who testified spoke of the importance of maritime Southeast Asia to China and other nations that depend on navigating through the South China Sea. “The sea lanes that run through Southeast Asia are some of the world’s busiest and most strategically important…Last year 90 percent of foreign oil imported by China went through the Malacca Strait,” said Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David B. Shear.

Yet, the U.S. lacks a clear strategy for the region, according to those who testified.

“Most ASEAN governments are eager for deeper U.S. engagement. During the George W. Bush administration, there was a widespread perception that the United States only cared about fighting terrorism and was indifferent to other Southeast Asian needs,” testified Dr. Ellen Frost, from the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The Obama Administration has been making efforts to renew and expand U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. In July 2009 Secretary Clinton signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, reversing the Bush administration and giving a legal basis for US-ASEAN relations. Also in July she attended the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phuket Thailand, where she announced, “The United States is back.”

“Clinton’s statement was “clearly a response of concern that China’s involvement in the region was potentially destabilizing, especially in the Mekong Basin and the South China Sea,” said Dr. Cronin.

In November President Obama met with the ASEAN-10 during his visit to Singapore and attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leadership Meeting, which was the first meeting of an American president with all of the ASEAN heads of government. And on Feb.1, the White House announced that the President would be traveling to Indonesia and Australia in March.

China’s involvement in destructive infrastructure projects

The majority of Dr. Cronin’s written testimony discusses China’s decision to build eight hydropower dams on the Upper Mekong River, which he says will have devastating environmental effects on the Lower Mekong countries, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. He also blames the latter countries for being short-sighted for pursuing environmentally unsustainable development with plans to build 13 dams on the mainstream of the lower part of the Mekong.

“…the mainstream dams in both the Upper Mekong in China and Lower Mekong in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia [and Vietnam] will have an incalculable impact on human and food security and livelihoods in the whole Mekong Basin,” said Dr. Cronin. Preserving the fish stocks, which many depend upon for their livelihood and diet, is not compatible with mainstream dams.

Commenting in general about China’s aid to Southeast Asian nations, Ernest Z. Bower, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) said:

“Too often, Chinese funds are used to build unnecessary projects that serve political rather than practical requirements. These projects support local politicians rather than practical requirements.”

Opponents of Mekong dams campaign in Australia

2010-01-01T00:08:00.000+07:00

12 February 2010
ABC

Environmental activists from Thailand are in Australia to campaign against 11 new dams along the Mekong River.

In the region south of China, 60 million people rely on the Mekong River in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Oxfam Australia is assisting in the campaign.

Oxfam's Michael Simon says the proposed hydropower dams will block fish migration and flood rice paddies.

"Land is already extremely hard sought after, for plantations, logging, and for these people to be relocated away from the river, away from their livelihoods," he says.

"It's a well known global norm that people who are forced to resettle are pushed further into poverty."

Oxfam has sponsored a photo exhibition in Canbera and Melbourne, featuring the diversity of life on the Mekong.

It's on display at the High Court in Canberra until February 16, then at the State Library of Victoria.

Lyons: Underestimating China

2010-01-01T00:07:00.000+07:00

By Adm. James A. Lyons
12 February 2010
The Washington Times

On a recent visit to Australia, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus downplayed the threat posed by China's rapid modernization of its military forces, highlighted in Australia's 2009 Defense White Paper. With no discernable threat, China's unprecedented force modernization program has grown at a double-digit rate for the past 10 years.

Though China professes that the modernization of its military forces threatens no one and is only for defensive purposes, it is classic Chinese subterfuge. Every new weapons system it has acquired or developed is designed specifically to target or intimidate U.S. military forces. For example, China's development of an anti-ship ballistic missile is designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers - not some commercial container ship. It has purchased from Russia the Supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship cruise missile, which was designed specifically to strike our Aegis cruisers and destroyers. It has tripled to 36 the number of surface combatants carrying anti-ship cruise missiles.

China's strategic modernization program is no less impressive. Its four new nuclear missiles - some probably with multiple warheads - coupled with its recently demonstrated anti-ballistic-missile and anti-satellite intercept capability cannot be ignored. Nor can its development of a new strategic bomber and a fifth-generation fighter.

The building of underground submarine pens on Hainan Island, which can house both strategic and nuclear-attack submarines, cannot go unnoticed. By this year, China could have 60 attack submarines. Hainan Island's strategic location provides quick access to the critical sea lines of communication that lead to northeastern Asia and Australia, plus ready access to the broad reaches of the Western Pacific. This facility, coupled with China's illegal action to claim the entire South China Sea as part of its "historic waters," should be a wake-up call. Further, its unilateral claim of sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea, including the Paracels, Spratlys, Senkaku and Taiwan, provides substance to China's goal of dominating an island chain that includes Taiwan. Taiwan is the key to extending that dominance out to a second island chain that includes Guam.

The Australian Defense White Paper properly recognizes the threat posed by China to Australia's national security and also highlights the adverse impact it could have on U.S. naval and Marine forces in the Western Pacific. Australia places its security not only on its own self-reliant military forces, but on the strategic underpinnings provided by its most important ally, the United States. In that sense, Australia is concerned about the reduction in U.S. strategic forces and the lack of a modernization program. The extension of the U.S. strategic umbrella is critical to Australia, as it is to our other friends and allies in the region, including Japan and South Korea.

According to reports, Mr. Mabus stated that the immediate challenges to stability across the Pacific did not stem from China's growing naval power, but the threat from pirates, terrorists and illegal fishing. This view obviously reflects the Obama administration's new strategy of not preparing for major conflicts, which is a formula for disaster. Further, it plays into the China propaganda line that its modernization is only for defensive purposes. China goes on to state that it has never committed aggression against anyone. This propaganda is repeated by pro-China supporters, plus a line attributed to Henry Kissinger that "military imperialism is not China's style." Then China's aggression in Tibet, Vietnam, India, Russia and the South China Sea must have been aberrations.

How much further will Chinese imperialism reach, when, by the end of this decade, it could have multiple aircraft carriers, a growing large-ship amphibious navy, near nuclear parity should the president succeed with further U.S. nuclear warhead reductions, and growing numbers of fifth-generation fighters? It's not just this picture that worries some of our Australian allies, but also the refusal of the Obama administration to see how it may be accelerating a growing threat.

I agree with Mr. Mabus that our commitment to the Western Pacific region must remain absolute. Many of the programs that need to be supported to enhance that commitment go beyond the Navy's budget.

Our recently announced sale of the Patriot defensive weapon system to Taiwan was a good start, but more needs to be done. Taiwan also needs F-16 fighters now, then fifth-generation F-35s later this decade, and submarines. We should never let Chinese bluster - like its threat to cease its mostly useless "assistance" to end Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs - interrupt American aid to democratic Taiwan. The Navy budget needs to include funding for a 12th aircraft carrier, plus funding for a core surface naval force that is imbedded with the capabilities of a Zumwalt-class destroyer to counter known and future threats.

Unlike Mr. Mabus, I can see clearly that China is a real and growing threat to U.S. naval forces in Asia, to U.S. allies and friends such as Taiwan and to freedom of navigation in the maritime and outer-space realms. Denying these facts will not make China go away and will not impress our allies.

Retired Navy Adm. James A. Lyons was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations.

Chinese patrol boat seizes fisherman's catch

2010-01-01T00:06:00.000+07:00

8 February 2010
Earth Times

Hanoi - A Chinese patrol boat stole a Vietnamese fishing catch last week, Vietnamese officials said Monday. Trinh Phuoc, head of a Vietnamese Coastal Border Guard post in the central province of Quang Ngai, said a fishing boat with a 16-man crew was stopped February 2 by a Chinese patrol near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.

The boat's owner and captain, Nguyen Chin, reported that 10 to 20 Chinese, some of them in uniform, boarded his boat and seized about 500 kilograms of fish, a navigation device, spare parts and tools. Vietnamese officials said they were not yet sure how they would respond.

"We don't know what to do about this news," said Vo Van Huyen, chairman of the Ly Son Island's People's Committee. "We have reported it to higher authorities."

The online newspaper VnExpress quoted Chin as saying the Chinese had dumped his fresh water supply into the sea and poured water into the crew's rice supplies before telling him to return home. Over the past year, Chinese naval patrols have seized several Vietnamese fishing boats and detained fishermen in the South China Sea.

In August and October, they arrested fishermen who tried to shelter in the disputed Paracel Islands during storms. Tensions over sovereignty in the South China Sea have risen since last year when countries submitted their official territorial claims to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing rejected submissions by Malaysia, Vietnam and other countries as violating its own claims in the area.

The area surrounding the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea is believed to contain substantial undersea oil and mineral deposits.

Vietnam Enlists Allies to Stave Off China’s Reach

2010-01-01T00:04:00.000+07:00

By Edward Wong
New York Times
4 February 2010

HANOI, Vietnam — The archipelago called the Paracel Islands lies in the South China Sea 250 miles off the east coast of Vietnam, a series of rocks and reefs and spits of land that, to the undiscerning eye, appear as valuable as broken coral washed up on a beach.

But that archipelago and the nearby Spratly Islands are rich in oil and natural gas deposits, and so they are coveted by the nations that form a wide arc around the South China Sea. China, Taiwan and Vietnam have competing claims in the Paracels, while all three and the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have claims on the Spratlys or the waters surrounding them.

The most vociferous are Vietnam and its traditional rival, China. Indeed, no issue between them is more emotional or more intractable.

Tensions crept up another notch last month, after China announced plans to develop tourism in the Paracels, which the Chinese military has controlled since 1974. It was an inauspicious start to what the two governments had officially labeled their “Year of Friendship.”

The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry loudly denounced China’s move, as it usually does in these situations. But quietly, Vietnam has been doing more than just complaining; it has laid the groundwork for another strategy to pry the islands from China’s grasp.

Vietnam is pushing hard behind the scenes to bring more foreign players into negotiations so that China will have to bargain in a multilateral setting with all Southeast Asian nations that have territorial claims in the South China Sea. This goes against China’s preference, which is to negotiate one on one with each country.

In other words, Vietnam wants all parties at the same table to stave off China, the behemoth. This strategy of “internationalizing” the issue is one that smaller Asian countries like Vietnam may adopt more often as they wrangle with the Chinese juggernaut on many fronts. The thinking is: As China’s political power in the world expands, smaller nations will gain leverage over China only if they force it to negotiate in multilateral forums.

Vietnamese officials “are internationalizing the issue, and they’re doing it in a quiet way, not in a direct way,” said Carlyle A. Thayer, a scholar of Southeast Asia and maritime security at the Australian Defense Force Academy. “They say they want to solve it peacefully, but let the international community raise the issue.”

Analysts say a big test for this strategy will come this year, as Vietnam takes over the leadership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean. Vietnam is likely to use its position to try to persuade the countries to join territorial negotiations with China, analysts say. In November, Vietnam held a conference in Hanoi, its capital, where 150 scholars and officials from across Asia came to discuss disputes in the South China Sea — an opening salvo in the new strategy, analysts say.

“The kind of thing that I took away was that developments in the South China Sea had either deteriorated or had the potential to deteriorate,” said Mr. Thayer, who attended the workshop.

American military and intelligence officials say the South China Sea, which has some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, is growing as a security concern because Beijing is increasingly emboldened to flex its naval muscles there. In the past two years, China has been more aggressive in asserting control over the area — detaining Vietnamese fishermen, increasing sea patrols and warning foreign oil companies away from working with Vietnam.

The United States takes no sides in these disputes, but American officials “remain concerned about tension between China and Vietnam, as both countries seek to tap potential oil and gas deposits that lie beneath the South China Sea,” Scot Marciel, a deputy assistant secretary of state, said in July while testifying before Congress. Mr. Marciel added that China had shown a “growing assertiveness” in regard to what it deemed its maritime rights.

Tensions over such rights plague China’s relations with many of its neighbors. Just last month, Japan protested Chinese plans to develop gas fields in the East China Sea.

For the Vietnamese, the South China Sea dispute is so emotional that it unites virtually all of them under an anti-China nationalist banner, even those in exile who usually abhor Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party. In Houston, a South Vietnamese enclave usually hostile to the Vietnamese government, a pop band proudly calls itself Hoang Sa, the Vietnamese name for the Paracels.

In December, Vietnam asked China to return fishing boats and other equipment seized from fishermen detained by the Chinese military near the islands. One Vietnamese news organization has estimated that China detained 17 vessels and 210 fishermen last year; the fishermen have all been released.

Also in December, the Vietnamese prime minister signed an arms deal in Russia that reportedly included the purchase of six diesel-electric submarines for $2 billion, presumably to be used in the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, China has agreed to continue talks with Vietnam, but it is willing to discuss only joint development of the area, not sovereignty rights. And it refuses to negotiate with all the relevant Southeast Asian nations in any multilateral way.

“There would be too many countries involved,” said Xu Liping, a scholar of Southeast Asia at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing.

Do Tien Sam, a scholar of China at the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, said the Vietnamese government believed the exact opposite, that the “negotiations should involve discussions between at least five countries.”

“They all need to sit down,” Mr. Do said.

The conference here in November was not an official site for talks but rather a workshop intended partly to explore multilateral approaches to the issue. Despite China’s resistance to such approaches, several scholars from research groups in Beijing attended.

Some analysts are skeptical of whether Vietnam will get any traction with its new strategy, especially if it decides to press the issue as it presides over Asean. The association has members that have no stake in the fight, like Cambodia and Myanmar.

“Vietnam’s approach faces real obstacles,” said M. Taylor Fravel, a political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has written a book on China’s territorial issues. “It is hard to see how consensus can be built within Asean short of a major armed clash involving Chinese forces.”

China and Vietnam: Clashing Over an Island Archipelago

2010-01-01T00:02:00.000+07:00

By Ishaan Tharoor
14 January 2010
Time.com

In the realm of geopolitical disputes, the barren Paracel Islands are a far cry from the mountains of Kashmir or the alleys of Gaza. Claimed by both China and Vietnam, the archipelago comprises some 30 tiny spits of land in the middle of the South China Sea with innocuous names like Woody Island and Antelope Reef. No one lives there, nor has there been any evidence that lucrative natural resources lie beneath its lagoons and reefs. But, experts say, at a time when regional economies are booming — and nationalist sentiments swelling — the Paracels and the heavily contested Spratly islands further south remain a flashpoint in this part of the world, where the traditional balance of power is tilting further toward China.

Tensions flared most recently last week when the Chinese government announced it would begin developing high-end tourism on a few of the Paracels as part of an ambitious new plan to draw tourists from around the world to Hainan, a Chinese island province off the mainland's southern coast. But while planners dream of creating a Chinese Hawaii — with the Paracels' clear waters a potential luxury destination for divers — the leaked proposal made Hanoi bristle almost instantly. China has retained de facto control over the archipelago since seizing it in its entirety with gunboats in 1974, but Vietnam has stubbornly clung to its long-standing territorial claims over the archipelago. On Jan. 4, a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman said the possibility of Chinese tourists snorkeling around a Paracel cove "seriously violates Vietnam's sovereignty." Chinese officials dismissed the Vietnamese protests, saying the matter was purely one of China's own economic development.

The spat may be a minor compared to incidents in the past — the two countries fought a bloody border war in 1979, and in 1988 a naval battle near the Spratlys left 70 Vietnamese sailors dead. But it comes amid a steady buildup of Chinese might in the region. Ralf Emmers, an expert on the South China Sea and associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, says the Chinese tourism gambit is a move "to make its sovereignty claims over these islands a fait accompli." Vietnam watchers point to an escalation of tensions since the 2007 completion of a strategic Chinese submarine base on Hainan Island, just over 124 miles (200 km) from Vietnam's eastern shore. The base has enabled Beijing to project its power not only in its own backyard, but further into the Pacific and Indian oceans as well. Last year, China detained 25 Vietnamese fishermen found near the Paracels, who were released only after weeks of demonstrations in Vietnam. Chinese officials also allegedly pressured multinational oil companies to eschew tying up deals with Hanoi to explore for resources in the South China Sea, or, as Vietnam calls it, Bien Dong (East Sea). (See pictures of the China-Vietnam border war.)

Vietnamese prickliness at what many see as Chinese encroachment has led to Hanoi beefing up its own naval capabilities. Last month, it penned a landmark $2 billion deal with Moscow to acquire six Kilo-class Russian submarines. The government is also formulating plans to improve its coastal-defense operations and to better protect Vietnamese fishing fleets. Still, considering China's size and wealth, there's little talk of an arms race in the region. "Vietnam is subject to the tyranny of geography. It's like a mid-sized Chinese province," says Carl Thayer, an authority on the Vietnamese military at the Australian Defence Force Academy. "If the elephant really decides to move, the Vietnamese will be squashed."

Open conflict, of course, is unlikely given the scale of economic integration in Southeast Asia. Sino-Vietnamese relations in most arenas are as robust as they've ever been. But observers are concerned that governments have yet to come up with an effective way to arbitrate this maritime dispute. In 2002, China signed a code of conduct with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Vietnam is a member, pledging to refrain from activities that would destabilize the fragile status quo in the South China Sea. Few parties have kept to the spirit of the agreement. The Spratlys, an island chain far larger than the Paracels, are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and nominally by Taiwan, and resemble a Risk game board with territories grabbed pell-mell over the years in a scramble for land and influence. Malaysia has set up a diving resort on one of its own reefs, while most other nations have military posts on their islands. "The ASEAN model has been more or less useless," says Simon Shen, a professor of international relations at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. "The official discourse is [for claimant nations] to co-develop [the islands], but this is almost impossible given the nationalism the dispute inspires."

In China and Vietnam, in particular, nationalist netizens have pressured their governments to remain firm on issues of sovereignty. Both sides have dredged up archival evidence supposedly linking these clusters of uninhabited rocks in the sea to the glories of ancient dynasties and Emperors. For Hanoi, the matter has become especially sensitive as an array of dissidents — from Buddhist monks to activists protesting bauxite-mining — have taken up the cause of the archipelagoes, accusing the ruling Communist Party of selling out to China with every act of acquiescence. "The Vietnamese leadership is burning a candle on both ends," says Thayer. "They have to balance the reality of the situation against rising national sentiment and hope they don't get burned."

Walking such a precarious tightrope means Hanoi — as well as other governments claiming the Spratlys and the Paracels — have to measure their actions carefully. "The real risk in the South China Sea," says Emmers, "is that of a miscalculation that could lead to skirmishes and a clash of arms." As signs of meaningful cooperation are few, most expect this tacit consolidation of interests — including China's economic expansion into the Paracels — to continue. How this chess game plays out may have broader ramifications as the Chinese military extends its clout and influence in the coming decades. "It's an interesting showcase for what the future of Chinese naval power may look like," says Emmers. "And not just in the South China Sea."

Vietnam condemns China tourism plan for archipelago

2010-01-01T00:01:00.000+07:00

AFP
8 January 2010

HANOI - Vietnam has condemned what it says is a Chinese plan to develop tourism on the disputed Paracel archipelago.

The Paracels would be included in China's plan to develop nearby Hainan island into an international tourist site, Vietnamese foreign ministry spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga said in a statement late Monday.

China announced its intention on December 31, the ministry said.

Nga demanded China immediately end the plan which "causes tension and further complicates the East Sea situation".

Vietnam and China have a long-standing dispute over sovereignty of the Paracels and a more southerly archipelago, the Spratlys. Both are in the South China Sea, which Vietnam calls the East Sea.

On Tuesday, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said Beijing had "taken note" of the Vietnamese protest.

She added: "I want to reiterate that China has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratleys and the Paracels."

In December, Vietnam and Russia signed a major arms deal which reportedly involves the purchase of six submarines. Analysts said the deal aims to bolster Hanoi's claims against China over the potentially resource-rich islands.

Vietnam says its policy is to ensure a peaceful outcome to the maritime disputes.

Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands by Monique Chemillier-Gendreau

2010-01-01T00:00:00.001+07:00

Book:
Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands by Monique Chemillier-Gendreau

Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Annexes1-6
Annexes7-18
Annexes19-43

VietWill to demonstrate for UN attention on China's aggression in South China Sea

2008-01-18T03:00:00.001+07:00

VietWill Press Release (VietWill.org)
Berkeley, CA
18 July 2008

Vietnam assumes the president's seat at the United Nations Security Council in July 2008. This event marks a significant hope for many nations in the new world order since it means a small country like Vietnam can make certain level of impact on the outcome of international security issues. This month, Le Luong Minh being Vietnam's Ambassador to the U.N., sets the agenda to discuss for a possible U.N. sanctions against Zimbabwe and the like, and yet no mention about Vietnam's "sore," the South China Sea dispute.

It was the hope of VietWill that Vietnam would take this opportunity in which international attention is focused on it to put forth the issue of the conflict in the South China Sea, in which the Beijing government is seen to be the primary antagonist in pursuit to control the sea and the resources both proven and unproven that lies beneath Paracel and Spratly islands. However, in its first time taking the president's seat, this issue was nowhere to be seen on Vietnam's agenda.

Regretting the loss of this opportunity, VietWill sees it fit to voice its concerns this time to the world about the dangers of a Chinese hegemony in the region. At the Asia security conference in May, the U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates himself cautioned Beijing on its bullying of its neighbors which he sugarcoated using the term "coercive diplomacy". Taking advantage of the weakness of the individual Southeast Asian countries and the ASEAN's disunited response toward the issue, China is slowly but surely making gains on its quest for control of the region, despite such control is neither justified by historical title nor modern international maritime law.

China forcefully seized both the Paracel and part of the Spratly Islands from Vietnam and the Philippines in recent history, as well as drawing undefined borders around virtually all of the South China Sea. The dispute involves 5 different countries in the region, but any suggestion for a fair resolution through international arbitration, such as the International Court of Justice would be squarely rejected by Beijing. At the same time, China is in a position to threaten severe negative economic and political consequences to its neighbors if they were to take a firm stand toward its aggression. Thus, China's "coercive diplomacy" euphemistically speaking, or "playground bullying", as is the case, becomes the primary method for Beijing to take grab of the land and water resources in the South China Sea at the peril of its smaller neighbors. This bullying has recently gotten more intense with the discovery of a new Chinese nuclear submarine base on the island of Hainan, right on the doorstep of the nuclear-free zone of Southeast Asia, as designated by the 1995 Bangkok Treaty signed by 10 SEA countries.

In light of a need to call for attention to China's aggression in the South China Sea and to urge for more daring and collaborative actions from affected countries, such as the ASEAN bloc, the European Union, NATO, Japan, Korea, and the United States, VietWill will hold a demonstration in front of the United Nations office in San Francisco and New York in July in order to publicize Beijing's unjustified aggression in the South China Sea.

VietWill believes that on the occasion that Vietnam, one of the countries most affected by China's "bullyism", takes the president's seat on the U.N. Security Council, it is a timely opportunity for concerned individuals and groups to bring this matter to the forefront attention so that the day that this matter makes its way onto the U.N. agenda, and even to the ICJ would be sooner rather than later.

What will Nguyen Tan Dung talk to Bush about?

2008-01-18T03:00:00.000+07:00

By Tony Le

19 June 2008

On June 17th the White House announced that next week, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung will visit the U.S. on a three day trip starting on Tuesday. Dung will come to the White House to meet with President George Bush, and the two are scheduled to discuss ways to boost cooperation in education, energy, climate change and food security, among other things.

It is unclear whether China will be mentioned in the discussion between the two leaders. However, if it doesn’t, it’s another opportunity lost as far as I am concerned because in the issue of energy, the new bully on the block is none other than Beijing. The Chinese government is doing its best to secure future energy supplies by entering into close relationships with all sorts of rogue governments in both Africa and Asia. It is trying to build up its influence over the Indian Ocean in competition with India, vying for control of the East China Sea with Japan and Korea, and outright claiming nearly all of the South China Sea and the islands in it.

It is a good sign that Nguyen Tan Dung is going to the meet Bush. Most likely there will be Vietnamese Americans who want to hold protests, as they have done with other top level visits from Vietnamese leaders in the past, because they are concerned with human rights issues and other matters in Vietnam. But they’re probably not opposed to Nguyen Tan Dung visiting the U.S. itself.

And they shouldn’t. After all, heads of states have a righ to visit each other’s countries. In this case, I just hope that the Vietnamese Prime Minister takes the opportunity to discuss with Bush about what China is doing in Asia and maybe the two governments can agree to work towards a more proactive American role in the Pacific to counter against the new aspiring superpower on the block.

Vietnam doesn’t need to be the U.S.’s next best friend in Southeast Asia. However, a strategic collaboration is not such a terrible way to go. Vietnam probably knows by now that the U.S. doesn’t necessarily want to take over the country, so it can shed these once very pronounced fears from its consciousness. And there is no shame in admitting that the U.S. still has a leadership role in the Pacific, and this role needs to be reaffirmed in light of recent developments in the Chinese military agenda.

On this trip, if Dung does not forget to include the topic of the Eastern Sea and China’s aggression in the region in the topics of discussion, then we can say that the trip was worthwhile. However, if Vietnam is slow in gathering allies on its side in the face of China’s advances in the region, and the U.S. keeps slacking off in asserting its leadership role in the Pacific, then the results will be quite unfortunate not only for Vietnam and Southeast Asia, but even for the U.S. itself.

The solution for the Spratly Islands ought to look like this

2008-01-18T02:37:00.000+07:00

By Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel Ludwig
International Herald Tribune
10 October 1995

HONOLULU: China's pledge in July, at the annual meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations, that it would negotiate disputes over ownership of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea according to international law, and discuss the issue with ASEAN as a group, has set the stage for a solution.

The six claimants — China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei — start fresh talks with Indonesian officials this Tuesday to try to ease renewed tension over the disputed area, a potentially rich zone for undersea oil and natural gas.

What does international law say about possible solutions? The main guidance is provided by previous international agreements, rulings by the International Court of Justice, and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing has said it will use the convention as a basis for negotiations, although of the six claimants only the Philippines and Vietnam have actually ratified it.

The precedents in international law suggest that all the claims to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands — a group of tiny islets, sand cays and reefs scattered widely over the southern sector of the South China Sea — are weak.

The historic record supporting the claims of China, Taiwan and Vietnam is incomplete and intermittent, and would probably be unconvincing to the International Court of Justice.

None of the claims to the Spratlys, including the more recent claims of Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, is supported by the requisite continuous and effective control, administration and governance.

Even if some of the sovereignty claims were to prevail, these tiny outcrops in the sea do not appear to be legally qualified to generate surrounding exclusive economic zones out to 200 nautical miles, or the even more extensive continental shelves. According to the Law of the Sea Convention, rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own cannot be the basis for such zones; nor can artificial islands.

Only some 26 features in the Spratly chain are above water at high tide. The largest has a land area of less than half a square kilometer, and only six others are bigger than 0.1 square kilometer. None of them has ever sustained a permanent population. Vietnam has already taken the position that these islets should not generate extended maritime zones, and other countries in the region seem to be moving toward this view.

Even if the Spratlys were deemed to be the source of extended zones, they would not have equal weight to do so in relation to the larger land masses that surround the South China Sea. The International Court of Justice and other tribunals have consistently ruled that small islands do not play an equal role in determining maritime boundaries, and sometimes are ignored altogether.
For example, Vietnam and Malaysia have continental shelf claims extending well into the Spratly area, and these claims would be considered superior to any claims based on the islets.

If the court were asked to determine the maritime boundaries in the area, it would probably define the area in dispute, measure relevant coastlines and identify significant geographical features to be taken into account. It would develop provisional boundaries based roughly on median lines, check to see whether those lines violated "equitable principles," focusing in particular on the relative coastline lengths and relying on a rough sense of fairness to each claimant. It would then adjust the lines accordingly.

In a maritime boundary settlement following such principles and ignoring the Spratlys and the Paracel Islands in the northern part of the South China Sea (which Chinese forces seized from Vietnam in 1974), China-Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines would gain roughly equal areas.

Although most of the Macclesfield Bank southeast of the Paracels would go to China-Taiwan, it would not get any of the Spratly geologic block further to the south. The Philippines would get the northwestern portion of the Spratlys, including the Reed Bank. Malaysia would get two sizable sectors off its states of Sarawak and Sabah separated by Brunei's narrow corridor.

Sovereignty over the Spratlys themselves might be allocated based on the sector in which they are situated, or might eventually fall to the present occupants. But in either case, sovereignty would be limited because the islets would generate only a 500-meter safety zone or perhaps a territorial sea out to 12 nautical miles. The Spratlys would be demilitarized and open to access for peaceful purposes by other claimants.

If the claimants could not agree to an allocation scheme, the UN Law of the Sea Convention requires them to establish a provisional arrangement. The convention also urges cooperation in semi-enclosed seas as well as sharing of the resources in areas beyond 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones.
These principles taken together favor a dramatically different option — multilateral joint development of an agreed area.

One logical approach would be for China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei to set aside their claims for now and establish a multilateral Spratly Management Authority.

The authority would administer the contested area, which could be defined in several possible ways. Our preferred option would be to define it as the area beyond a line halfway between the coastline of the South China Sea and the disputed features in the Spratlys.

The claimant states could be given weighted voting shares in a governing council and financial responsibility in the authority in rough relationship either to their coastline lengths or the original extent of their claims. In either case, China-Taiwan would have a substantial portion of shares, benefits and costs.
Decisions would normally be made by consensus, but when voting became necessary, substantive decisions on matters affecting the entire area would be taken by a two-thirds vote of the assigned shares.

Decisions affecting a particular location might require a majority of the votes in the governing council as well as a majority of the claimants to the affected area. Nonclaimant states in the region — and perhaps concerned maritime nations outside the region — might have a voice, but not a vote, in the operation of the Spratly Management Authority.

The multilateral joint development solution to the Spratlys imbroglio should be attractive, since all claimants would be sharing in the proceeds from the exploitation of resources in and under the disputed waters. The continuing discord and threat of conflict now dominating the region are discouraging investors.

If a cooperative solution could be developed, the claimants would be working together to explore and develop oil and gas, manage fisheries and maintain environmental quality. Such cooperation would greatly reduce the chances of miscalculation and dangerous confrontation.

Other powers not involved in the Spratlys dispute, including the United States and Japan, would be highly supportive because safety and freedom of navigation would be assured through the South China Sea, which is an important maritime highway for naval and commercial shipping of many nations.

Mr. Valencia is a senior fellow in the program on international economics and politics at the East-West Center in Hawaii. Mr. Van Dyke and Mr. Ludwig are specialists on international law and resources at the University of Hawaii. They contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

China's "historic waters" in the South China Sea: an analysis from Taiwan, R.O.C.

2008-01-18T02:35:00.002+07:00

By Yann-huei Song , Academia Sinica, Taiwan
and Peter Kien-hong Yu, National Sun Yat-sen University
American Asian Review Vol. 12, N.. 4, Winter, 1994 (pp. 83-101)

In January 1948, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) of the Republic of China (ROC) officially published a map-Nanhai zhudao weizhi tu (Map of Locations of South China Sea Islands)-on which a "U"-shaped line was drawn to enclose a large part of the waters of the South China Sea. 1 The four groups of South China Sea islands, namely, the Pratas (Dongsha), the Paracels (Xisha), the Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), and the Spratlys (Nansha), were enclosed by the line. Because no protests or opposition were expressed by the states concerned or the international community in general after the map was published, and the legal status of the enclosed waters has never been clarified by the ROC, questions concerning the nature of this "U"-shaped boundary line continue to be raised. Particularly since the naval skirmish between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in March 1988, questions regarding the legal status of the "U"-shaped line have been raised, with different opinions among scholars specializing in international law and politics in the ROC on Taiwan on what the line represents. 2 Recently scholars, and even government officials, from Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have began to raise questions about the "U"-shaped line. 3

Given the fact that the South China Sea territorial dispute has become one of the most important security problems in the region, and that the Chinese claim to a large part of the South China Sea as its "historic waters" will have a tremendous impact on the future delimitation of maritime boundaries in the area, deepening animosity among the six claimants-the PRC, the ROC, the SRV, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei-there is an urgent need to explore the issue thoroughly.

This article will examine the legal question of Taipei's claim to the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the "U"-shaped line as its "historic waters." After a discussion of the emergence and development of the ROC's claim, the concept and definition of historic waters will be examined. Thereafter, the nature of the "U"-shaped line and the legal status of the waters enclosed by the line will be considered. Finally, the potential impact of the ROC's claim on its relations with other Southeast Asian states will be evaluated.

The "U"-shaped Line and China's "Historic Waters"

After France reasserted claims to the Paracels in 1931 and the Spratly islands in 1933, it was generally agreed that China had to take actions to defend its sovereignty over the island groups in the South China Sea. 4 As a result, a Review Committee for Sea and Land Maps was established in June 1933. Four months later, a revised "Review Regulation for Sea and Land Maps" was issued by the Executive Yuan of the ROC. In December 1934, the Committee started to review the names of South China Sea islands in both Chinese and English. And in April 1935, the Zhongguo Nanhai gedao yu tu (Map of the Islands of the South China Sea), believed to lye the first official Chinese map of the South China Sea, was published by the governments. 5

Between 1946 and 1947, the MOI conducted a further study of the situation in the South China Sea and, based upon information collected by the Nationalist navy, published a "Cross Reference Table of the New and Old Names of the South China Sea Islands" in December 1947, listing 159 islands or islets. In January 1948, the "Map of Locations of South China Sea Islands" on which a "U"-shaped line was drawn to encircle the four larger groups of the South China Sea islands as well as their surrounding waters was officially Published and became available to the public. Since then, this "U"-shaped line has been used in Chinese maps for the purpose of showing the boundary limit of the Chinese maritime areas and the Chinese claim to the South China Sea islands. 6 The line was drawn "arbitrarily" and there was no precise delimitation of this line by coordinates. However, for over four decades, no protests were issued by neighboring countries, whose interests were involved in the area encircled by the line, or by the international community in general. Scholars, Chinese or foreign, specializing in ocean law and politics, did not examine the question either. Although occasionally mentioning that the line indicated China's claim to the islands and maritime areas in the South China Sea, no one, to our knowledge, ever raised a question concerning the line during that time. Neither the ROC nor PRC governments clarified the nature of the line or the legal status of the waters enclosed. In recent years, however, the question was raised both in Taiwan and mainland China, and by other concerned states.

About one year after the naval skirmish between the PRC and Vietnam in 1988, the ROC's MOI established an ad hoc committee to help determine the basepoints and baselines to be used for measuring the breadth of the ROC's territorial seas. At the same time, another ad hoc committee was set up to help draft the ROC's laws on the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the territorial seas.7 It was these two ad hoc committees that raised the question of "historic waters" and the legal nature of the "U"-shaped line, but committee members were divided over the issue.
One group argued that the waters encircled by the "U"-shaped line should be claimed as China's historic waters. The reasons given were twofold: First no protests or opposition were issued when the map became available to the Public in 1948; and second, the claim to the enclosed waters as historic waters did not violate Article 47 (1) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which provides:

An archipelagic State may draw archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.

A second group opposed this position, arguing that China's historic waters claim could hardly be justified: The "U"-shaped line was drawn arbitrarily and it was impossible to locate the line at sea because of the lack of coordinates, causing difficulties in determining the legal status of the claimed waters. Also, the concept of "historic waters" was outdated and can hardly be used to support Taipei's claim." However, when the committee drafted Article 3 of the Draft Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the ROC it adopted the view that the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line are China's "historic waters."" Moreover, in the preamble of the Guidelines for Nanhai (South China Sea) Policy, approved by the Executive Yuan in April 1993, the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line were claimed as Chinese territory, subject to the jurisdiction of the ROC." Furthermore, in September 1993, a two-day conference on the South China Sea was held in Taipei and both the Interior Minister and the Premier, during the opening ceremony, reiterated that the waters of the South China Sea have long been the ROC's historic waters. 13 Although the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line are claimed as China's historic waters, the legal status of the area remains to be clarified-are they "internal waters," "territorial sea," "archipelagic waters," or something else ?

The question regarding the legal status of the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line has not only been raised by ROC scholars, but also by scholars from the member states of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For example, Dr. Hasjim Djalal, the former Director General of the Research and Development Agency and Indonesia's Ambassador to Germany, and Dr. B. A. Hamzah, Director General of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs (MIMA) both challenged Chinese claims at the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea hosted by Indonesia." Hamzah argued:

There are parties which have claimed the entire South China Sea as their own on the basis of antiquity. Such claims cannot be serious nor treated with much respect . . . . By no stretch of imagination can the South China Sea be considered by any nations as its internal waters or historic lake as a basis to assert claim. Since such area claims are frivolous, unreasonable and illogical, I urge the Parties concerned to drop area claims and focus instead on their claim to islands and non-islands. I would also urge all parties to reject claims to the entire South China Sea (referring to area claims) as there is no basis in law or history.15

Given the developments outlined above, the legal status of the waters of the South China Sea encircled by the "U"shaped line and claimed by the ROC as its historic waters must be examined. Before considering the legal status of the claimed waters, it is useful to briefly introduce the legal regime of historic waters under international law.

The Concept and Definition of Historic Waters

According to the Yearbook of the Intentional Law Commission, the concept of "historic waters" :
has its root in the historic fact that States through ages claimed and maintained sovereignty over maritime areas which they considered vital to them without paying much attention to divergent and changing opinions about what general international law might prescribe with respect to the delimitation of the territorial sea. 16

Another study concluded that the doctrine of "historic waters" :

developed from that of historic bays which had emerged during the 19th century for the protection of certain large bays closely linked to the surrounding land area and traditionally considered by claiming States as part of their national territory. 17

Although the development of the concept of "historic waters" is closely related to the legal regime of historic bays, the terms "historic waters" and "historic bays" are not synonymous, "Historic waters" has a wider scope than "historic bays." Historic title can not only be applied to waters such as bays, but also to territorial seas, straits, archipelagos, and to all those waters which can generally be included in the maritime area of a coastal state .18

Although both concepts can be traced back to the 19th century, no generally accepted definitions exist for the two terms and the legal regimes of "historic bays" and "historic waters" have never been spelled out in any international conventions. In 1958, when the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1) was held in Geneva, the question concerning the meaning of the terms "historic bays" and "historic waters" was raised by the delegations from Japan, Panama, and India, as well as others. However, mainly because the participants generally believed that the Conference had neither sufficient material nor time to deal with the problem properly, the UNCLOS I ended by adopting a resolution requesting the UN to arrange for the study of the legal regime of "historic waters," including "historic bays." Although the UNCLOS I decided not to address the question concerning the definition of the two terms, it inserted safeguard provisions in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone adopted in the Conference, thereby recognizing the legitimacy of both "historic waters" and "historic bays."
In 1962, the UN Secretariat published a study, entitled "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays" in Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 19 The study cited the Fisheries Case between the United Kingdom and Norway to support the theory that "historic waters" are not limited to bays. The study suggested that title to "historic waters" should be considered independently on its own merits and when the theory of "historic waters" is considered, "one should avoid . . . bas[ing] any proposed principles or rules on the alleged exceptional character of such waters." 'the study also examined the elements of title to "historic waters," the issues of burden of proof, the legal status of waters regarded as "historic waters," and the settlement of disputes. However, it points out that, although the discussion of the principles and rules of international law relating to the legal regime seems to justify a number of conclusions, some of the conclusions are "highly tentative and more in the nature of bases of discussion than results of an exhaustive investigation of the matter. 1121, Regrettably, the International Law Commission (ILC) did not pursue the question of the legal regime of "historic waters" or "historic bays."

During the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 111) from 1973 to 1982, a "draft article concerning territorial sea: bays, the coasts of which belong to a single state, historic bays or other historic waters" was proposed by Colombia .21 However, the legal regimes of "historic waters" and "historic bays" were not considered during the Conference. There are two possible reasons for this. First, the twelve-mile territorial sea limit had generally been accepted by most coastal states, which made it possible to place the waters concerned under a state's sovereignty and jurisdiction. Second, the development of the legal regimes of the continental shelf, EEZ, and archipelagic waters may bring about a gradual phasing out and eventual elimination of the phenomenon of "historic" claims.22 As a consequence, the UNCLOS III merely reproduced the relevant articles of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone without defining the term "historic waters." Thus, no authoritative definition of "historic waters" can be found in any convention.

One scholar defined the term "historic waters" in his study of the legal regime of bays in international law, published in 1964, as:

waters over which the Coastal State, contrary to the generally applicable rules of international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, and over a substantial period of time, exercise sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the community of States.23

Another scholar classified claims to "historic waters" into three categories: 1) bays claimed by States which are greater in extent, or less in configuration, than standard bays; 2) areas of claimed waters linked to a coast by offshore features but which are not enclosed under the standard rules; and 3) areas of claimed seas which would, but for the claim, be high seas because they are not covered by any rules specially concerned with bays or delimitation of coastal waters (maria clausa). 24. Examples of the first category of "historic waters" claim include Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra as its "historic bay" in 1974. The closing line of the Gulf of Sidra is 296 miles in length, but the generally accepted length of the closing of a bay is 24 miles. Another example is the Russian claim to Peter the Great Bay as its "historic bay." The length of the closing line is 108 miles. Libya's claim has been challenged by countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. The Russian claim has been challenged by the United Kingdom, France, Japan, the United States, Sweden, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Examples of the second category of "historic waters" claim include Canada's claim to the waters of its Arctic archipelago. Tonga's claim to a rectangle of sea that the several groups of its islands frame as its "historic waters" is the best example of the third category of "historic waters". 25 In 1960, it was proposed that the ILC invite all the member states of the UN to send to the Secretariat documentation relating to "historic waters," including "historic bays," under each state's jurisdiction, and indicate the legal regime that supported the claims. However, the proposal was rejected out of fear that:

if Governments were invited to specify their claims to historic waters they might be tempted, as a matter of prudence, to protect their position by advancing all their claims, including possibly some new ones. They might also thereby commit themselves to a rigid attitude which could make a solution of the problem more difficult in the future. Furthermore, possibly exaggerated claims would not be a suitable basis for the formulation of principles on the matter. 26

In the study prepared by the UN Secretariat, the idea of including a list of "historic waters" was also considered, but, again, due to the concern that "such a list might induce States to overstate both their claims and their opposition to the claims of other States, and so give rise to unnecessary disputes," the idea was rejected." Therefore, it is difficult to tell precisely how many "historic waters" claims there are. Moreover, it is also difficult to examine the claimant states' justification of their claims or the basis for opposition to the claims by other states.

The Legal Status of the Waters Enclosed by the "U"-shaped Line

The 1962 study of the juridical regime of historic waters concluded that the legal status of waters regarded as historic waters "would in principle depend on whether the sovereignty exercised in the particular case over the area by the claiming state and forming a basis for the claim, was sovereignty over internal waters or sovereignty over the territorial sea."" In other words, depending on the sovereignty exercised over the claimed waters by the claimant state, the waters could be considered either internal waters or territorial sea. In 1982, in the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, the International Court of Justice concluded that "general international law ... does not provide for a single 'regime' for 'historic waters' or 'historic bays,' but only for a particular regime for each of the concrete, recognized cases of 'historic waters' or 'historic bays" 29 However, it must be pointed out that the exercise of sovereignty over the claimed waters by a claimant state is only one of the elements in determining whether the historic title had been established. Other requirements also must be met to establish the historic title to the claimed waters.

During the UNCLOS 1, Japan proposed that "historic bays" be defined as "those bays over which coastal State or States have effectively exercised sovereign rights continuously for a period of long standing with explicit or implicit recognition of such practice by foreign States." The 1962 UN Study also suggested that at least three factors must be taken into consideration in determining whether a state has acquired a historic title to a maritime area. These factors are: 1) the exercise of authority over the area by the state claiming the historic right; 2) the continuity of this exercise of authority; and 3) the attitude of foreign states." In 1976, Colombia proposed a draft article to the Second Committee of the UNCLOS III, in which paragraph 1 reads:

A bay shall be regarded as historic only if it satisfies all of the following requirements: (a) that the State or States which claim it to be such shall have clearly stated that claim and shall be able to demonstrate that they have had sole possession of the waters of that bay continuously, peaceably and for a long time, by mean of acts of sovereignty or jurisdiction in the form of repeated and continuous official regulations on the passage of ships, fishing and other activities of the nationals or ships of other states; (b) that such practice is expressly or tacitly accepted by third States, particularly neighboring States. 32

Based upon the above arguments, it can be concluded that the general requirements for establishing historic title to a specific maritime area include: 1) exercise of authority over the area claimed; 2) continuity of the exercise of authority; and 3) the attitude of foreign states. In addition to these requirements, the burden of proof rests on the state which claims historic title to the questioned waters.

As already mentioned, Taipei claims the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line are China's historic waters but the legal status of the claimed waters has yet to be clarified by the ROC government. If the waters are claimed as internal waters, Taipei must prove that it has been continuously exercising sovereignty over the waters encircled by the "U"-shaped line for a considerable period of time in the same way it exercises sovereignty over other internal waters. If the waters are claimed as territorial sea, it must show that it has been continuously exercising sovereignty over the encircled waters for a long period of time in the same way it exercises sovereignty over other territorial seas. The same principles apply if the encircled waters are claimed as historic archipelagic waters.

Under the legal regime of "internal waters," a coastal state exercises full sovereignty over those waters which lie on the landward side of the baseline from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured and foreign ships enjoy no right of innocent passage through a state's internal waters, unless granted by the state as a privilege. A state's lakes, canals, rivers, ports, and harbors have exactly the same status as "inland waters."33

Should the waters of the South China Sea encircled by the "U"-shaped line and claimed as China's historic waters have the legal status of "internal waters"? First, the ROC government has never claimed the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the "U'-shaped line are "internal waters." Moreover, foreign vessels, including warships, have continuously and freely navigated the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the line since the map was published by the ROC in 1948. No action by the ROC has ever been taken to protest foreign vessels' passage through the enclosed waters. Considering these two reasons, it seems safe to conclude that the answer to the question is "no."

Article 3 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that "every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." Every state exercises sovereignty over its territorial sea and the only right which foreign ships enjoy in a state's territorial sea, apart from any specific treaty provisions which may exist, is the right of innocent passage. Foreign aircraft enjoy no right of innocent passage through the air space above the territorial sea. Can the waters of the South China Sea encircled by the "U"-shaped line be considered China's "territorial sea"?

First, foreign aircraft have been overlying the encircled waters since 1948 when the map was published. And foreign ships also have been enjoying freedom of navigation in the waters encircled by the "U"-shaped line, perhaps except in those waters measured 12 nautical miles from the baselines of those islands occupied by Taiwan.

Second, the Presidential Decree concerning the Territorial Sea and the EEZ, issued on October 8, 1979 defines the extent of the ROC's territorial sea as twelve nautical miles from its baselines. Although the islands and waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line were not mentioned in the Decree, as a corollary, it can be surmised that the ROC's territorial sea in the South China Sea is measured 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the claimed islands.

On October 7, 1992, the ROC's Ministry of Defense declared that foreign aircraft and ships are prohibited from entering into the waters and airspace above the waters measured 6,000 meters from the shorelines of the Pratas (Dongsha) and Taiping (Itu Aba) Island .34 These points demonstrate that the legal status of the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line, except those within 12 nautical miles from the baselines around the occupied islands, are not territorial sea. The concept of "archipelagic waters" is a new one in international law of the sea, created in the UNCLOS Ill. The waters enclosed by straight archipelagic baselines are archipelagic waters, which are neither internal waters nor territorial sea. An archipelagic state exercises sovereignty over its archipelagic waters. The sovereignty "extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil and the resources contained therein." 35 However, foreign ships and aircraft enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic sealanes and air routes over archipelagic waters. 36 Due to the fact that the legal regime of "archipelagic waters" was developed during the UNCLOS III and that the Chinese map enclosing the South China Sea with a "U"shaped line was published in 1948, it can hardly be argued that the area has the legal status of archipelagic waters. As it stands, the ROC has never had complete sovereignty over all the resources contained in the waters enclosed by the line, including the sea bed and subsoil. Furthermore, foreign ships and aircraft have enjoyed freedom of navigation and overflight, instead of the right of innocent passage or the right of archipelagic sea lanes or air route passage.

Since the ROC has never continuously exercised sovereignty over the waters of the South China Sea as internal waters, territorial sea, or archipelagic waters, it is safe to conclude that a historic title has not been established. The ROC has failed to meet the requirements that determine whether a historic title to a maritime area has been established. Moreover, the ROC government never asserted an official claim to the enclosed waters as historic waters prior to 1990. Therefore, the states whose interests would be affected by the claim need not respond nor take action to invalidate the ROC's claims.

If no historic title has ever been established, what is the purpose of the "U"-shaped line? It could simply be a boundary reference line, indicating that the islands of the South China Sea enclosed within the line belong to China. This is the conclusion of Steven K.T. Yu who argues that the purpose of drawing the "U"-shaped line was to show the public that the four large groups of islands in the South China Sea belong to China. 37 Likewise, Hungdah Chin uses the same argument and concludes that China can hardly establish a historic title to the waters enclosed by the line, given the fact that the ROC government has never made such claims and the ROC delegation to the UNCLOS I was silent on the matter .38

If the ROC's claim to the waters enclosed by the "U"shaped line as historic waters is ill-founded, what about the PRC's claim? Has the PRC ever claimed the waters of the South China Sea as China's "historic waters"? The answer to this appears to be "no." Although the "U"-shaped line is also used on maps published in the PRC, Beijing has never claimed the waters enclosed in the line as historic waters, even during the UNCLOS III. In practice, the PRC has never protested the exercise of the right of innocent passage and overflight of foreign ships and aircraft through the area, However, it must be pointed out that the PRC has continuously claimed ownership over the South China Sea islands since 1951. 39 Ownership of these islands will entitle Beijing to claim a variety of maritime zones in the South China Sea, which include internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, continental shelf, and EEZs.

Conclusion

ROC's current position on the waters of the South China Sea enclosed by the "U"-shaped line is not acceptable to the other states involved in the South China Sea islands disputes, or to other states that make no claim to the South China Sea islands but whose interests are affected. The ROC would have difficulty proving that it has continuously exercised sovereignty over the enclosed waters since 1948 when the line was drawn and published. Or in other words, it will be very difficult for the ROC to establish a historic title to the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line, unless different criteria than those discussed above can be cited by the ROC in support of the claim.

The key issue in the dispute is not claims to "historic waters," but rather ownership of South China Sea Islands. In September 1958, the PRC declared that the breath of its territorial sea is twelve nautical miles and that this applies to the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha, and Nansha Islands as well. 40 On February 25, 1992, the National People's Congress adopted the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the PRC, in which the PRC's baseline for designating the territorial sea is determined with the method of straight baselines, formed by joining the various base points with straight lines. 41 The method is also applied to the South China Sea islands claimed by the PRC. According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, waters on the landward side of the baseline are part of the internal waters of the state. Accordingly, a large part of the waters of the South China Sea will become China's internal waters, subject to its sovereignty if Beijing chooses to enforce the law. Other countries will enjoy no rights at all, except the right of innocent passage. Moreover, areas 24 miles and 200 miles measured from the baselines will respectively become the PRC's contiguous zone and EEZ. If this becomes the case, the maritime areas subject to the PRC's sovereignty and jurisdiction will be enlarged to a point, even larger perhaps than the waters enclosed by the "U"-shaped line.

This could be one reason why Beijing has been silent on the question of "historic waters." Strategically speaking, there is no need for the PRC to play the role of "bad guy" when the ROC has already assumed the role. In Taiwan, among the Chinese scholars specializing in ocean law and politics, there is no consensus regarding the policy of claiming the enclosed waters as the ROC's historic waters. Moreover, diplomatically, it is quite likely that the ROC's claim will serve as an obstacle to Taiwan's "southward policy," of developing closer economic relations with Southeast Asian nations. 42 Due to the fact that no Southeast Asian nations formally recognize the ROC, and the real concern of the states in the region is the PRC, it is not likely that the ROC's claim that the South China Sea enclosed by the "U"-shaped line is China's "historical waters" will have much impact on the future development of the South China Sea islands dispute. But such a claim will hamper relations between Taipei and other Southeast Asian capitals. The real stumbling block to a peaceful solution of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea is the question of ownership, in whole or in part, of the South China Sea islands. In short, the question of China's claim to "historic waters" only complicates the effort to settle the dispute.

----------------------------------------------

Notes:
Yann-huei Song (LL.M., University of California Law School, Ph.D., Kent State University) teaches at the Institute of the Law of the Sea, National Taiwan Ocean University and is a research fellow at the Academia Sinica in Taipei. His research interests are the law of the sea and national ocean policy.
Peter Kien-hong Yu (Ph.D., New York University) teaches political science at National Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. He has published more than 30 articles and is the editor of Chinese Regionalism (Westview Press, 1994).
1 See Tzoh-zhou Yang, Nanhai fonyun [The South China Sea Imbroglio] (Taipei: Zhenzhong Publishers, 1993), 910. The "U"-shaped line is also shown on the maps included in the following publications: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Vietnam, White Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands (Saigon, 1975), 90; Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York and London, Methuen, 1982), 195; David G. Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 79; Jon M. Van Dyke and Dale L. Bennett, "Islands and the Delimitation of Ocean Space in the South China Sea." in Ocean Yearbook 10, ed. Elizabeth Mann Borgese, et al. (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1993), 55. See also Peter Kien-hong Yu, "Issues on the South China Sea," Chinese Yearbook on International Law and Affairs (1991-1992), 138-200.
2 Hurng-yu Chen, "The Boundary of the South China Sea Should be Drawn by Coordinates," Central Daily News (Taipei) (July 26, 1992):2.
3 See Kuan-chen Fu, "Nanhai "U"-shaped Boundary Line and the Unique Nature of the Waters within the Line," United Daily News (Taipei) (June 2, 1993):11.
4 See Choon-ho Park, "The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources," Ocean Development and International Law Journal 5, no. I (1 978):33 and Kuen-chen Fu, A Study of the Legal Status of the ROC's Historical Waters (Taipei: The Evaluation Commission, May 1993), 1.
5 See Han Jen Hua, ed., A Compilation of Historic Documents and Materials Relating to the South China Sea Islands (Beijing: Dong Fang Publishers, 1985), 172-179; Fu, A Study of the Legal Status of the ROC's Historical Waters.
6 The question of the exact purpose of the "U"-shape is unknown. The person who helped draw the line is reported to still be living in Nanjing, China. If the person is found, the question of why the line was drawn in such a way may be answered. See also Fu, A Study of the Legal Status of the ROC's Historical Waters.
7 See Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, "The 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention: Current Problems and Issues to the Republic of China," paper presented at "The Law of the Sea Convention: Issues and Prospects" sponsored by Southeast Asian Program on Ocean Law, Policy and Management (SEAPOL), Chiang Mai, Thailand, May 1991, 8.
8 See Kuan-chen Fu's statement in Wenti yu yanjiu [issues and Studies] 32, no. 8 (August 1993):6.
9 See International Legal Materials 21 (1982):1261-1354.
10 Chen, "The Boundary of the South China Sea Should be Drawn by Coordinates".
11 Hurng-yu Chen, "A Comparative Study of the South China Sea Policy and Thinking of the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait," paper presented at the symposium on Asian-Pacific Strategic Situation and Prospective, the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, May 18-19,1993, 11.
12 United Daily News (Taipei) (April 12, 1993): 1.
13 United Daily News (Taipei) (September 7, 1993):l.
14 Fu, A Study of the Legal Status of the ROC's Historical Waters, 3-4.
15 B.A. Hamzah, "Conflicting Jurisdiction Problems in the Spratlys: Scope for Conflict Resolution," paper presented to the Second Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bandung, Indonesia, 15-18 July 1991, 199-200.
16 See "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays," Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. 11 1962, 6-7.
17 Donat Pharand, Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 91.
18 See "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays," Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. 11 1962, 6. See also D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea Vol. 1, ed. I.A. Shearer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 419.
19 R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 2nd ed., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 36.
20 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays," Yearbook of the Intentional Law Commission Vol. 11, 1962, 6 and 25.
21 See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. V, 202-203.
22 Yehuda Z. Blum, "Current Developments: the Gulf of Sidra Incident," The American Journal of International Law 80 (1986):677.
23 L.H. Bouchez, The Regime of Bays in international Law (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 281.
24 D.P. O'Connell, The Intentional Law of the Sea Vol. 1, 417-418.
25 See Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea. 37-38; O'Connel, International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, 410, 418; Pharand, Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law, 107, 113-32.
26 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 5.
27 "The Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 26.
28 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 25.
29 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 36.
30 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 3.
31 "Juridical Regime of Historic Waters," 13.
32 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. V, 203.
33 For provisions relating to "internal waters" see Article 5(l) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, and 50 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
34 United Daily News (Taipei) (October 14, 1992):l.
35 See Article 49 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
36 See Article 53 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
37 Steven K.T. Yu, "on the Legal Status of ROC's Nanhai U-shaped Line: Based Upon the Regime of 'Historic Waters'," Lilun yu zhengee Theory and Policy] 8, no. 1 (November 1993): 96.
38 Hungdah Chiu, "The Legal Regime of our Nanhai Historic Waters," Wenti yu Yanjiu [Issues & Studies] 32, no. 8 (August 1993):23.
39 In 1951, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai pointed out that the South China Sea Islands have always been China's territory. See Lou Yuru and Zeng Chengkui, eds., Dangdai Zhonqquo De Haiyang Shiye [contemporary China's Marine Undertakings] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1985), 446.
40 See Myron H. Nordquist and Choon-ho Park, North America and Asia-Pacific and the Development of the Law of the Sea: The People's Republic of China (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1981), 6.
41 Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, the UN, The Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 21 (August 1992), 24-27.42 United Daily News (Taipei) (November 13, 1993):l and (November 24, 1993):2.

The Cow Tongue: China's Claims in the Eastern Sea (South China Sea)

2008-01-18T02:30:00.002+07:00

By Tony Le

In 1947 the Chinese Nationalist Government issued a map on which 11 dotted lines circumscribed nearly all the Eastern Sea (South China Sea). This evolved into the 9-dotted line map in 1953. According to cartographic convention, this meant China claimed sovereignty over all the islands enclosed within those dotted lines. In 1974 China’s navy invaded the Paracel Islands under Vietnamese sovereignty and has illegally occupied the islands until the present.

Despite China’s claims of ownership over the Spratly Islands, it never physically occupied this archipelago until 1988 when its navy clashed with Vietnam’s navy and took control of 6 of the features for the first time in history. China continued to take over more features in subsequent clashes with Vietnam in 1992 and the Philippines in 1995.

Despite only actually occupying a number of features in the Spratlys, in 1992 the Chinese National People’s Congress passed a “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,” in which it claimed all islands in the Spratlys (and most of the rest of the Eastern Sea) as Chinese territory.

As mentioned earlier, China issued its dotted line maps claiming both land and "historic water" terrritories in the Eastern Sea giving it the whole sea up to a line ranging roughly 15 to 200 nautical miles from the coasts of the others. It is from this map that the boundaries around the claimed territories has the shape that reminds one of a “Cow Tongue”.

In 1996 Beijing established baselines completely around the Paracel Islands in a manner that would make the Paracel Islands equivalent to an archipelagic nation. China claimed the Paracels as a Chinese archipelago, with rights to all resources both within the baseline and reaching outward from it toward an exclusive economic zone that it refused to state definitely what that extent is. China further claimed that waters within the baselines were “internal waters.” This is equivalent to asserting that all waters within the baselines are “the good earth” and that neither transit nor innocent passage by foreign vessels would be permitted. At the time Beijing declared it “will announce the remaining baselines of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China at another time” implying that it would take the same action in the Spratlys as it did in the Paracels at a time when China was in a military position to do so effectively.

In 2007, Beijing announced that it had established the administrative city of Sansha to govern the three archipelagos that it laid claims to in the Eastern Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

As it stands today, China’s claims in the Eastern Sea, among which are the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and territorial waters add up to approximately 80 percent of the area of this region, including 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones around the various islands.

China says this claim of EEZ is based on the 1982 UNCLOS. But in fact, UNCLOS does not say that any island can claim 200 miles. UNCLOS says that 12 miles can be claimed for small islands that don’t have local population and economic life. This is the case with virtually all the islands being disputed on the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. It is obvious that China’s claim of 200 miles is pure greed stemming from its humongous appetite for cotrol of the region and its resources, and not at all founded on UNCLOS.

UNCLOS stipulates that when there are overlapping claims present, a fair resolution must be reached by the claimants. Yet, China thinks that it can take little tiny islands and claim as much of the sea as the coastline of a country, notwithstanding that China’s claims of sovereignty over these islands are not at all well-founded. China knows that it is not fair, that is why it consistently refused to settle the matter in International Court because it knows that it stands little chance of convincing anyone of its claims. Instead China prefers bilateral negotiations as a way to easily assert its influence on individual parties. And if diplomatic pressure does not work, China can always resort to its 094 nuclear submarines that it has put into its newly built secret nuclear naval base in Sanya, Hainan to send the message to its neighbors to remind them who’s the boss. History has indeed shown that Beijing is not at all unwilling to flex its military muscles when its words alone is not enough to achieve the desired goals. And regular military exercises along with a formidable military buildup taking place in the region forewarns of what might come about if the Big Brother doesn't get his way.

China says Google must show Spratly and Paracel Islands belong to China

2008-01-18T02:23:00.000+07:00

By Tony Le
VietWill.org
6 May 2008

Beijing is at it again, this time with Google. According to a news report by AFP today, the Chinese government is investigating online mapping sites that may expose state secrets or compromise its so called territorial integrity. China doesn't want Internet maps to be showing where China's military bases are located or where its army is stationed.

Beijing is also quite concerned about online maps that show various disputed territories as not belonging to China, for example, the Paracel and Spratly Islands in Vietnam's Eastern Sea, or the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. It also wants Taiwan to be indicated as part of Chinese territory.

Not only Google, but online Chinese mapping sites Sohu and Baidu are being investigated as well. It will come as no surprise if Sohu and Baidu correct their "errors" if there happens to be any. However, it will be of great interest to the parties in the territorial disputes to see whether Google will submit to Beijing's pressure for the sake of its business interests in the gargantuan market that is China.

Of great particular concern for Vietnamese people are the Paracel Islands which China illegally seized from Vietnam in 1974, and part of the Spratly Islands which China also took control from Vietnam after a military invasion in 1988.

Presently, searching the Google maps site reveals that the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands are labeled by their English names. There are no Chinese or Vietnamese names added to the English label, unlike other undisputed Chinese territories that have both the English script and the Chinese script underneath.

Undoubtedly, Beijing would like Google maps to indicate these islands as Xisha and Nansha (with Chinese characters included) on the map. If it judges that the present way that Google labels these archipelasgos as "illegal" and "damanging" to Chinese territorial integrity, perhaps it will decide to ban Google in China as it has done in other instances with Youtube and Google itself in 2002.

Beijing’s bullyism now shows itself in myriad ways -- taking all the festivity out of the Olympics torch relay, building a secret nuclear submarine base in Hainan Island along with an ominous military build up, and threatening actions against even the big Internet giant Google so that it can get its own way. As China continues to climb up the superpower ladder rung by rung, we can be sure that Beijing will not cease to come up with even more ingenious ways to make its ambitions a reality.

News story link
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gpWeF-...pYOoLM1b7yh-Hew http://www.theinquirer.net/gb/inquirer/new...le-china-online

China to investigate Google for illegal maps: official media

6 May 2008

BEIJING (AFP) — China has launched an investigation into online mapping services by Internet giants including Google and Sohu in an effort to protect state secrets and territorial integrity, state press said.

According to Min Yiren, vice head of the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping, authorities hope to get rid of online maps that wrongly depict China's borders or that reveal military secrets, the People's Daily said Monday.

The government began the investigation into the problematic maps in April and will continue it until the end of the year, the report said.

Min cited five areas of concern, with the redrawing of China's borders and placing disputed territory outside the nation the top priority, it said. Such areas of dispute include Taiwan, the Spratlys and Paracels island chains in the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, it said.

Previous reports, citing Min, said that there were nearly 10,000 illegal map websites in China. The People's Daily named US Internet giant Google, as well as China's Sohu and Baidu, as being under investigation.

The report was seen as the first time the government media had named specific companies as possible offenders. Eight ministries including the mapping bureau, the Ministry of Industry and Information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Public Safety are involved in the investigation, it said.

Last year, China restricted mapping and survey activity by foreign entities for national security reasons.

China's military buildup in the South China Sea

2008-01-18T02:21:00.003+07:00

China shrugs off report of tropical nuclear sub base

BEIJING, May 6 (Reuters) - China refused to be drawn on Tuesday on a photograph which Jane's Information Group analysts believe is evidence of a new underground nuclear submarine base off the southern tropical island of Hainan.

China's increasing dependence on imported petroleum and mineral resources had contributed to an intensified Chinese concern about defending its access to vital sea lanes, particularly to its south, Jane's said.

It said high-resolution commercially available satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe was independent verification of previous suggestions that China is constructing an underground nuclear submarine base near Sanya on Hainan.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang would neither confirm nor deny the report.

"China is going down the road of peaceful development. China's national defence policy is defensive. Other countries have no reason to fear, or make a fuss about it and be prickly," Qin told a regular news conference.

"We have vast coastal areas and territorial seas. Protecting our national security on the seas, protecting our sovereignty on the oceans and our oceanic rights are the sacred responsibilities of our armed forces."

The extent of construction indicated the Sanya base, known as Yulin, could become a key future base for People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aircraft carriers and other ships, Jane's said.

The base and the positioning of China's most advanced sub-surface "combatants" at Sanya would have implications for China's control of the South China Sea and the strategically vital straits in the area, Jane's said.

The satellite image suggested the base had been supported by a gradual military build-up in the Paracel islands over the last 20 years and the transformation of the Chinese-held islands in the disputed Spratly chain into assets that could support a range of military operations, it said.

China had pursued the build-up at Sanya with little fanfare, offering no public explanations regarding its plan to base nuclear weapons or advanced naval platforms there, Jane's said.

Bangkok-based Western military expert Robert Karniol said China had at least one other nuclear naval base in the eastern coastal city of Qingdao. (Reporting by Ben Blanchard and Benjamin Kang Lim; Editing by Nick Macfie)

China defends maritime rights, but silent on nuclear sub base report

Agence France-Presse
6 May 2008

BEIJING - China on Tuesday refused to comment directly on reports it was building a major underground nuclear submarine base, but defended its right to protect its maritime and territorial interests.

"We have a vast territorial sea, and it is the sacred duty of the Chinese army to safeguard our security on the sea, the sovereignty of our territorial waters, and maritime rights and interests," foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters on Tuesday.

He was responding to questions about a report by Jane's Intelligence Review, a respected defense periodical, on Friday that said China was building the base near the holiday resort of Sanya on southern China's Hainan island.

Jane's reported it had confirmed the existence of the base through satellite images.

It said China's plans raised regional and global security concerns, partly because the vessels would be stationed so close to Southeast Asia's sea lanes.

Qin would not confirm nor deny the existence of the base, but insisted that China's military posed no threat to the world.

"There is no need for the Western countries to be worried, or concerned, or make any irresponsible accusations," Qin said.

"China's national defense and military building will not pose a threat to any countries."

Jane's said the base could mean China was preparing to house a large proportion of its nuclear forces, and even operate them from there, which could cause concern to regional powers and others further afield.

The positioning of China's most advanced underwater combatants at Sanya could have implications for China's control of the South China Sea and the strategically vital straits in the area, said Jane's.

"For both regional and extra-regional powers, it will be difficult to ignore that China is now building a major naval base at Sanya and may be preparing to house and protect a large proportion of its nuclear forces here and even operate them from this base," the group said.

"This development so close to the Southeast Asian sea lanes so vital to the economies of Asia can only cause concern far beyond these straits."

Britain's Daily Telegraph also reported on the base and called it a "vast, James Bond-style edifice capable of concealing up to 20 nuclear-powered submarines, which will enable China to project its power across the region."

China's naval secrets

By Richard D. Fisher, Jr.
Wall Street Journal Asia
5 May 2008

Experts attempting to understand the strategic aims behind China's aggressive military expansion have generally focused on Taiwan. But a new naval base points at Beijing's significant and growing interest in projecting power into waters far from the Taiwan Strait. China, in fact, is equipping itself to assert its longstanding and expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, and this plan could raise tensions well beyond the region.

The new base is near Sanya, a city on the southern tip of Hainan Island. It's an ideal place for a naval base, and a significant expansion compared to the nearby naval base in the port city of Yulin. Sanya features much larger piers for hosting a large fleet of surface warships, a new underground base for submarines and comfortable facilities that would attract technically proficient soldiers and sailors. Its location will allow China to exert greater dominance over disputed territories of the South China Sea; to place a much larger naval force closer to sea lanes crucial to Asia's commercial lifeblood; and to exercise influence over the critical Straits of Malacca.

While construction of this new base has only recently been visible via commercial satellite imagery, since 2002 military and security officials in three Asian governments have conveyed to this analyst details, and at times concerns, about China's construction of a major naval base at Sanya. It's not just a matter of the base's existence, but of what Beijing appears to intend to do with it. Officials in two of these governments have pointed to a unique feature of this base: a large new underground facility designed to house nuclear and non-nuclear submarines. In a conversation at an academic confernece in late 2004, a general in China's People's Liberation Army admitted that Beijing was building a new base on Hainan, but denied there was an underground facility.

New high-resolution satellite imagery, however, appears to belie the general's statement. Acquired by Jane's Information Group from satellites of the DigitalGlobe Corporation, this commercially available imagery shows cave openings around the Sanya base consistent with another known PLA underground submarine base in Jianggezhuang near the Bohai Gulf. Other openings on the opposite side may have facilitated excavation or could serve as weapon- or supply storage areas. The size of the underground submarine facility is unknown, although one Asian military source has suggested it will hold at least eight submarines. There is space in this area for a supported underground structure that could house more than 20 subs.

Sanya will prove crucial to China's strategic nuclear and power projection ambitions. The Bohai Gulf in the north of the country, the location for the base of the first PLA nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), is too shallow to support nuclear deterrent patrols. But with the opening of the Sanya base, China's new Type 094 SSBNs can soon find safer 5,000-meter-deep operating areas south of Hainan Island.

The Pentagon projects that the PLA will build five Type 094 SSBNs. Should the submarine-launched ballistic missiles on these submarines contain multiple warheads, as some Asian military sources suggest, the SSBN fleet based at Sanya could eventually house up to half of the PLA's total nuclear missile warheads.

As such, China is going to invest in the facilities and forces needed to defend these vital strategic assets. Sanya has piers necessary to base a far larger force of surface warships, a new large pier, and many new housing and headquarters buildings in this attractive resort area. Both to protect its SSBNs and to defend China's growing interest in securing sea lanes to critical resources in distant areas like Africa, the Persian Gulf and Australia, Sanya can be expected to host future Chinese aircraft carrier battle groups and naval amphibious projection groups. Some Chinese sources suggest that the PLA could eventually build four to six aircraft carriers.

This concentration of strategic naval forces at Sanya will likely heighten China's longstanding desire to consolidate its control over the South China Sea. In 1974, 1988 and 1995, China used military force to capture Vietnamese- and Philippine-controlled or claimed islands and reefs. Its most recent acquisition, Mischief Reef, located about 200 kilometers off the Philippine island of Palawan, now contains two large concrete structures. The PLA appears to have a constant ship presence in this reef, which is very close to one of Asia's key maritime superhighways.

Now Beijing also has the Sanya base at its disposal. And sure enough, in mid-November 2007, the PLA held major naval and air exercises south of Hainan near the disputed Paracel Islands, prompting protests from Vietnam. Either in conjunction with this exercise or soon after, the first Type 094 SSBN moved to Sanya, where it is today -- as caputured by DigitalGlobe satellite images. The implication is clear: Sanya will serve as a base from which to assert China's dominance in the crowded South China Sea.

China and the U.S. have already tangled around Hainan. On April 1, 2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic reconnaissance aircraft flying in international airspace near Hainan tangled with a PLA Navy jet fighter. The Chinese pilot died, but in the fight, forced the damaged U.S. aircraft to land on Hainan and endure a humiliating disassembly by PLA intelligence services. This is likely a foretaste of the sensitivity China will accord U.S. or other naval forces that seek to monitor China's nuclear naval operations -- aimed in large part at the U.S.
* * *

While conflict with China over this region need not be preordained, there is a clear need to request that Beijing explain the content and purpose of its new large naval base at Sanya. China's potential to base a large force of nuclear weapons so close to the region covered by ASEAN's 1996 nuclear-free-zone treaty would at a minimum appear inconsistent with Beijing's pledge to sign protocols to this treaty. Furthermore, the Philippines' lack of any credible air or naval forces to defend its contiguous sea lanes, upon which much of Asia's commerce depends, creates a dangerous power vacuum.

China's movement of nuclear and future large-scale conventional naval forces to Sanya may fill this vacuum, but the interests of Tokyo, Seoul, New Delhi, Canberra and Washington will also be engaged. China's buildup in Sanya is a clear illustration of the need for China to respond to calls by Japan, Australia and the U.S. for greater military transparency. The only other prudent alternative is for these countries to increase their cooperation to defend their interests in deterring nuclear threats and threats to maritime safety.

Mr. Fisher is a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center. This essay is based on an article in the May issue of Jane's Intelligence Review.

Satellite images of China's secret nuclear naval base

These are recently released photos of the secret nuclear naval base built by China in the South China Sea

Telltale: A satellite view of Sanya reveals signs of a submarine base, the Pentagon says

Formidable: An 094 nuclear submarine like the one apparently seen in satellite imagery of Sanya harbour, which also shows Chinese warships, below, moored alongside a long jetty

One of the photos shows China's latest 094 nuclear submarine at the base. U.S. Defence chiefs estimate China will have five of the 094 subs operational over the next two years, each capable of carrying twelve nuclear warheads.

Ominous: A tunnel entrance thought to lead to caverns that could hide many submarines

A 2005 picture shows engineering and excavation barges working at the same spot
Source: Daily Mail, UK (2 May 2008)

The entrance to a tunnel built into the hillside (The Telegraph, UK)

China builds a massive warship base

Jonathan Manthorpe,

Vancouver Sun

Friday, May 02, 2008

The maritime arms race in Asia has crossed another threshold with the publication of satellite pictures of a massive Chinese underground submarine and warship base giving it a significant tactical advantage in the strategically important South China Sea.

The naval base has been constructed by tunnelling into the mountainous shoreline of China's southern Hainan Island near a place called Sanya.
The entrance is so large it will allow vessels from China's growing fleet of over 50 conventional and nuclear-powered submarines to enter and leave the base without being spotted by the West's spy satellites.The first ship assigned to the base last December was the first of China's new Type 094 nuclear ballistic missile submarines, which carry 16 JL-2 ballistic missiles, each with a range of 8,000 kilometres. The missiles could reach about four-fifths of North America if fired from a submerged Type 094 stationed just off the coast of China.

Western intelligence organizations believe the base will accommodate up to 20 of China's nuclear powered submarines and probably several surface ships, including aircraft carriers, as well.

Chinese military planners have for years been debating whether to build aircraft carriers, which are an enormously complex element of a navy to use effectively.
For several years the noises from China suggested the planners had abandoned the idea of carriers in favour of cheaper, more simple and effective weapons such as missiles.

But the political judgement that aircraft carriers are an important way of demonstrating power to neighbouring and competing countries appears to have won the day.

Latest reports suggest Beijing may order the construction of up to six aircraft carriers and their supporting battle groups within the next few years.

It has been known for over six years that China was constructing the base as part of its effort to challenge United States naval dominance in the Pacific Ocean and Asia, and to be able to project Beijing's power throughout the region and beyond.

But interest in the development was revived two weeks ago when the British-based publication Janes Intelligence Review published photographs of the entrance to the base obtained from the commercial satellite company DigitalGlobe.

China's determination to be able to project power in Asia is a strong concern to the U.S. Navy, which already judges Beijing's submarine fleet a deterrent to Washington being able to sail to the aid of Taiwan if the island nation is invaded by China.

But China's maritime ambitions are of special concern to India, which is already a significant naval power and sees its regional supremacy being challenged by Beijing.

In part in response to China's Sanya base the Indian navy is building a similar underground base at Rambilli in the south-central state of Andra Pradesh.
The Indian base is due to be completed by 2011 and will serve as the depot for the country's entire fleet of submarines, currently 16, but due to grow significantly in coming years with the construction of a class of domestically designed nuclear powered boats euphemistically called Advanced Tactical Vessels.

Like China's Sanya base, Rambilli will allow submarines to enter and leave the facility while submerged and therefore away from the prying eyes of spy satellites.

Rambilli is very much a response to China's extension of its naval reach, which has seen Beijing make a pact with Islamabad to use a Pakistan naval base at Gwadar and another with Burma to establish an electronic eavesdropping centre on the Coco Islands to keep tabs on the Indian Navy in the Bay of Bengal.
It has now become a published element in India's naval doctrine that a central task is to be able to deter navies from outside the region -- for which read China -- from operating freely in South Asian waters.

China's dramatic expansion and modernization of its navy in recent years has been driven by the need to give reality to Beijing's threats to invade Taiwan, the island nation of 23 million people which China claims to own.

But because domestic American legislation requires the U.S. to aid in Taiwan's defence if the island is invaded, Beijing has had to acquire enough power to deter the U.S. Navy in order to make its threat credible.

Beijing has done that by concentrating on development of its submarine fleet and by acquiring, initially from Russia, the most modern anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles obtainable.

Within recent months Chinese submarines have demonstrated their capabilities by suddenly appearing off the important American forces bases at Okinawa in Japan and the Pacific island of Guam without being previously detected.
Last November a Chinese submarine surfaced in the middle of a U.S. Navy battlegroup led by the aircraft carrier Forrestal. The boat had not been detected.

But as China's economy has grown by leaps and bounds, so has Beijing's concerns about keeping sealanes open for the delivery of resources and the export of manufactured goods.

The South China Sea is of special concern to Beijing because it is the transit route for many imported resources, especially oil and minerals, and because China has territorial disputes in the region will all the countries of Southeast Asia bordering the sea.

Most recently those disputes have boiled over with Hanoi after Beijing announced it was establishing an administration over islands in the Paracel group that are claimed by Vietnam.

Beijing's Dirty Moves

2008-01-18T02:20:00.001+07:00

By Tony Le
29 April 2008

For months and months, the Olympic torch relay route showed Paracel Islands enlarged and boxed off on the map as Chinese territories. Vietnamese people all over the world have been protesting this blatant move by China to politicize the Olympics by using it to make illegal claims on territories that it stole from Vietnam. A Vietnamese torch bearer, Le Minh Phieu, even wrote to the IOC President about the matter. No response ever came from the IOC or Beijing in response to these protests.

Finally, right before the final leg of the torch relay was to take place in Saigon on April 29th, suddenly, we notice that on the relay map on the Olympic website, the Paracel Islands have been removed completely. (see http://torchrelay.beijing2008.cn/en/journey/map/ ).

The decision by Beijing to remove the Islands from its relay route map may be interpreted in two ways. The first explanation is that Beijing finally gives in to the demands of the Vietnamese people because it understands that it has violated Olympic rules by using the sports festival to make claims on Vietnamese territories.

But we are not too naive to think that Beijing would have a change of heart so easily. The second interpretation is more plausible. Vietnamese who have been calling for protests cite the route map as a primary reason for such an action. Thereforre, if Beijing removes the map, then there would be no reason for protest. This action is meant to neutralize the antagonistic feelings that Vietnamese have towards Beijing and would in effect "pull the rug out from under them".

In addition, Saigon is the last leg of the international part of the relay. All these months, people of the world have already looked at the map and have already seen the islands. They have already been persuaded that these islands legitimately belonged to China. Now that the torch comes to Saigon, the job of the map is essentially done. Removal of the islands does not hurt China in the least.

This is not the first time that Beijing resorts to this kind of cheap conciliatory trick to appease the Vietnamese public opinion. Last year, when hundreds of Vietnamese students protested in front of Chinese missions in Hanoi and Saigon over Beijing's establishment of Sansha to govern the Spratly and Paracel Islands, China chastised Vietnam for allowing such protests to occur. Afterward, a local official in Hainan was quoted in the South China Post as saying that he knew of no plan to establish Sansha. It is amazing how an official could not know of a plan that had been approved by the Chinese central government itself. But this was the kind of trick that Beijing used to quell anger directed to its plans to annex Vietnamese land and waters.

Fortunately, Vietnamese people are not so naive as to fall for such cheap and dirty tricks by Beijing. Removal of the map itself does not mean that China will not continue to find all kinds of means to control Vietnam's Eastern Sea and the islands in it. And this Vietnamese would not be surprised in the least if immediately after the torch leaves Saigon, the relay map returns to the way it was before.

Letter to Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung

2008-01-18T02:17:00.000+07:00

Sender: Le Trung Thanh, Vietnamese Citizen, Overseas Archictecture Student in Taipei, Taiwan

To the respected Prime Minister:

On April 29th, the Olympic torch relay ceremony will take place in Ho Chi Minh City. On the occasion of the torch coming to Vietnam, I write to you to express my desire to organize a successful demonstration against China for violating Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

I believe this is also the desire of all the Vietnamese people who are passionate about our national territories in the face of China’s deceptive plans of invasion.
I trust that you share the same opinion that if we organize a peaceful and non-violent demonstration, it also means that the Olympic torch relay ceremony is a success. That is the reason why I am writing this letter to you.

It was for this same purpose that on April 19th, I came to Bangkok, Thailand in order to send out a message to the international media that “Paracel and Spratly Islands belong to Vietnam” in order to protest China’s violation of Vietnamese territories.

My message received much attention from international news agencies and friends present at the event that day, along with good feelings that they reserve for our country.

This was a source of great encouragement and a good experience for myself and my friends in order to have appropriate behavior on April 29th in HCMC.
I would like to share the following with you:

1. The Thai government and police left a very beautiful impression for everyone when they reserved a very special place in front of the United Nations office for the contingent of protesters, and gently asked them to avoid provocative behavior.

Supporters as well as protester expressed their individual feelings orderly and the police accomplished their responsibility of keeping security and order.

2. I believe that both you and I are Vietnamese citizens, so we have the responsibility to protect and be faithful to our Country. This has been indicated clearly in the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1992 (Articles 8, 9, 31, 69, 76).

In the issue of “Paracel and Spratly Islands” we both have the duty to raise our voice in protest, because our silence means that we agree to lose the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

But if there are diplomatic concerns, the Vietnamese government can assist Vietnamese citizens to demonstrate peacefully against China so that they may implement their duty to their country in a constitutional and legal way.

3. At 11 in the morning on April 29, 2008, we, who carry in ourselves Vietnamese hearts will gather in front of the City Opera House, along with banners and slogans protesting China’s violation of Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, will demonstrate in the spirit of peace and non-violence.

On the side of the government, I propose that you order the security forces and police to carry out their responsibility of ensuring security for the contingent of protesters.

4. I have also informed the international media who will come to observe and record pictures so that the world will look onto us with good feelings.

That is, Vietnamese citizens carry out their right to love their Country, demonstrate peacefully against China’s deceptive plan of using the Olympics to annex Vienamese territories.

That is also the behavior of the police forces of Vietnam, which seriously ensure security and order for both the 2008 Olympic torch as well as the protesters of the politicisation of the Olympics.

As Vietnamese people, we have never been afraid of the Northern imperialist forces. I invite you to review the pages of our people’s glorious history in order to have more courage in the face of difficult decisions:

“Nguyen Trai’s Poem:Proclamation following a victory over the Chinese” [excluded in translation]

Respected Prime Minister, throughout our history of thousands of years of building and maintaining our country, our forefathers have never been afraid to face Northern imperialist forces. Today, I also believe that all Vietnamese people, myself and you included, desire that the rights and the civic duty of Vietnamese people will never come under China’s decisions.

Therefore, on April 19th in Bangkok, even though I carried in myself the will to fight for my country, I was very ashamed that I had to kneel on the land of a foreign country to fight for my own Fatherland.

Please note that when this letter arrives in your hand is when it has also been publicized on the mass communication outlets. We, the Vietnamese people who are concerned with the destiny of the country await your response.

Lastly, I send you my regards for good health and clear mind in order to prudently lead, protect, and build the Fatherland.

With respect,

Le Trung Thanh

Translated by Le Duc

For Vietnamese, no harmony in torch journey

2008-01-18T02:16:00.001+07:00

www.VietWill.org
24 April 2008

By all accounts, the Ho Chi Minh City leg of the Olympic Torch relay taking place on the 29th of April is expected to be relatively trouble free for the Beijing government. Most likely, we will not see protesters in support of Tibet or Darfur in the streets due to Vietnam's strict laws governing public demonstrations. However, that does not mean that the Vietnamese people are welcoming the Olympic torch with open arms. On the contrary, for the past months, there have been intense discussions on internet forums and blogs of Vietnamese both inside and outside of Vietnam regarding the coming of the torch to HCMC.

Many Vietnamese, especially the educated young are actively campaigning for demonstrations on April 29th, which happens to coincide with the eve of the Fall of Saigon in 1975, to protest Beijing's aggressions in Vietnam's Eastern Sea (South China Sea). Vietnamese anger directed at Beijing is exploding once again fueled by recent renewed reports of the Chinese navy's capturing, shooting, and killing of Vietnamese fishermen. Previously anger surfaced in response to China's seizure of Paracel Islands in 1974, then again with the Spratly Islands seized since 1988. China asserts claims on all of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and over 80% of Vietnam’s Eastern Sea, an egregious action that has no basis in international law. As a result, many Vietnamese fishermen who make their living in these waters have fallen victim to Chinese navy patrols.

Recently, Le Minh Phieu, a Vietnamese selectee to bear the torch in HCMC wrote to the IOC President to inform the Committee of Beijing's violations of Olympic rules by politicizing the sports festival. Phieu pointed out that Beijing took advantage of the Olympics to legitimize its illegal claims of Paracel Islands by depicting the archipelago on its relay route maps as Chinese territory. The tiny islands totaling only a few square kilometers in area appear enlarged and boxed off on the route map.

In December of last year, Vietnamese students staged protests in front of the Chinese embassy in Hanoi and the general consulate in HCMC for two consecutive weekends in response to Beijing's decision to establish the administrative region of Sansha to govern the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The protests in Vietnam spurred anti-Beijing protests staged by Vietnamese in many cities in Europe, Asia, and America.

Similar to its neighboring counterparts of New Delhi, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta, Hanoi is also expected to be intolerant of protests on the occasion that the Olympic torch arrives to HCMC. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in a weekend meeting with officials in HCMC ordered them "to conduct the relay safely and solemnly, showing the patriotic, sports-loving and peace-loving spirit of the Vietnamese people and the Vietnam-China special friendship."

Hanoi has welcomed the Beijing's "men in blue" to help keep the relay incident free. But unlike the past protest attempts in which Vietnamese students were stopped by the police even before they made it to the designated site, this time, it is not possible, unless the city wants to stage an "audience-less" torch relay. So, everyone will have to be allowed to come to the site of the event.

But we can be sure that not everyone in the crowd will come to cheer for the torch. Some are expected to have a trick or two up their sleeves. If they do manage to pull off a protest or some sort of public gesture to show their anger at Beijing's aggression in Vietnam's Eastern Sea, the Vietnamese will most likely have all the media attention to themselves since it is unlikely that they have to compete with Tibet and Darfur groups. This was the obstacle that Vietnamese protesters faced in Paris and San Francisco, where virtually all the media attention was given to the Tibet issue, leaving the Vietnamese cause unnoticed.

The Olympic torch will come and go, but it is certain that the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands will remain a quagmire for a long time to come. As China's economy grows along with its unceasing appetite for natural resources, Beijing will find it even harder to give up its claims on the islands and the waters of Vietnam's Eastern Sea, no matter how fragile those claims are from a legal standpoint. It has also been building a nuclear submarine base in Hainan Island to advance its ambitions. However, Beijing can also be sure that the Vietnamese people, especially the young generation, sense an urgency to defend Vietnam's territorial integrity and the lives of Vietnamese fishermen.

As Vietnamese are aware of Beijing's increasing aggression in the region, they are more likely to gather support and join hands in a concerted effort to thwart a possibility of Chinese hegemonic reality in Southeast Asia. When Beijing decided to establish Sansha last year, it probably did not expect that there would be such a strong reaction from the Vietnamese people. The issue at hand is whether Hanoi and the world is ready to take more assertive actions in the face of Beijing's outrageous violations against the Vietnamese people and their national territories.

China's new nuclear naval base in South China Sea revealed

2008-01-18T02:16:00.000+07:00

Secret Sanya - China's new nuclear naval base revealed

Jane's Security News

21 April 2008

China is constructing a major underground nuclear submarine base near Sanya, on Hainan Island off its southern coast, Jane's can confirm. Although Asian military sources have disclosed this fact to Jane's since 2002, high-resolution commercially available satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe allows independent verification of the previous suggestions.

The extent of construction indicates the Sanya base (also known as Yulin) could become a key future base for People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aircraft carriers and other power-projection ships. In December 2007, perhaps in concert with a major PLAN exercise the previous month, the PLA moved its first Type 094 second-generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to Sanya.

An underground submarine base and the positioning of China's most advanced sub-surface combatants at Sanya would have implications for China's control of the South China Sea and the strategically vital straits in the area. Further satellite imagery suggests the construction of Sanya has been supported by a gradual military build-up in the Paracel Islands over the last 20 years, and the transformation of the Chinese-occupied features in the Spratly Island group into assets that could support a range of military operations.

China's nuclear and naval build-up at Sanya underlines Beijing's desire to assert tighter control over this region. China's increasing dependence on imported petroleum and mineral resources has contributed to an intensified Chinese concern about defending its access to vital sea lanes, particularly to its south. It is this concern that in large part is driving China's development of power-projection naval forces such as aircraft carriers and long-range nuclear submarines.

China has pursued this build-up at Sanya with little fanfare, offering no public explanations regarding its plan to base nuclear weapons or advanced naval platforms there.

For both regional and extra-regional powers, it will be difficult to ignore that China is now building a major naval base at Sanya and may be preparing to house and protect a large proportion of its nuclear forces here, and even operate them from this base. This development so close to the Southeast Asian sea lanes so vital to the economies of Asia can only cause concern far beyond these straits.
Source: http://www.janes.com/news/security/jir/jir080421_1_n.shtml

More than a cry for dead victims

2008-01-18T02:15:00.000+07:00

By Dr. Pham Hong Son
Special to The Epoch Times
19 April 2008

Did any of the casualties in Darfur's genocide or dead victims of the recent Chinese crack-down in Tibet, and of the Chinese shootings in the sea around Vietnam's Paracel and Spratley islands, glance at the official website of the upcoming Beijing Olympics which contains the slogan: "'One World One Dream fully reflects the essence and the universal values of the Olympic spirit–Unity, Friendship, Progress, Harmony, Participation and Dream. It expresses the common wishes of people all over the world, inspired by the Olympic ideals, to strive for a brightfuture of Mankind"?

I am not certain enough to answer for the casualties in Darfur and victims in Tibet, but I am very sure that no Vietnamese victims would have glanced at the website because all of them were merely fishermen too poor to care about internet information. And could that flaw help their souls experience less suffering as they did not know that the authorities who devised those kind words also stood behind their death? No one knows.

There is no doubt that a growing number of people around the world, including several of the world's powerful politicians and celebrities, are acting against the upcoming Beijing Olympics, from delicate gestures to overt calls for boycott. Many see the recent anti-human rights-conduct of the Chinese authorities as the main cause for the heat in the current protest but a root-cause seems further away.

First it needs to be made clear that no one opposes the noble-spirited games of the Olympics. Most people can also agree that the pride and great benefits in hosting the Olympics should be shared among people around the world. So it might be welcome when such a big country as China is to host the Olympic Games. But history tells us of a rogue regime which took advantage of the Olympics to advance a sinister hidden ambition. The 1936 Olympics in Berlin under Hitler's regime was the case.

And now consider China's Olympics. China has had an ambition to dominate the world since it was newly founded. China is a casual name for the People's Republic of China which was established on the mainland by Chinese communists in 1949, as distinct from Republic of China (Chinese Taipei or Taiwan) founded by Chinese nationalists on the off-shore island. A China map presented in "Brief history of modern China" published in Beijing in 1954 featured China's borders covering large parts of the former orient and central Asia belonging to the former Soviet Union and the whole Korean peninsula, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Viet Nam. Cambodia.

Four years earlier China attacked and occupied the independent Tibetan state, China's neighbor in the west. In 1956, at the Chinese communist party central committee's congress, Mao Zedong, the communist leader stressed: "We must become a world's leading country in the fields of culture, science, technology and industry. It is unacceptable if we do not become a superpower in a few decades."

In the two subsequent decades, China made every effort to realize that ambition but failed by conducting paranoid-like programs such as the "Great Leap Forward", "the Four Modernizations" and "the Cultural Revolution" that cost dozens of millions of lives and the devastation of the natural and social environment. From the post-Mao period until now, China's hegemony seems less vocal but always firm. Deng Xiaoping, a successor of Mao, and regarded as the author of China's opening in 1978, uttered his philosophy in a proverb-like statement: "it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice".

This immoral philosophy has led China to economic growth of about ten percent p.a for nearly two decades regardless of the disastrous consequences to nature and society. The power of the ruling party has been enhanced greatly but it is the reverse for the people. A ruthless repression of pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the large-scale persecution of Falun Gong followers in 1999 are typical examples.

Military build-up

While newly escaping from the low-income list, China has invested a great deal in military strength. The defense budget was stealthily growing for years. Now China has already 2.3 million military personnel–the world's largest. The figure officially annnounced for the increase in China's defense budget last year was 17.8 percent, and for this year 17.6 percent, up to $58.8 billion; military experts estimate that the true figure is more than twice that announced by China.

The Chinese navy has been equipped with new high-tech facilities and is regarded as the strongest in the region. Seemingly to assuage the world's concerns, China has conducted a series of deflecting tactics such as taking limited part in unravelling international problems like North Korea's nuclear threat, sending troops for the UN peacekeeping force in Liberia, and a recent agreement to establish a telephone link between its defense department and United States. Those tactics seem to be bought even by Bush's administration except perhaps for the Pentagon.

We want to believe in China, but the fact is that China is expanding flagrantly its control and invasion over the sea and islands of Vietnam–the Paracels and Spratley which are important strategic positions in the international sea route.

We think about China's hostile behavior toward the Dalai Lama's demand only for real autonomy in Tibet; and China's ambiguous attitude toward rogue regimes in Burma, Sudan, Iran. So it is obvious that China's hegemony is advancing region-wide and what happens to humankind if one day such a violence-favoring regime grows strong enough to dominate the world?

And back to the upcoming Olympics. Although China had conducted a great deal of political and economic lobbying, one important but intangible thing which helped China win the 2008 Olympics hosting rights was the altruism of humankind. The right to host the 2008 Olympics Games seven years ago was preceded by the promise of China's leaders, implicitly and explicitly, to improve its own poor human rights record.

Tragic images

At the time the world, especially people in countries with a free-press which are also powerful members of the IOC, could not forget the tragic images of the 1989 Tiananmen Square, Falun Gong's persecution or China's abysmal human rights record...and it might have been sure that everyone hoped and expected the highly-ethical Olympics spirit would inspire the host country's leaders' toward a more liberal society. But so far the reality has been the opposite.

The attempts of China's leaders to make man-made wonderworks at any cost have caused fatal consequences. Until last month China's authorities did not recognize the lost lives in building Olympics facilities and the exact death toll is still unknown, not to mention the anguish of displaced people.

An irony for nature is that the Shunyi "water heaven" water park that can shoot 134 meters high, has been built on the dried-out remains of the Chaobai River, and many athletes are considering using masks in the upcoming games.

And as usual the authorities have been making every effort to silence any citizen who dares to address real human rights issues, as was the case of a recent 3.5 year-prison sentence given to a 35 year-old man named Hu Jia for his peaceful activism on AIDS and human rights issues.

Betrayal

This disappointing reality has just made those who had supported Beijing hosting the Olympics feel completely betrayed. And the recent Chinese crackdown, with some 140 Tibetan monks and civilians killed, only serves as an additional drop to a brim-full glass of indignation. Altruism itself feels betrayed.

Though Polish P.M Donald Tusk, Czech President Vaclav Klaus, Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have refused to attend the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony on August 08; though many like Reporters Sans Frontières and the human rights activist Mia Farrow vowed to continue to protest; and though the Beijing Olympic Torch relay has been facing unwelcome attention, the final outcome has to be seen.

But one thing for certain is that the activism against the upcoming Beijing Olympics has been in the interests of a bullied people, including about 1.3 billion in China, and in the hope for a friendly and peaceful future for humankind.

Dr. Pham Hông Son, was born in Nam Dinh province, Vietnam. He graduated from medical college of Hanoi in 1992. In early 2002 he translated into Vietnamese the article " what is democracy?" that was posted on a website of the U.S. embassy in Vietnam. Sentenced to 13 years in prison in his first trial then reduced to 5 years in prison on appeal. He spent 4.5 years in prison and has been under house arrest in Hanoi since his release in August 2006. Author of many on-line essays focussing on political and social subjects of national interest. Defender of human rights, in particular rights to freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom of association. Honorary member of International PEN Centres (France, Canada and Sydney). One of the winners of the Hellmann Hammet Awards in 2003 (Human Rights Watch).

Land Border, South China Sea Disputes: Paracel Islands

2008-01-18T02:11:00.000+07:00

By Henry J. Kenny

Excerpt from the book:
Shadow of the Dragon: Vietnam’s Continuing Struggle with China and the Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, Potomac Book Inc., 2002, pp.61-64

The Paracel Islands are the second area of Sino-Vietnamese disputes in the South China Sea. Lying some 250 nautical miles east of Da Nang, the Paracels consist of two island groups: the Amphitrite Group to the east and the Crescent Group to the west. The entire land area of the Paracels totals 7.6 square kilometers, the largest of which is Woody Island, with almost two square kilometers.(32)

China has multiple claims to the Paracel Islands. First, it argues that its claim is supported by the 1887 Sino-French convention. That agreement gave China the right to all islands east of the longitude both countries had agreed to in dividing the Gulf of Tonkin. While Vietnam holds that this convention pertained only to the Gulf of Tonkin, China interprets it as pertaining to al of the South China Sea. Second, it claims a historic presence in the islands as evidenced by artifacts and records of ship visits dating to the Han dynasty. China supports this argument by citing recent discoveries of Chinese pottery and other items in the area. Third, China points out that it was the first country to exercise sovereignty over the Paracels, citing a 1909 claim. (33)

Vietnam rejects all these positions. First, it holds that the 1887 Sino-French convention was limited to the Gulf of Tonkin, a likely inference in light of the geographic focus of that convention. Second, it argues that Chinese artifacts do not constitute a basis for sovereignty. The Vietnamese political counselor in Beijing, for example, argues that Chinese artifacts in Japan do not mean that China owns Japan. Third, Hanoi claims that China never actually exercised sovereignty by occupying the islands in the wake of its 1909 claim, whereas Vietnam is the legal successor to French Indochina, which did claim and occupy the islands in 1933.

In fact, however, the French abandoned the isles in the face of Japanese advances in World War II, during which Japan seized the Paracels. In 1946 China reclaimed the islands but did not occupy them until 1956, and even then, they only occupied the Amphitrite Group. At the time, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognized the Chinese position. Premier Pham Van Dong reportedly stated that “from the historical point of view, these islands are Chinese territory,” and in 1958 reiterated that position: “The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes and supports the Government of the People’s Republic of China on its decision concerning China’s territorial sea made September 4, 1958.” (34)

Hanoi later rejected this position, stating that it was made out of necessity during a time when it depended on China for vital support in its war against the United States. When the government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) laid claim to the Paracels and eventually stationed troops in the Crescent Group, Hanoi did nothing to support the Chinese position. In January 1974, after direct U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam had terminated, China seized the Crescent Group from South Vietnamese troops. At the time, with an eye on conquering the South, Hanoi registered its first formal statement expressing dissatisfaction with the Chinese position and called for peaceful resolution of territorial issues. China holds that subsequent Vietnamese objection to its rightful ownership of the Paracels is disingenuous and that Vietnam has no basis for such claims.

China has now strengthened its position in the Paracels to the point where Vietnam has little hope of ever “recovering” them. The PLA has constructed a 2,700-meter runway on Woody Island capable of servicing small numbers of fighter aircraft, and the PLA Navy has been fairly active in the area. (35)

The most significant Chinese action in the Paracels, however, was its 1996 announcement that it was establishing baselines completely around the islands. The most obvious interpretation of this action was that China was claiming the Paracels as a Chinese archipelago, with rights to all resources both within the baseline and reaching outward from it toward an as-yet-unidentified exclusive economic zone. Vietnam immediately protested the action. It stated that “China had deliberately ignored the provisions of the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea on the delineation of base lines concerning the archipelagoes belonging to littoral countries and unilaterally delineated the base line of the Paracel Archipelago as if the islands were an archipelagic nation.” (36) In fact, the Chinese action was even more egregious, for in subsequent discussions with ASEAN members, China has made the claim that waters within the baseline are “internal waters.” This is tantamount to saying all waters within the baselines are “the good earth” and that neither transit nor innocent passage by foreign vessels would be permitted. (37)

In contrast to Vietnam, China refuses to include the Paracels in the Code of Conduct being negotiated between China and the ASEAN states over the South China Sea. China has also opened the islands to tourists and constructed scientific and communications stations on the islands. (38) Vietnam has repeatedly condemned this construction. A typical Vietnamese reaction is as follows:

“The New China News Agency reported that China had built a satellite relay station on Woody Island to “extend China’s security network more than 300 km south of Hainan Island” and “to aid China in its assault on crimes related to weapons, drugs, and smuggling in the Eastern Sea.” China also installed telephone booths on Spratly Islands. However, the essence of the issue is not the purpose of controlling smuggling but to “expand into the south of the Eastern Sea, step by step conquering the islands of the region…” The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry pointed out: “Vietnam’s stance regarding the Spratly and Paracel Archipelagoes is clear. Vietnam is fully justified to assert its sovereignty over the two archipelagoes. With regard to the issues under dispute, Vietnam advocates striving for a fundamental and lasting solution through peaceful negotiations. While promoting talks it is necessary to maintain stability on the basis of the status quo, and the parties concerned should exert self-restraint and refrain from any action that may further complicate the situation. We consider any illegal action by foreign countries concerning the two archipelagoes a violation of Vietnam’s territorial sovereignty and invalid. We deem that the above-cited plan is not conducive to the relations between the two countries and the settlement of disputes in the Eastern Sea.” (39)

Vietnamese government officials continue to assert their country’s sovereignty over the Paracels. Government spokespersons typically react to any action that denies Vietnam’s claim to the islands. For example, when China announced a temporary ban on fishing in the South China Sea in 1999, the Vietnamese foreign ministry responded by reasserting Vietnam’s sovereignty over the islands.

“Vietnam has time and again affirmed that it has sufficient historical evidences and legal basis to prove its indisputable sovereignty over the Hoang Sa [Paracels] and Truong Sa [Spratly] archipelagoes… Any action by any country on or around Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes as well as in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zones and continental shelf without the Vietnamese Government’s consent is violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty and sovereign rights over these zones.” (40)

The possibility of petroleum discoveries adds to the dispute. In October 1999 China announced the discovery of natural gas-hydrate, a solid “gas ice” in the seabed of the Paracel Islands. Gas-hydrate is a clean high-power energy source with considerable potential for future development. The discovery is reportedly the first of its kind in China.(41)

In summary, both China and Vietnam have strong claims to the Paracels, but only China has maintained a presence there since 1974. Vietnam has little ability to project power to the Paracels, while China has developed the islands for cultural, economic, and military use. The importance of the Paracels to Vietnam, then, appears less in any real hope of “recovering” them as in using them as a bargaining chip in anticipated negotiations over bilateral disputes in the Spratly Islands. Therefore, Vietnam’s policy of maintaining the status quo supports its favorable position relative to China, but at the same time that policy undercuts its claims in the Paracels where Vietnam has no presence whatsoever.

About the AuthorDr. Henry Kenny directs studies for the U.S. Navy and the Pacific Command at the Center for Naval Analyses Corporation. He has served with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the American Embassy in Tokyo, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Kenny is the author of The American Role in Vietnam and East Asia and other publications. He lives in McLean, Virginia.

Interview with Le Minh Phieu - Vietnamese Olympic torch bearer

2008-01-18T02:10:00.000+07:00

Le Minh Phieu is one of the 6 Vietnamese selected to carry the Olympic torch when it passes through Ho Chi Minh City on 29 April 2008. Recently, Phieu wrote a letter to the IOC President about China's violation of Olympic rules by wrongly claiming ownership over the Paracel Islands which it seized from Vietnam in its torch relay maps. On 9 April 2008, Phieu was interviewed by DCVOnline. Following is the content of the interview:

By DCVOnline (translated by Le Duc)

9 April 2008 in France

DCVOnline: Hello Le Minh Phieu, first, can you please tell us what motivated you to enter the contest “Looking for torch bearers for the Beijing Olympics 2008” sponsored by Samsung?

Le Minh Phieu: This project was initiated quite some time ago, since August 2007. At that time, a close friend knew of this contest, and he said that he would write an essay nominating me.

Knowing that the Olympic torch – a symbol of noble spirit, peace, and unity among the nations – making its way to Vietnam for the first time, I agreed to the idea. I was somewhat uneasy at that time. Honestly, I wondered whether I was suitable to carry the torch.

I also want to add that the situation was not very tense at that time. There wasn’t news about the establishment of Sansha. The Tibetan situation also wasn’t complex as it is now.

DCVOnline: After Samsung announced the results in which you were one of 6 nominees chosen to carry the Olympic 2008 torch in Ho Chi Minh City, has your application officially approved by the Vietnamese Olympic Committee yet?

Le Minh Phieu: I don’t know the concrete details of the selection process. When I received the official result, it is also the result that has been approved by all the agencies, including the Beijing Olympics 2008 Committee.

DCVOnline: When did you receive this result?

Le Minh Phieu: On 21 February 2008 at 11:01:53 AM, according to the announcement of Samsung.

According to the news by the Beijing Olympic Committee, the list of all the people participating in the torch relay in Vietnam will be sent to the Beijing Olympic Committee for examination before being officially announced. It was to be announced at the end of December 2007. This means that the news above was announced after being approved by all the agencies.

DCVOnline: Have you found out which part of the relay route will you be carrying the torch?

Le Minh Phieu: Not yet.

DCVOnline: On 7 April when the Olympic torch was going through Paris, what were you doing, and where were you?

Le Minh Phieu: At that time I was at the post office sending the letter to the IOC President and posting it on my blog.

DCVOnline: If on 29 April everything proceeds according to plan without changes, will you be participating in the torch relay or standing among the protestors?

Le Minh Phieu: I will participate in the relay. I was chosen to hold the torch, which means to honor the noble spirit, honor peace and unity among the nations of the world; therefore, I have to fulfill my responsibility. I cannot let down those who selected me. The reason I wrote the letter is also because of that reason: to honor and protect the noble values of the Olympics.

DCVOnline: So even if China does not care for the letter you sent to the IOC president, you will still participate in the torch relay?

Le Minh Phieu: I am a law student. I have to take actions as a person in this field. China’s action is a violation of the Olympic rules. I have called for this violation to stop. However, supposing China does not make amends, then we will have to find other ways.

I had promised to hold the torch in October, before the result was officially announced. Therefore, if I refuse now, it means that I will violate my own promise. The violation of a law is not the legal way to counter against another illegal action. Moreover, in any way, the Olympic torch belongs to the world; it is not China’s. It symbolizes goodness. If someone does something to take away that goodness, then we have to ask them to bring it back. We should not make that goodness be lost when someone else dirties it.

Moreover, I will carry the torch to affirm with the world that “even though we are not the host of the Olympics, the Vietnamese also have a noble spirit.” Therefore, as the host of the Olympics – the symbol of noble spirit – China should truly display that noble spirit.

DCVOnline: You just said that “before the results being officially announced,” what result is that?

Le Minh Phieu: That is the day in which I was selected to the final rounds (12 people in the final, 3 to be chosen). The Samsung organizers sent me a form to sign and I signed it. This took place in October 2007.

DCVOnline: A person name Pham V.H. wrote an article calling for Vietnamese to demonstrate against the torch on 29 April when it passes through Vietnam. What do you think of this call?

Le Minh Phieu: In my opinion, politics should be separated from sports. We need to give purity back to sports. That is also the spirit that I wrote to the IOC president about.

DCVOnline: What are your thinking on the activities of the Tibetans in and outside China protesting against territorial invasion, cultural genocide, and oppression and killing of Tibetans by the Chinese government?

Le Minh Phieu: I am sorry that I cannot answer this question. I am answering as a torch bearer, and as a person calling for separation of sports and politics. Therefore, I ask to not answer this question at this time.

DCVOnline: Then what do you think of the activities of the Tibetans in Paris and London recently when the Olympic torch passed through these two cities?

Le Minh Phieu: In Paris, they have the right to demonstrate. But I think that it would be better if the demonstrators did not obstruct and make the torch go out. The torch belongs to the world, not of any particular country. It represents goodness. It should not be obstructed and put out.

DCVOnline: Why did you choose 7 April to publicize the letter?

Le Minh Phieu: Simply because that was the day I finished writing the letter, and also the day I sent it to the IOC president. I posted it on the internet immediately after I sent it.

DCVOnline: How long did it take you from the time you thought of writing the letter until publicizing it?

Le Minh Phieu: I began to think about it on 22 March. I began to write since that day. Actually I was supposed to send it sooner but my blog had problems. I had to fix it before sending the letter.

DCVOnline: What are your thoughts on the reactions of the Vietnamese government in the face of acts of territorial violation and killing and injuring of Vietnamese fishermen by China?

Le Minh Phieu: This question is similar to the above question, so I ask to not answer.

DCVOnline: Has the Vietnamese embassy in France given any response since you publicized the letter?

Le Minh Phieu: I have not received any response. This activity was carried out by me rather quietly until the day I publicized the letter. Even in Bordeaux, virtually none of the students knew of this letter.

DCVOnline: Last question. Do you follow the opinions of people who read your letter posted on DCVOnline?

Le Minh Phieu: Since the day I publicized the letter until today, I had to prepare for a meeting with my professor this morning, so I haven’t had the chance to read many responses from people on the internet. I will probably read later.

DCVOnline: Thank you for this interview.

Source:
http://www.danchimviet.com/php/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4891

Pictures of VietWill protest in San Francisco (9.4.2008)

2008-01-18T02:09:00.000+07:00

http:// www.VietWill.org

Vietnamese torch bearer writes to IOC President about Paracels Issue

2008-01-18T02:08:00.001+07:00

Le Minh Phieu
A Beijing 2008 Olympic torch-bearer
Ph.D Candidate at Center for European and International Documentation and Research
Post-graduate School of Law - Bordeaux IV - Montesquieu University
Avenue Léon Duguit, 33600 Pessac, France

Bordeaux, 7 April 2008

International Olympic Committee
Château de Vidy
1007 Lausanne
Switzerland
Attn : Count Jacques Rogge
President
Subject: Request to De-politicise the Beijing2008 Olympics

Dear Mr. President,

First of all, I am proud and delighted to inform you that I will be one of sixty Vietnamese nationals carrying the 2008 Beijing Olympic torch through Ho Chi Minh City on the coming 29th April 2008.

It is my great honour to have been chosen as a bearer of the Olympic torch - the symbol of olympism, of peace and of solidarity of all people in the world - which will be relayed in Vietnam for the first time. However, after studying closely the Planned Route Map for the Beijing 2008 Olympic and Paralympic Torch Relay published on the official website of the BOCOG, I find that the torch that I will bear is not the torch of pure olympism, but it is a torch of an olympism politicized by the the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (“BOCOG”).

During the course of its historical developments, Vietnam has established its sovereignty over the Paracel islands. When Vietnam was divided into two parts by the 17th parallel according to the 1954 Geneva Agreements, this group of islands, located in the south of the 17th parallel, belonged to South Vietnam under the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam. After the country was united in 1975, according to the principles of succession of states under international law, the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietam obtained full sovereignty over the Paracel islands.

However, in 1974, China with their military forces invaded the Paracel islands. All the military forces of the Republic of Vietnam defending this group of islands were massacred by the Chinese army. Since then, the State of the Republic of Vietnam and subsequently the Socialist Republic of Vietnam have persistently demanded China to return the Paracel islands to Vietnam.

Nevertheless, China not only failed to return the Paracel islands to Vietnam but also demonstrated continual challenges of the Vietnamese sovereignty over these islands. China has constructed an airport on the Paracel islands, opened tourist routes to these islands and recently established the Sansha District to administer these islands. China is taking more and more steps to show their claim of sovereignty over the Paracel islands, the Vietnamese territory which they have invaded since 1974.

Even in hosting the 2008 Olympic and Paralymic games, China has not missed the opportunity to politicize the Olympic and Paralymic Games. Via the official website of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China deceives the world that they have sovereignty over the Paracel islands, an area which China illegitimately took from Vietnam in 1974. I will prove this to you through the following:

1. The Planned Route Map for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Torch Relay (Appendix 1 to this letter) and the Planned Route Map for the Beijing 2008 Paralympic Torch Relay (Appendix 2 to this letter) intentionally depict the Paracel islands as a part of the Chinese territory. In the maps, all provinces, municipalities and regions of China were shown from the top to bottom by ascending shades from dark to bright. The Paracel islands (intentionally enlarged in an inset) are shown in similar colouring style while other areas not under Chinese sovereignty are not shown in such manner.

The world has thousands of islands and they are normally indicated by dots on maps of this scale. Some islands are not shown even by such dots on these two maps. It is therefore impossible to find a nonpolitical reason to justify why the Paracel islands alone are depicted to a larger scale and enlarged in an inset in such manner.

2. In the Planned Route Map for the Beijing 2008 Olympics - Detailed Itineray on the Chinese territory (Appendix 3 to this letter), the Paracel islands are also the only items which were curiously enlarged. The Paracel islands are therefore always depicted to a larger scale and enlarged in an inset. The inset, if clicked upon, is even further enlarged, showing the map of the Paracel islands with a caption « South China Sea Islands ».

If the BOCOG does not wish to politicise the Olympic Games, does not wish to take advantage of the official website of the BOCOG to tell the world that China has sovereignty over the Paracel islands, why would the map of the Olympic torch relay contain the above mentioned features?

According to Rule 51 entitled «Advertising, Demonstrations, Propaganda » of the Olympic Charter effective from 07 July 2007 (available at http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf), ‘no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas”.

During one of your speeches on radio France 24, you referred to the above rule and stated that any athlete using the Beijing Olympics as a political forum would be punished.

In a press conference with the British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett on 18 May 2007, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs also criticised the politicisation of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Thus, the politicisation of the Olympics was not only recognised in the Olympic Charter but also quoted by you, the head of the International Olympic Committee and the Chinese Foreign Minister.

But, the BOCOG can not be exempted from the duty to de-politicise the Olympics. The use of their website to politicise and disseminate their political agenda as explained above is inconsistent with the atheletic spirit of the Olympics, goes against the statements made by you and the Chinese Foreign Minister on the media and, particularly, a breach of the Olympic Charter.

Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Olympic Charter (Mission and Role of the International Olympic Committee) and Rule 36.3 (the composition of the Executive Body of the Olympic Organising Committee), the International Olympic Committee headed by you must be partly responsible for the above act of politicisation.

Therefore, I am writing to request that you take actions to procure that the above politicisation be ceased, by requesting the 2008 Beijing Olympic Organising Committee to take specific steps including, but not limited to:

- Removing the graphical details showing the Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel islands on all maps posted on the official website of the BOCOG.

In my goodwill, I believe that such action, if carried out, will clearly evidence the real depolitical attitude of the International Olympic Committee, the BOCOG and the Chinese Government. On the other hand, as long as the Plans Routed Map on official website of 2008 Beijing Olympic contain the politicising elements as stated above, the Olympic Charter will remain breached and all appeals for depoliticisation in a political situation challenging the Beijing 2008 Olmpic as currently exists, will lack conviction.

For transparency, I would like to inform you that this letter will be copied and distributed to the media in the world and released to the public. May I draw your attention to the fact that not only me, but also the media and the public will be waiting for your response and action. I also confirm that the content of this letter shows only my personal views and does not represent the views of any other individual, agency, organisation or government of any nation.

While I await your reply and action, may I convey to you my best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Le Minh Phieu

Appendix 1
The Planned Route Map for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Torch Relay on the official website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Organising Committee
(Source: http://torchrelay.beijing2008.cn/en/journey/map/)

Appendix 2
Planned Route Map for the Beijing 2008 Paralympic Torch Relay published on the official website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Organising Committee
(Source: http://torchrelay.beijing2008.cn/en/journey/map/)

Appendix 3
The 2008 Olympic torch relay map (enlarged) published on the official website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Organising Committee
(Source: http://torchrelay.beijing2008.cn/en/journey/map/)

Source: Le Minh Phieu Blog
http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-UHzTMyU9fquQ3KuMrYpCZ8qXtg--?cq=1&p=1831

Vietnamese students protest at the Paris torch relay

2008-01-18T02:07:00.000+07:00

6 April 2007

VietWill persists with plan for protest at S.F. torch relay

2008-01-18T02:05:00.000+07:00

For Immediate Release:

VietWill persists with plan for protest at S.F. torch relay

Berkeley, CA
7 April 2008

VietWill, an Internet-based activist group, is determined to carry out its protest against China's aggression in Vietnam’s Eastern Sea (South China Sea) on the occasion of the Olympic torch arriving in San Francisco on April 9 to call attention to the Chinese government’s blatant disregard for the lives of Vietnamese fishermen as it strives for world superpower status.

VietWill also plans to use the relay event to speak out against the Chinese government’s politicization of the Olympics in declaring its ownership of Paracel Islands, which China illegally seized from South Vietnam in 1974. In addition, China also illegally took control of a number of the Spratly Islands from Vietnam since 1988, and made egregious claims over 80% of the Eastern Sea as its territorial waters.

The group will particularly protest China's bullying activities in Vietnam’s Eastern Sea, among which is the shooting, killing, and capturing of Vietnamese fishermen making an honest living on what China regards as its territorial waters.

Vietnam has a long coastline running north to south (2140 miles, islands excluded). Therefore, fishing is a critical economic activity for Vietnamese people, especially for those in Central Vietnam, where there is little agricultural land. For thousands of years, Vietnamese fishermen have been fishing on Vietnam’s Eastern Sea. Today, they continue to fish where their fathers, grandfathers, and ancestors fished, but they are called "pirates" and "robbers," chased after, and shot.

The injured are captured and mandated to pay a ransom of 15,000USD, which is equivalent to many years of earning on the sea. Most of the fishermen are not aware of the international border disputes or China's hegemonic ambitions; they only know that the shooting comes from China's Navy boats, and that the soldiers speak Mandarin.

Most of the incidents take place near the Paracel and Spratly Islands. These islands get attention because they are surrounded by an abundance of fish stock, and located on the main trade route through Asia, a strategic location economically and militarily. Additionally, the Spratly region is estimated to contain the fourth largest oil reserve in the world, more than that in Kuwait.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Chinese government would make claims on these islands in order to exercise its control in the region. Although the disputes began in the early 1900s, the escalation has only occurred in the latter part of the 20th century until the present as China focuses on using its military might to invade and seize the islands. And now, innocent Vietnamese fishermen are victimized as China flexes its military muscles.

VietWill invites all who are sympathetic to the livelihood of these poor fishermen on the sea, and who are concerned with China's "un-peaceful rise" to join the group in this demonstration.

Demonstrators plan to distribute information pamphlets and free T-shirts to the public at the protest site in San Francisco in order to highlight that China's bullying of Vietnam and its Southeast Asian neighbors by both diplomatic and military force is a huge threat to the stability in the region. If actions are not taken in a timely manner, it could pose an uncertain imbalance of powers in the world.

VietWill’s protest symbol at the relay will be the Trong Dong Hung Vuong, an ancient Vietnamese Bronze Drum, a symbol of Vietnamese peace-loving spirit with strength of resistance against Chinese imperialism. For thousands of years, Trong Dong has been in front of our battle against foreign invasion, in ceremony and worship our ancestor, and in festival celebrating victories and prosperous crop. And now, this very sacred cultural heritage will serve as the rallying cry and image for VietWill’s modern day struggle against China’s aggression.

www.VietWill.org
info@vietwill.net
Tel: 1 (714) 260-3879

3 years later, families of Vietnamese fishermen shot by Chinese navy in 2005 massacre plea for help

2008-01-18T02:02:00.005+07:00

By Tony Le

4 April 2008

On 8 January 2005, China's naval forces carried out one of the bloodiest attacks on Vietnamese fishermen ever in the South China Sea. The victims came from Thanh Hoa, one of the poorer provinces in Vietnam. (The accounts of the incident can be found here: http://vietwill.org/content/view/108/237/).

The killing has taken place for three years, but the families of the victims have not found any justice or peace of mind. They are also disappointed with the lack of assistance that they have received from Vietnam in order to demand reparations from China for its serious violation of international law.

In a 30 March 2008 letter of petition that they addressed to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, ASEAN Human Rights Commission, various human rights agencies and organizations, and news agencies, the representatives of the families of the victims in the massacre cry out for help and express their disdain of China’s actions of making aggressions on Vietnamese territories as well as the shooting and killing of innocent Vietnamese fishermen. The writers of the letter, also identifying themselves as the mothers and wives of the victims (photo), say:

"We reside in Hoang Truong village, Hoang Hoa district, Thanh Hoa Province, Vietnam. We represent the families of fishermen killed in the 8 January 2005 massacre in which Chinese naval officers killed 9 of our family members and injured 8 others.

We would like to present to you our petition letter regarding the Chinese government ordering and defending its naval forces to transgress Vietnamese territories and shooting and killing Vietnamese fishermen. The details of the incident are as follow:

On 8 January 2005, our family members were fishing in Vietnamese waters, where for hundreds of years, generations of our forefathers have gone to fish for a living. Suddenly many boats belonging to China’s naval forces illegally entered the territorial waters and shot at two of our fishing boats causing 9 people to die, and 8 others injured. In addition, they took 8 more back to China with them. According to the investigation by the border patrol of Thanh Hoa province, the boats were inside Vietnamese territorial waters when they were attacked. The boats at that time were located at 18’16’’ N and 107’6” E, which is 10 nautical miles from the border mark of the common fishing water between Vietnam and China. The victims captured were very ill treated; for example, they were not given good, were severely beaten, were forced to give depositions through harsh interrogations as criminals day and night without a translator, and were given medical care as if they were little more than animals… Death certificates given by both China and Vietnam left blank the “cause of death”.

In the letter, the families also express their disappointment with the Vietnamese government who they feel has not done enough to help them obtain justice from China.

“The violation of territorial waters and killing of innocent Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese naval forces is a serious violation of international law; however, even though three years have past, our families have not received any response from China. Although Vietnamese agencies have voiced their opinions about this violation, we feel that the Vietnamese government has not been forceful enough, and has not done enough to protect its people.”

The petitioners express that they are well aware of China's hegemonic ambitions and its intentions with regards to Vietnam’s territories.

“We understand that the Chinese government will never cease their ambitions of invading our country, will never cease the ambition of building a Great China, will always look down on our government and our Vietnamese people. Recently, they have egregiously established the Sansha administrative region comprising of Vietnam’s Paracel and Spratly Islands. They are increasingly making aggressions onto our land and waters, and harming our people. The year 2008 is when China hosts the Olympic, which has the great purpose of opening up exchange and increasing friendly collaboration among the countries; however, we see clearly that the Chinese government did not intend to do any of that. The boycotts and protests from people all over the world help us to understand the wicked intentions of the Chinese government even more clearly.

With this petition, we hope that agencies and organizations do your best to help us in our effort to find justice, so that forces that bring about pain and suffering for us take responsibility for the consequences that they have made.”

Sovereignty over Paracel and Spratly Islands: Analyzing the Viewpoints of Vietnam and China

2008-01-18T02:00:00.002+07:00

Tu Dang Minh Thu[1]
(Translated from Vietnamese by Le Duc)

Thoi Dai Moi
Journal of Research and Discussion
No. 11 – July 2007

When speaking of the Eastern Sea (South China Sea), no one does not think of two very beautiful names of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa. Unfortunately, these two names have become attached to things contrary to what is good, beautiful, harmonious, because these two distant archipelagos are the subject of a fierce conflict among the countries and territories in the region. The dispute has prolonged nearly a century but has not been resolved, but instead, intensifies day by day. It has now become a threat to peace in Southeast Asia.

At times explosive, other times calm, this dispute contains all forms of battle, from politics, diplomacy, to violence. The countries involved in the dispute also change depending on the time. At first, there was only France and China; after that, Japan and the Philippines also jumped in demanding their rights. After WWII, a defeated Japan withdrew from the dispute, France left Indochina, China had a change of government, the parties in the conflict now included South Vietnam, China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. After the reunification of Vietnam, the dispute continued between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the other three countries and territories. When the “new Law of the Sea” was born, the significance of the two archipelagos increased, as did the number of parties in the dispute. Malaysia, Brunei also demanded rights to the Truong Sa islands. With the new Convention on Law of the Sea, whichever country that controls these archipelagos not only controls the territorial waters around the islands but also the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf around the archipelagos. Therefore, the matter of determining sovereignty on the archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa has become increasingly important.

I. The Progression of Dispute

The progression of the dispute will be outlined temporally through three periods [in Vietnamese history]: pre-French colonialism, French colonialism, and post-French colonialism.

1. Pre-French Colonialism

- Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen lived on the islands according to the season, but no one knows since what time.

- Beginning of 17th century: The Nguyen Lord organized exploitation of the islands. The Hoang Sa Company and the Bac Hai Company had the task of stationing on the two archipelagos 8 months each year to exploit the resources: catch fish, collect valuable resources on the islands, collect goods from sunken vessels.

- 1753: In Le Quy Don’s set of historical works Phu Bien Tap (Miscellanies on the government of the marches), it is told that there were 10 soldiers of the Bac Hai Company arriving on the Spratly Islands. 8 came on shore while 2 stayed on the boats to guard. Unexpectedly a storm arrived and the boats drifted to port Thanh Lan of China. The Chinese government investigated, and helped them to return home after finding out what happened.[2]

- 1816: Emperor Gia Long formally took possession of the islands, ordered for the flying of flag and taking geographical measurements.

- 1835: Emperor Minh Mang ordered building of shrine, placing of a stone tablet, staking the island, and planting trees. The Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies were given more responsibilities: exploitation, patrolling, collecting taxes from people on the island, and guarding and defending the two archipelagos. The two companies continued their activities until France arrived to Indochina.

2. Era of French colonialism

- 1884: Hue Pact resulted in colonial rule of Vietnam.

- 9/6/1885: The French – Qing agreement was a friendship agreement, bringing an end to conflict between France and China.

- 26/6/1887: French – Qing agreement determined land borders between northern Vietnam and China.

- 1895 – 1896: La Bellona and Imeji Maru incident. The two ships La Bellona and Imeji Maru sunk near Hoang Sa, one sunk in 1895 and the other in 1896. Fishermen from Hainan collected bronze from these two sunken ships. The insurance companies of these two ships protested to China. Chinese government replied that they were not responsible, because Hoang Sa was not Chinese territory, and was also not An Nam’s.

- 1899: Indochinese governor Paul Doumer requested that France build a lighthouse but was not carried out because of the lack of fund.

- 5/1909: Chinese sent people to briefly survey the Hoang Sa archipelago before returning.

- 1920: Mitsui Busan Kaisha asked France for permission to exploit Hoang Sa. France denied the request.

- 1920: France controlled the islands and collected taxes there.

- 30/3/1921: South Chinese government declared the incorporation of Hoang Sa (which it called Tay Sa) into Hainan island. Since that time, dispute arose between France and China about juridical title over Hoang Sa. Dispute also arose since 1930 related to Truong Sa, which was French territory.

- 1925: Scientific explorations were made on the islands under the organization of Dr. Krempt, director of the Institute of Oceanography in Nha Trang.

- 8.3.1921: French Governor declared the two archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa to be French territories.

- 1927: The ship De Lanessan docked on Truong Sa.

- 1930: Three French ships – La Malicieuse, L’Alerte, and L’Astrobale – took control of Truong Sa and flew the French flag on this archipelago.

- 1931: China ordered exploitation of bird fertilizer on Hoang Sa with the right being given to Anglo-Chinese Development Company. France protested.

- 1932: France formally declared An Nam had sovereignty over Hoang Sa. France incorporated Hoang Sa into Thua Thien province.

- 1933: Truong Sa was incorporated into Ba Ria province. France proposed to China to take the matter to international court, but China refused.

- 1938: France set up an ownership stele, built a lighthouse, meteorological station, and sent Vietnamese forces to protect Pattle Island.

- 1946: France withdrew after losing in WWII. France returned to Pattle, but withdrew because of engaging in war with Vietnam.

1946: Using the Cairo and Postdam declarations as a front, 4 Chinese warships came to the islands, and soldiers came ashore for the reason of disarming Japanese soldiers.

- 1947: China declared that it has taken Hoang Sa, but in fact, it had only taken over Woody Island. France protested and sent French-Vietnamese forces to the island. The two sides negotiated in Paris. France proposed an international arbitrator, but China refused.

- 1950: Chinese forces withdrew from Woody Island.

- 1951: At the San Francisco Conference, the Peace Agreement with Japan did not state clearly which country had sovereignty over the islands. The Vietnamese Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Tran Van Huu declared that Hoang Sa and Truong Sa were Vietnamese territories. None of the 51 countries participated protested. The USSR proposed that the two archipelagos be given to China, but it was rejected with 46 votes against, 3 votes for.

3. Post- French colonialism

- 4/1956: South Vietnam replaced France in controlling the islands. Only the two largest islands Phu Lam (Woody Is.) and Linh Con had been taken by China before South Vietnamese forces were able to send their troops to the islands, in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Accords.

Throughout this time, South Vietnam continued to assert Vietnamese sovereignty over the islands and carried out relevant administrative tasks vis-à-vis the archipelagos.

- 1/6/1956: Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau of S. Vietnam re-affirmed sovereignty of Vietnam over the two archipelagos.

- 1961: South Vietnam incorporated Hoang Sa into Quang Nam province.

- 1974: South Vietnam incorporated Truong Sa into the Phuoc Tuy province.

- 1974: China invaded Hoang Sa, took control of the islands, after overcoming S. Vietnamese naval forces.

- 1975: The Vietnam People’s Army replaced South Vietnam’s forces at Truong Sa.

- 1977: Vietnam declared its sea territories, including the archipelago.

During this time, a number of countries also took control of a number of islands on Truong Sa.

- 1988: China sent force to Truong Sa for the first time and a battle took place between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces. Over 70 Vietnamese officers disappeared into the waters. China prevented the Red Cross from rescuing missing Vietnamese officers.

- 1989: China took another island.

- 1990: China proposed to collaborate in developing Hoang Sa.

- 1992: China seized more islands.

- 1994: A head-off took place between Vietnam and an exploration ship of China collaborating with Crestone Company

Presently, China controls all of Hoang Sa. As for Truong Sa, the dispute takes place among six countries and territories: Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.

II. Analyzing Vietnamese and Chinese Claim

The claims that both Vietnam and China make are based on historical title, both asserting that they have exercised sovereignty since ancient times, as supported by historical evidence. In addition, China before, as Taiwan today, and other authors usually point to the French-Chinese Accord of 1887 to assert that the two archipelagos belong to China. Because China and Taiwan have agreed to speak with one voice in this dispute, it can be said that this is a reason given by China. Recently, since the dispute with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, China has given a number of other arguments, which are pronouncements once made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This paper will analyze the above three arguments.

1. Historical sovereignty

Both Vietnam and China claim that they discovered, occupied and exercised sovereignty since a long time ago. Let us attempt to analyze the arguments of both sides to determine whether they satisfy international criteria. First, we look at international law regarding possession of an unoccupied territory.

1.1. The possession of an unoccupied territory

Occupation of a territory, in order to be legal, must satisfy three criteria:

First is the criteria related to the territory being occupied: the territory must not have an owner (res nullius), or it has been abandoned (res derelicta).

Second, the possessor must be a country. Possession must be carried out by the government of a country or representative of the government of the country that desires to carry out the occupation. Private individuals cannot exercise possession.

Third is the method of occupation:

Occupation must take place over time. Before 1884, the right to occupation was decreed by the Pope. From the 8th to 15th century, the Pope divided land between Spain and Portugal. By the 16th century, when many other countries participated in the discovery of new land, the method of land division of the Pope was criticized, and a new method for dividing up territories was devised. Whichever country discovered a territory first had to right to take possession of it. Discovery here meant simply seeing the land, not necessarily setting foot on it; that was enough for ownership. Afterward, this criterion was seen as inadequate, and so another criteria was installed, which was symbolic possession. The country doing the possession must leave behind on the territory something symbolizing its desire to take possession: flag, stele, stakes, or anything that would symbolize the country’s possession. By the 18th century, this was again seen as inadequate to justify a country’s sovereignty. Consequently, by 1885, the Berlin Conference set out to resolve ways to divide up land in Africa, which included new more practical criteria for possession. In addition, the Berlin Conference also required that the country taking possession must inform other countries of its possession. The principle of true possession and exercise of sovereignty later became international convention and became the basis for modern international rules regarding possession of unoccupied territories. However, the factor of informing other countries is not an international practice, but only apply to cases in the confines of the Berlin Conference only.

Presently, according to international law, territorial possession must include factors both physical as well as non-physical. The physical factor is indicated through true possession and exercise of sovereignty on that territory. This means that the country taking possession must have regular presence on the territory possessed, and must have activities or behavior that contains national characteristic with regards to that territory. The exercise of sovereignty must be continuous. The non-physical factor means that the country must intend to truly possess that land. In order for the possession to be effective, both physical and non-physical criteria must be satisfied. The abandonment of territory also must satisfy two conditions: physical, which means there is no exercise of sovereignty over a long period of time, and non-physical, which is the intention to abandon that land. If the two conditions of physical and non-physical are met, then the territory may be seen as unoccupied territory.[4]

In addition to the method of occupation and effectivity, a country can gain possession through other methods such as secession, prescription, consolidation through historical title… The method of “consolidation through historical title” is applied if a country has made use of another territory for a long period of time without opposition from any other country.[5]

The above criteria have been applied regularly in international cases, such as in the disputes involved Palmas Island, Groenland Island, Minquier and Ecrehous Islands….

1.2 Historical sovereignty of Vietnam

It must be said that due to situation of war, many historical documents of Vietnam have been destroyed or missing. Vietnam has provided many historical and geographical documents to prove that it has discovered these two archipelagos for a long time, has occupied symbolically as well as truly, and exercised sovereignty over the two archipelagos through many emperors’ reigns through at least three centuries.

1.2.1 Discovered at least since the 15th century, and exercised sovereignty in the 17th century

Vietnamese fishermen lived on the islands and exploited them since ancient time. The earliest document that Vietnam has is Do Ba’s “Tuyen tap Thien Nam Tu Chi Lo do thu”, written in the 17th century. The term “Tuyen tap” (selected) indicates that these documents were collected from many previous sources. In this volume, Do Ba described these islands very accurately, and confirm that the Nguyen Lords established the Hoang Sa Company to exploi the islands since the 17th century. The description is as follows:
“At the village of Kim Ho, on both banks of the river, stand two mountains each containing a gold deposit exploited under government control. On the high sea, a 400-li long and 200-li wide archipelago (2) called "Bai Cat Vang" (Yellow sandbanks) emerges from the deep sea facing the coastline between the harbor of Dai Chiem and the harbor of Sa Vinh (3). During the South-West monsoon season, commercial ships from various countries sailing near the coasts often wreck on the insular territories. The same thing happens during the North-East monsoon season to those ships sailing on the high sea. All the people on board wrecked ships in this area would starve. Various kinds of wrecked cargoes are amassed on these islands.

Each year during the last month of winter, the Nguyen rulers send to the islands an 18-junk flotilla in order to salvage them. They obtain big quantities of gold, silver, coins, rifles and ammunitions. From the harbor of Dai Chiem the archipelago is reached after a journey of one-and-a-half day, while one day suffices if one embarks from Sa Ky.”[6]

According to historian Vo Long Te, even though Do Ba’s book was written in the 17th century (1686), the first paragraph of the two paragraphs above was quoted from Hong Duc’s volume Hong Duc Ban Do, which is the pen name of emperor Le Thanh Tong (1460-1497).[7] Consequently, Vietnam has discovered or known of these islands at least since the 15th century. The name of Bai Cat Vang indicates that these islands were known by Vietnamese who, though were not well educated, but knew much about the ocean and were able to exploit these islands long before the Nguyen Lords organized expeditions to exploit them. Vietnamese people had made their living on the islands for many centuries, and the government under the Nguyen Lord organized systematic exploitation of the islands since the 17th century. These factors, especially the exploitation by the government since the 17th century through many centuries, has established a historical title by Vietnam over these islands since that time.

1.2.2. Exercising Sovereignty in the 18th century: Le Quy Don’s historical work of Phu Bien Tap Luc (Miscellanies on the government of the marches)

Le Quy Don was a mandarin in the Le Dynasty, in charge of the Thuan Hoa, Quang Nam region. He wrote Phu Bien Tap Luc in 1776, in Quang Nam, and thus was able to make use of many documents of the Nguyen Lord government.[8] The following passage discusses about the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos:

“…In the Quang Ngai Prefecture, beyond the harbor of An Vinh village, Binh Son district, there is a mountain called Re island, more than 30 dặm wide. In the front there is Tu Chinh ward, where people grow beans going towards the sea; beyond that, there is the Dai Truong Sa island, where there used to be many treasures. The Hoang Sa Company was set up to collect them. They must travel three days and nights in order to reach the islands, which is close to Bac Hai.”[9]

Another very long passage in Phu Bien Tap Luc needs to be cited because it provides many details related to how the Nguyen Lords organized systematic exploitation of the two archipelagos.

“…The village of An Vinh, Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Prefecture, is close to the sea. To the northeast (of the village) there are many islands and miscellaneous rock heads jutting out of the sea, totaling 130 altogether. From the rock heads out to the islands, it sometimes takes a day (by sea) or at least a few watches. On top of the rocks there sometimes are freshwater springs. Linking the islands is a vast strip of yellow sand of over 30 li in length, a flat and vast expanse where the water is clear and can be seen through to the bottom. On the islands there are countless swallows; the species of birds are in the thousands, and hang around even when they see people. On the banks there are many strange things. In terms of snails there are elephant mother-of-pearls which is as big as a mat, on its stomach there is a grain as large as the fingertip, the color is lucid, not like pearls. The shell can be made into ‘tam bai’, and can be used with lime to build houses. There is also ‘oc xa cu’….and ‘oc huong’. All these can be preserved and eaten…[more descriptions of other organisms on the islands].

Foreign vessels encountering storm take shelter on this island. In the past, the Nguyen had created a Hoang Sa Company of 70 men, made up of people from An Vinh village. Every year they take turns going out to the sea, setting out during the first month of the lunar calendar in order to receive instructions regarding their mission. Each man in the company is given six months worth of dry food. They row in five fishing boats and it takes them three days before they reach the islands. They are free to collect anything they want, to catch the birds as they see fit and to fish for food. They (sometimes) find the wreckage of vessels which yield such things as bronze swords and copper horses, silver decorations and money, silver rings and other copper products, tin ingots and lead, guns and ivory, golden bee-hive tallow, felt blankets, pottery and so forth. They also collect turtle shells, sea urchins and striped conches in huge quantities. This Hoang Sa Company does not come home until the eighth month of the year. They enter at Eo harbor, then go to Phu Xuan (present-day Hue) to turn in the goods they have collected in order to have them weighed and verified, then get an assessment before they can proceed to sell their striped conches, sea turtles and urchins. Only then is the Company issued a certificate with which they can go home. These annual collections sometimes can be very fruitful and at other times more disappointing, it depends on the year. It sometimes happens that the company can go out and return empty-handed. I have had the opportunity to check the records of the former Count of Thuyen Duc and found the following results: In the year of Nham Ngo (1702), the Hoang Sa Company collected 30 silver ingots. In the year of Giap Than (1704), 5,l00 catties of tin were brought in. In the year of At Dau (1704), 126 ingots of silver were collected. From the year of Ky Suu (1709) to the year of Quy Ti (1713) i.e. during five consecutive years, the company managed to collect only a few catties of tortoise shell and sea urchins. At one time, all they collected included a few bars of tin a few stone bowls and two bronze cannons.

The Nguyen Lords also established the Bac Hai Company. This company was not given a specific number of people; or how many people from Tu Chinh village and from Canh Dung village who were chosen to be part of the Bac Hai Company. Whoever volunteered to go will be given documents and instructions for their work.” [10]

This passage indicates that the exploitation activities by the Hoang Sa and Bac Hai Companies took lace from the 17th to the end of the 18th century. The activities of these companies were systematic, and on a regular basis, which was 8 months of each year. The sailors were recruited by the government, received benefits from the government, as well as work permits and instructions from the government.

Historical volumes such as Lich Trieu Hien Chuong Loai Chi, Dai Nam thuc Luc Tien Bien, Dai Nam Nhat Thong Chi, Hoang Viet Dia Du Chi, all have passages that relate that the Nguyen Lords organized the exploitation of the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos, as well as other islands. The Thanh Chau Company were in charge of islands on the sea in the region of Quy Nhon, where they collected swallow nests. The Hai Mon Company carried out their activities on Phu Quy islands, while the Hoang Sa company were charged with going out to Hoang Sa islands. After that, the Bac Hai Company was established under the management of the Hoang Sa Company in order to work on the islands in the South, among which was the Truong Sa islands, Con Lon islands, and other islands in the Gulf of Siam that was under the sovereignty of Vietnam.”[11]

Especially important is the historical volumes entitled Lich Trieu Hien Chuong Loai Chi: Du Dia Chi (Settlements of matters by the successive dynasties )written by Phan Huy Chu (1782-1840). Phan Huy Chu’s works have been researched by Gaspardone. This historical collection was written at the beginning of the 18th century and consists of 49 books, now stored at the École Fransaise d’Extrême Orient.[12]

1.2.3 Official taking possession and exercise of sovereignty in the 19th century

Sovereignty continued to be exercised through the 19th century under the Nguyen Dynasty (which is the era following the rule of the Nguyen Lords).

The first Nguyen Emperor, Gia Long, affirmed historical authority of Vietnam even more by officially taking possession of the two archipelagos. In 1816, the emperor ordered the Hoang Sa Company and imperial naval officers to make explorations, take distance measurements, and planting flags on the Hoang Sa archipelago to symbolize the sovereignty of Vietnam. The following passage found in the volume Vietnam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien prove this point:

“In the year of Binh Ty, the 15th year of reign of Emperor Gia Long (1816), naval forces and the Hoang Sa Company made their ways up onto Hoang Sa in order to investigate and explore maritime distance.”

The taking possession of the archipelagos by the order of Emperor Gia Long was affirmed by Western documents.

M.A. Dubois de Jancigny wrote:

“…For over 34 years, the archipelago of Paracel, also known as Cat Vang or Hoang Sa, is a twisted group of islands composed of below and above water islands, which is very terrifying for maritime travelers, has been possessed by the Nam Ky people. We do not know whether they have erected buildings or not, but it is certain that Emperor Gia Long has decided to take this place as his own, because he himself has seen it necessary to take over this place, and in 1816, he has formally planted the flag of Nam Ky there.”[13]

Another article written by Jean Baptiste Chaigneau also noted the above matter:

“Nam Ky presently has an Emperor reigning over Nam Ky itself, Bac Ky, and a part of the Kingdom of Campuchia, a number of distant islands and the Paracel archipelago made up of uninhabited rocks both above and below water. It wasn’t until 1816 that the present Emperor took possession of those islands.”[14]

In 1833, the Emperor Minh Menh ordered a stele to be planted on Hoang Sa and a temple built. He also ordered for the planting of trees and stakes on the islands. In Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien, Book 104, it is written:

“In the autumn month of August of year Quy Ty, the 14th year in the reign of Minh Menh (1833)…the Emperor declared: In the Quang Ngai Prefecture, there is an archipelago called Hoang Sa. From a distance, water and sky is of the same color; it’s impossible to tell whether it’s deep or shallow. Recently, vessels often wander into the shallow and meet calamity. Now, boats should be prepared so that by next year, there will be people to go there to erect shrine, plant stele, and plant many trees. Later on, the trees will grow tall and green, people will see clearly in order to avoid accidents. This is of benefit forever.”[15]

In the following year, Emperor Minh Menh ordered the Hoang Sa Company to go to the islands to make measurements for the task of map drawing. In Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien (1834), book 122, it is noted:

“In the year of Giap Ngo, the 15th year of the reign of Emperor Minh Menh….the Emperor ordered the Company Commander Truong Phuc Si and over 20 sailors to go to Hoang Sa to make maps…”[16]

By 1835, the order of erecting shrine and stele was completed and was mentioned in Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien, book 154:

“In the summer month of June, year At Mui, the 16th year of the reign if Minh Menh (1835)…A shrine was erected (on the islands of) Hoang Sa in Quang Ngai. Hoang Sa is a maritime territory of Quang Ngai. There is a place with white sand, filled with green trees. In the middle of the sandbank there is a well. In the South-West, there is a shrine, a tablet engraved with 4 words: “Van Ly Ba Binh”(1). As for Bach Sa, it has an area of 1,070 truong, formerly had the name of Phat Tu Son. On the east, west, and south bank, there are corals that stretch along the water surface. In the north, beside an island composed entirely of coral arising from the water, with area of 340 truong, 1 truong 3 meters high, on par with a sand bank, called Ban Than Thach. Last year, the Emperor ordered a shrine and stele to be erected there, but it could not be done due to strong waves and wind. Only now is the naval commander Phan Van Nguyen ordered to bring officers, workers, and sailors from the two provinces of Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh, transport materials out to erect the shrine (7 truong away from the older shrine). On the left side of the shrine a stele is erected; on the front side there is a windshield. The work must be completed in ten days.”[17]

The following passage in the same set of book indicates that the Nguyen Dynasty did not only concern about the exploitation of the islands, but also was conscious of the strategic position of the two archipelagos, and viewed them as defensive territories for Vietnam. As a result, a long-term plan was devised to reinforce these territories, as seen in the Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien, book 165:

“In the year of Binh Than, the 17th year in the reign of Minh Menh (1836), spring, January 1…

Ministry of Public Work reported: the land of Hoang Sa belongs to our territorial sea and is of great strategic importance...We have sent our men there to draw maps, but in view of the large area of the sea and of its distance, we have managed to carry it out in one place and we don’t know how to continue the work. Each year it is a custom to send our men there to reconnoitre and to accustom ourselves to the maritime routes. From this year on, at the end of each first month, men of the navy, of the coast guard, and of the garrison will be sent on board a large junk to arrive at the beginning of the second month in Quang Nghia, and the two provinces of Quang Nghaa and Binh Dinh will be authorized to hire junks from privates who will serve at the same time as guides in the voyage to the Hoàng Sa. When the junks arrive at an island or a shoal, no matter which one, they will from that point measure the length, the width, the height, the area, the perimeter of that island or shoal, the depth of the surrounding waters, find out the submerged shoals, reefs, if any, specify whether the approach is dangerous or normal, examine well the terrain, measure and draw a sketch. Moreover, considering the day and the port of departure and marking the route and the direction followed to arrive at a given point, they must estimate in dặm the length of that route and locate this point in regard to the coast by specifying the province and the district in front, the approximative distance in regard to the coast in dặm. All this must be mentioned and reported upon the return.

The King approved the report and gave order to the commander of the navy, Pham Huu Nhat, to lead the fleet and to prepare 10 wooden posts to mark the visited places (each post is 5 thước long, 5 tấc wide, and 1 tấc thick). Each post bears the following inscription engraved on one of its faces: the commander and overseer Phạm Hữu Nhật of the navy has come here to the Hoang Sa for reconnaissance and topographical measures and leaves this witness-post to mark the fact.” [18]

After that, the two archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa were drawn into the maps of the kingdom of Emperor Minh Mang. The passages above prove that historical sovereignty continued to be maintained by Emperor Minh Menh. They also indicate that Vietnam’s sovereignty continue to be carried out by the Nguyen emperors. The Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies were given more responsibilities: patrol, make measurements for the islands for map drawing, make explorations of the geography, draw maritime routes,…These companies also had the responsibility to collect taxes from people living temporarily on the islands. [19]

The two companies of Hoang Sa and Bac Hai were active until the period of France’s invasion of Vietnam. At least since the time of the Nguyen Lords in the 17th century (and perhaps since the 15th century or before), through the various reigns of Nguyen emperors over three centuries, these two companies carried out many activities of exploitation, administration and guarding the archipelagos. The Nguyens were also conscious of its international responsibility since that time and carried out plantation of trees on the islands to help vessels from being sunken and stuck in shallow waters. Clearly these are executions of sovereignty by a country on its own territories.

Therefore, Vietnamese sovereignty was established through two complementary methods: (1) historical title beginning with the use and possession of an unoccupied territory over a long period of time by the Nguyen Lords in the 17th and 18th century (consolidation par titre historique), and (2) sovereignty beginning with the formal possession and execution in a continuous manner under the Nguyen emperors in the 19th century (prise de possession, occupation et effectivite). In reality, establishment through the first method is sufficient to determine title by Vietnam, and therefore, Vietnam would have historical title since the 18th century. This title was then reinforced when the Nguyen emperors officially took possession of the islands. The Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies did not stay constantly on the islands because the conditions did not permit such stay. However, international regulations have been lenient in this aspect, not requiring a constant stay on the islands by the country taking possession. In the Clipperton case, France only ordered a warship to investigate the island without placing any administrative agency to be active regularly. International Arbitrator decided that this was enough to be seen as executing sovereignty, because the conditions on the islands were not permissive of living on a constant basis on the islands. [20] In Vietnam’s case, even though not living on a constant basis on the islands, the Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies remained on the islands 8 months of the year until the wind directions began to change, which was when the storm season arrived forcing them to return home for 4 months. They returned in the first month of the year and stayed for 8 months each year in this manner. With the conditions at that time, boats from other countries, including China were fearful of coming to the islands, while Vietnam ordered officers to be stationed at the islands 8 months each year. This is already surpassing the criteria determined by the Clipperton case, and more than sufficient to see that Vietnam had possessed the two archipelagos since the time of the Nguyen Lords (17th century).

1.2.4. China says that the islands in Vietnam’s maps (Map of Unified Dai Nam) is not Xisha and Nansha of China because the maps show the islands too close to the mainland. [21]

It must be said that the technology of measuring and drawing maps, and perception about distance and time in history are not the same as today. The Chinese authors themselves confirmed this aspect. [22] The matter of determining islands being disputed is not new, and has been presented in many cases. [23] This issue will also put forth by China in section 1.3 of this paper. In any case, in Vietnam’s situation, one only needs to look at the map to see that there is no confusion between Hoang Sa, Truong Sa, and other islands along the sea, when the islands are drawn, because the islands along the shore such is Re island, are also drawn on the map. They are drawn as close along the shore. Therefore, we can conclude that the islands in which the Vietnamese map indicates as Hoang Sa and Van Ly Truong Sa are Hoang Sa and Truong Sa. This method of thinking was applied in the Palmas case. The map drawer did not have accurate perception of distance and proportion needed when drawing on paper, leading to the distance being drawn shorter than in reality.

Even the distance between the two archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Van Ly Truong Sa was reduced, so that in the first look, one would think that these were but one archipelago. However, many things drawn from accounts in Vietnamese history as well as maps of that time, prove that these were not one archipelago.

(1) On the Map of Unified Dai Nam, there is clear notation of two archipelagos: Hoang Sa and Van Ly Truong Sa.

(2) The Vietnamese history and geography books mention up to 130 islands. This number is not consistent with the Hoang Sa archipelago, or Truong Sa archipelago, if accounting each individually. However, if we combine the two archipelagos, the number of 130 is accurate. [24]

(3) If we compare the maps: Map of Unified Dai Nam (no. 1), the magnified map taken from Map of Unified Dai Nam (no. 2), the Times Atlas of the World (abbreviated as Atlas, no. 3 and 6), the magnified modern map of Hoang Sa (no. 4), and map of Truong Sa (no. 7), we will see the following;

- The shape of the archipelago on Map 1 is not consistent with that of Hoang Sa in particular. The shape of the Hoang Sa archipelago is circular, comprising of two Crescent groups, as the name indicates. Behind the Crescent group is the Amphitrite group in an arch shape. In addition there are other scattered islands surrounding the two main groups (see map 3 and 4). In the meantime, if we see map 2, we will find that there is one archipelago in an elongated manner with the middle section being narrowed, which is completely not like the shape of Hoang Sa. The top part of this string of islands has a shape that looks like Hoang Sa (see section A to B on the map, marked by the author for clarity). But the bottom part of the string has an elongated shape spreading out (section B to C), which doesn’t look like any section of Hoang Sa as we can see in map 3 or map 4. This section is definitely not Hoang Sa. According to map 6, between Hoang Sa and Truong Sa there are no other islands, especially one that has an elongated string shape. Therefore, the bottom half of the string of islands drawn in map 2 is none other than Truong Sa.

- The Map of Unified Dai Nam (Map 1) indicates that the string of islands spread all the way from Quang Nam to Cam Ranh, the lowest island on the map is situated on the sea beyond Cam Ranh and Khanh Hoa. While the map of Atlas indicates that Hoang Sa is situated on the sea beyond Quang Nam, with the southern most island being Triton lies parallel to Quang Nam province. In Map 2, the southern most island to the west in the A-B group is parallel to Dai Cat (called Dai Chiem in Do Ba’s map), which lies parallel to Quang Nam. Therefore, the above mentioned island is Triton (indicated as X by the author in map 2). If that’s the case, then how do we explain the string of islands in the second half of Map of Unified Dai Nam, beginning in Quang Nghia (Quang Ngai on Atlas) and stretching to Cam Ranh? The Hoang Sa islands do not stretch to Khanh Hoa or Cam Ranh Bay. If we look at Atlas map, we will see that parallel of Phan Rang province, near Cam Ranh Bay (see Map 6), is the island of Thitu of the Truong Sa archipelago: Northeast Ca, Southeast Cay, South Reef, and West York Island, all are situated on the sea, similar to the distance between Khanh Hoa and Cam Ranh (see Map 7).

- Looking at the Map of Unified Dai Nam (map 1), there are 4 possible explanations:

a) The Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies did not know of Truong Sa and only Hoang Sa was drawn.

b) The Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies were active in Hoang Sa and Truong Sa. The map drawer wanted to draw both archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, but due to inadequate technology, the features were drawn closer than reality.

c) The Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies were only active in the north part of Truong Sa, which is Northeast Cay, Southeast Cay, South Reef, and Thitu; and due to inadequate technology, the map drawer drew those islands as being close to Hoang Sa.

d) The Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies were active in the above mentioned islands and the islands to the south, i.e. Xubi Reef, Loaia Island, Itu Aba Island, Great Discovery Reef, Spratly Island,… but due to inadequate technology, these islands were drawn as being close to Hoang Sa.

Based on mentioned data, the first explanation (a) may be eliminated first, because the number of islands, the shape of Hoang Sa, its location compared to mainland, all these details as drawn on Map 1 and 2 are not consistent with reality as seen in map 3 and 4. We cannot think that due to poor technology that the map drawer of Unified Dai Nam stretched Hoang Sa all the way down to Cam Ranh. In Dai Nam Thu Luc Chinh Bien, book 165, it was clearly said that the purpose of the expeditions of Hoang Sa and Bac Hai were to map the travel routes to each island, and determine the exact location of each island compared to the mainland provinces. “Must determine clearly which port is the way to each island. The way must be estimated in ‘dặm’.” [25] Therefore, the map drawer cannot be so mistaken as to think that the southernmost island of Hoang Sa is parallel to Cam Ranh. The third explanation (c) does not explain the shape of the string of islands on Map 1. The second (b) and fourth (d) explanations seem most accurate because they can explain the shape of the islands in Map 1, the position of the islands parallel to Khanh Hoa, Cam Ranh. The shape of the string of islands in the C-D_ section makes us lean towards explanation (d). However, explanation (c) may also be applied if we believe that the Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies knew of all or most of the islands in the Truong Sa archipelago, but were able to draw of the Western islands when putting them onto the map. This way would be consistent with the number of 130 as mentioned in the above history books. In addition, Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien also indicated in the Ministry of Public Works report that the archipelago was very vast, so only a limited number of islands were drawn. The report also admitted that the map was not drawn accurately.

“The Hoang Sa archipelago, on the frontiers of our country, is an important strategic point…Groups of people have been sent to take measurements and draw maps, but because the archipelago is extremely vast, only one island has been drawn on the map, and even that is not accurate and detailed as desired…” Therefore, the report suggested that the Emperor ordered for people to go to the islands annually: “We should send groups of people to the islands annually in order to investigate the archipelago thoroughly…” [26]

In the map, Truong Sa is drawn closer to Hoang Sa than in reality because technology at the time was poor, not able to make good proportions on paper. Chinese and Western maps of the time also had this defect. Moreover, the location of the archipelagos was on the same longitude of 111 degrees; [27] the Truong Sa archipelago lied a little more to the south east. Therefore, in reality, they were not so far apart. At that time, people did not have accurate perceptions of distance and proportion that must be adhered to when drawing maps. Therefore, it is understandable why the two archipelagos tended to be drawn closely together. Anyway, explanations (b), (c), or (d) all prove that at least Vietnam had sovereignty over the Truong Sa archipelago.

The ancient Western maps also did not distinguish between Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, and so drawn the two together as Hoang Sa. One example is the map of Van Langren, 1595, Les etablissement et point de penetration europeen en Extreme Orient au 18e siecle (Map 8 and 9).

Before the reign of Minh Mang, Hoang Sa and Truong Sa were considered a single archipelago, and thus was called Hoang Sa, sometimes called Van Ly Truong Sa. But after the expeditions were ordered by Emperor Minh Mang to take measurements and make investigations of the two archipelagos, maps drawn thereafter (i.e. Map of Unified Dai Nam), made clear notations of the two separate archipelagos. Looking at map 2, we will see the two groups A-B, and B-C separately with separate names (see Map 5).

Therefore, we can conclude that Vietnam executed sovereignty on both archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa. This would explain the appearance of the Bac Hai company, which was ordered to exploit and administer Truong Sa, Con Lon, Ha Tien region,…(Phu Bien Tap Luc, book 2). One might wonder why the company would be called Bac Hai (North Sea) when its responsibility was in Truong Sa, Con Lon, Ha Tien, which were located in the south. Historian Vo Long Te explained that according to Sino-Vietnamese, Bac Hai can also mean “very distant”. Therefore, “Bac Hai” may be understood as a very distant sea. [28] A second way to explain the name of Bac Hai is that this company administered not only the islands to the north but also those in the south. In Phu Bien Tap Luc, it is said that the Bac Hai company were active “…in the North Sea, in the islands of Con Lon, Cu Lao, Ha Tien region and Con Tu…”. [29]

According to this theory, it may be understood that the Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies complemented each other instead of dividing the sea between them. According to Phu Bien Tap Luc, the division has to do with the kinds of product exploited: the Bac Hai company seemed to collect only sea products, while the Hoang Sa company collected goods, gold, silver…from sunken vessels.

Another comment to be made is that Truong Sa lies near Con Lon island. If the Bac Hai company or Vietnamese fishermen had carried out activities on this island for a long time, would they have not known about Hoang Sa as well? This is the less probable since Vietnamese boats at that time were a powerful force and were praised by Western explorers. Gentil de la Barbinais noted in Nouveau voyage autour du monde (1738): “Even though Vietnam at this time attacked or defended mostly on the mainland, their use of naval force was more great, and can be said the most excellent. The Vietnamese king has 150 boats. In a recent exhibition of boats recently taking place in 1678, there were up to 131 boats….”

1.3 Historical Title argued by China

China also makes use of the argument of discovery and execution of sovereignty on the two archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa.

1.3.1 Discovery

China asserted that it has discovered the two archipelagos at dispute since the Han Dynasty, in 206 B.C. However, there is a Chinese author that affirms that the earliest document recording Chinese activities on these islands took place during the Song Dynasty (13th century). [31]

China has supported its position with many passages taken from its history and geography books. However, the reality shows that what has been put forth by China, only describes the two archipelagos as things that lie along the travel route through the Eastern Sea only. Moreover, the passages that have been used as evidence before the 13th century do not state which islands, but only speak of the South China Sea. Only passages since the 13th century mention names of islands, but there is no passage that mentions the names Xisha and Nansha. Many points taken from the passages mentioned, moreover, indicates that Wanlishitang which China says is Nansha, in reality, is not Nansha but is another island.

a) History books before 13th century

- The book of Yi Wu Zhi (period of the three kingdoms) states as follow: [32]

“There are small islands, hidden rocks, and sandbanks in the South Sea; there, the water is shallow and filled with magnet stones…” These descriptions are very general, only mentioning that “there are small islands”, without stating clearly which islands.

- The book of Zuo Zhuan from the Spring and Autumn period records as follows: [33]

“The glorious reign of the Zhou Dynasty overcame the barbarians in order to make the South Sea (island) a possession of China…”

The word “island” was inserted in parenthesis by the author Jian-Ming to indicate that “South Sea” referred to “South Sea islands”. But the original text in Chinese only mentions “South Sea” not “South Sea island.”

b) History books since the 13th century

- The book of Chu Hien Chi (13th century) records: “In the East of South Sea is Thien Ly Truong Sa and Vạn Lý Thạch Đường, and beyond that is eternal ocean vastness…” [34]

- The book of On the Sea from the Ming Dynasty records: “Van Ly Truong Sa lies to the southeast of Vạn Lý Thạch Đường …” [35]

- Even the 19th century Chinese historical documents, in the reality of Vietnam’s Nguyen Lords’ possession and execution of sovereignty over the islands, only describe these islands as accidental things seen along the travel route through the Eastern Sea by Chinese vessels. Moreover, there are documents that admit in a matter of fact manner of a relationship between these archipelagos with Vietnam, if not to say that, they admit these islands as the frontier borders of An Nam. For example, the author of the book “On the Sea” (1829-1842) writes:

“The outer travel route is connected to the inner travel route by Van Ly Truong Sa located in the middle of the sea. The length of the archipelago is tens of thousands of “dặm” It is the curtain of outer defense of An Nam”. [36]

From this, we can make the following observations about the historical evidence about discovery rights of China:

There is no document that mentions the two names of Xisha and Nansha, and there is no book that speaks of China’s title over these two archipelagos. [37] The history and geography books of China mention a great number of names, including Qianlichangsha, Wanlishitang, Quianlishitang, Jiurulouzhou, Qizhouyang, Zishousan. Now, China says all these names refer to Xisha and Nansha. Therefore, in order to determine the validity of these historical evidence, there needs to be experts to examine and determine to see if these names in fact refer to Xisha and Nansha as China says.

1.3.2 Execution of sovereignty

Data that China and Chinese authors put forth to prove execution of sovereignty on the two archipelagos include: investigations, expeditions, and artifacts found on the islands.

Investigations and expeditions
The majority of the articles written about investigations and expeditions make assertions without providing any concrete historical documentation.

* Before the Yuan Dynasty

The following passage is taken not from any history book, but from a Chinese government official, professor Wang Hengjie of the Center of Ethnic Minority, in 1991, based on the artifacts dug up on Xisha to conclude that there were expeditions carried out by the Zhou Dynasty on these islands:

“The Zhou government during the Spring and Autumn period not only conquered the barbarians in the South, but also organized expeditions on the islands of the South Sea to make them land of China…” [38]

This is only the conclusion of a government official in 1991, not an objective history book. If there were indeed expeditions and other activities, why were they not recorded in Chinese history books, similar to what had been written in Vietnamese history books? China prided itself in having advanced culture and other ethnic groups were “barbarians”, then why didn’t it know to record activities of the government into history books, if such activities really took place?

Shen wrote in the book Hau Han Thu: Chen Mao was appointed top mandarin of Jiaozchi and there were “investigations on (the islands of) the South Sea”. He wrote in quotations the word “xing bu Zhanghai”.[39]

This passage indicates that there is no place that refers to Xisha and Nansha. Moreover, the word “island” is arbitrarily inserted by the author, since the original Chinese text which he put in quotation (xing bu Zhanghai) does not contain the word “island”, which means that investigations were made of Zhanghai, i.e. South Sea, only.

Shen also writes that the book of Nanzhou Yiwu Zhi tells of naval officers during the Han Dynasty making expeditions from Malaysia returning to China. Then he quotes from Nanzhou Yiwu Zhi: “going by boat to the north east, one encounters many small islands, hidden rocks, hidden sandbanks, making their clear appearance on the South Sea. Here there is shallow water and many magnet stones.” [40] Consequently, in Nanzhou Yiwu Zhi, we can see that there are no expeditions on the islands of Xisha and Nansha, or going about these islands. It is only stated generally that the boat goes through the Eastern Sea, and having expeditions on Malaysia, Borneo.

In another place, Shen writes that the local government under the Tang Dynasty executed sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha by sending vessels to patrol the sea around these islands. To prove this point, the author made use of the General Record of Quangdong written by Hao Yu-lin. Here it is written that by the order of the mandarin responsible for South Sea matters at that time, patrols and investigations made of South Sea (xing bu ru hai). [41] Here as above, Shen does not quote any passage from the General Record of Quangdong that recorded these events, and therefore, we do not know what exactly these passages said.

Only four words were quoted “xing bu ru hai”. If this is quoted from the history book, it only states that there were investigations made on the South Sea (if in fact the South Sea, because we are not sure whether this is the South Sea or some other sea).

Even if these investigations did take place, it is only stated generally to had taken place in the South Sea, not specifically around that of Xisha and Nansha. And if in fact, it was the South Sea, this is a vast region. How can we be sure if they took place in the area of Xisha and Nansha? And if it did take place, was the purpose to make investigations as a territory possessor or to generally investigate the sea? Does the original text of the book referred to by Shen mention patrols or in fact simply going through these areas?

In another place, Shen affirmed that the two archipelagos were placed under the administration of Qiongzhou municipality (Hainan today), but does not provide any historical evidence, only a footnote that refers to a Chinese government document in 1992. [42] Nevertheless, even if China incorporated the two archipelagos into Hainan, this act is not sufficient to establish juridical title according to international law.

China also espouses that the fact that artifacts were found on the islands indicate that Chinese people had lived on these islands. Artifacts dug up from Xisha such as pottery, vases, and other artifacts indicate that since the 5th century, Chinese people have lived and made their living on the South Sea. [43] From this, China concludes that because there were Chinese living there, China has sovereignty.

However, international law does not accept sovereignty simply because there are people living on the land. On the islands there are many groups of people living depending on the season, including Vietnamese people, not just Chinese. Moreover, private individuals do not have the right to possess territories.

* From the Yuan Dynasty until the present

China argues that it has sent an astronomer to the island to observe and take measurements. [44]

- The expeditions mentioned during this period were in fact trips to other regions such as Java, and not Xisha or Nansha.

- The passage used to prove of trips to Xisha and Nansha are taken from Yuan Shi as follows:

“…The boat goes through Qihou Yang and Wanlishitang, parallel with Jiaozhi and Zhangcheng,…they stepped onto the islands such as Hundun, Dayang, Ganlan, Jialimada, and Julan. They stationed here and cut down trees to make small boats…”

The author explains that Qizhou Yang and Wanlishitang are Xisha and Nansha, and Jialimada as Borneo today [45]. However, this point contradicts with the passage quoted from Hai Lu:

“Van Ly Truong Sa lies to the southeast of Vạn Lý Thạch Đường.” [46]

Based on this quote from Hai Lu, if we were to accept the two names as referring to Nansha and Xisha, then Van Ly Truong Sa has to be Nansha, while Vạn Lý Thạch Đường has to be Xisha. However, the book of Yuan Shi states that Vạn Lý Thạch Đường (Wanlishitang) is Nansha, and Qizhou Yang is Xisha. In the end, we do not know which is Nansha, which is Xisha. If we combine the two quotes above: “To the east of the South Sea is Van Ly Truong Sa and Vạn Lý Thạch Đường,” then Vạn Lý Thạch Đường is perhaps Macclesfield Bank. Marwyn Samuels also thinks this way (see Marwyn Samuels 18-19, Note 31).

Another point that perhaps points to Wanlishitang as in fact Macclesfield Bank, is that the passage taken from Yuan Shi: “…The boat goes through Qizhou Yang and Wanlishitang, parallel with Jiaozhi and Zhangcheng,…”. If we look at the order of the travel route, Wanlishitang cannot be Nansha, but is Macclesfield Bank because the boat cannot go through Nansha before going by Jiaozhi. Moreover, this passage indicates that the boat only goes through Quizho Yang and Wanlishitang; there is no place stating that they stepped onto Xisha and Nansha (assuming we accept Qizhou Yang and Wanlishitang as Xisha and Nansha).

Another passage taken from the Abridged Records of Islands and Barbarians by Wang Da Yuan which the author asserts as a famous seafarer during the Yuan dynasty states:

“The beginning of Shitang is in Chaozhou. It is twisted like a long snake lying on the sea, stretching close to many countries; it is called by the people as Wanlishitang. In my estimate, it is under 10,000 li…We have been able to determine its branches. A branch stretches to Java, another to Boni and Gulidimen, and another stretches to the western side of the sea, to Kunlun…If one desires safety, it is better to avoid it, because it is very dangerous here.” [48]

This passage also says nothing about China making patrols around the islands or making expeditions onto the islands. On the contrary, the archipelago is described as a beast, some of which is terrible and should be feared and avoided. If one was describing one’s own territories, such strange and unfamiliar words would never be used.

China also assert that under the Ming dynasty in the 15th century, an explorer Cheng Ho went through the sea 7 times, and upon his return, put Hoang Sa and Truong Sa onto the map. [49]

However, these trips did not have any act of taking possession of the above mentioned archipelagos.[50] These trips were not expeditions meant to take possession but to explore in order to know the geography, look for economic means, and show off China’s might with countries in the region which were vassals of China.[51]

Samuels concluded that even then, the islands were not paid attention to by China. [52]

In order to conclude the section of “historical title of China”, we can say that the passages written before the 13th century only proves that Chinese boats went through the South Sea. These documents do not mention the names of any of the two archipelagos. The first documents that mention names were written towards the end of the Yuan Dynasty and during the Song Dynasty (13th century). However, the documents mention Thien Ly Truong Sa and van Ly Thach Duong – no one is sure if these are Xisha and Nansha or not, especially Van Ly Thach Duong which is said to lie to the east of Hainan island. This is certainly not Nansha, but perhaps Macclesfield Bank. Either way, these documents only prove that the Chinese boats did pass by and coincidentally saw these islands on its route through the Eastern Sea. There is no word that indicates that China ordered boats to make patrols around the islands as owner of the islands in order to guard it as national borders. There are also no statements to prove that China organized expeditions on the two archipelagos of Xisha and Nansha, but only mentioned of conquering JiaoZhi, making expeditions in Malaysia, Borneo, and Java.

According to international law of ancient time, seeing the islands without stepping onto them is enough basis for title due to discovery. However, this criteria was applied to Western countries in history who went out to explore new land. China, however, only passed by, coincidentally saw the islands, never took possession, never saw the islands as its territory, only centuries later, after another country had possessed it, turned to claim that it had discovered the territory. In this case, can the act of coincidentally seeing the land without thinking to possess it be seen as discovery in legal terms? How can one claim discovery right when the non-physical factor which is the will to discover new land and the desire to occupy that land does not exist? The case of China is that it “knew” of the land not that it discovered the land.[53]

Supposing that China had discovery rights, this would only be initial rights (inchoate title), because after that China never possessed the islands, even symbolically, never stepped onto the islands, and never executed sovereignty. In short, China never saw the islands as its own. International courts has judged numerous times that the discovery rights must be completed by the act of possession over a reasonable period in order for it to be effective. [54]

Professor Marwyn Samuels analyzed the attitude of China at that time. According to Samuels, Chinese policy at the end of the Ming Dynasty and during the Qing Dynasty did not concern much with the sea but with guarding its mainland, the region of SinKiang, Mongolia and the northern borders. Therefore, its naval forces was very poor. [55] Under the Yuan Dynasty, the naval force was strong (14th century), but even then, China did not pay attention to the Eastern Sea, and did not intend to possess the islands. [56] On the contrary, the boats even feared them and avoided them for fear for rocks and shallow water which had sunken many vessels of other countries. Chinese sailors of that era had a proverb that was passed down from generation to generation: “Going out one fears That Chau (which China calls Xisha today), on the way back one fears Colon.” [57]

With this mentality at that time, how can China see these islands as its own and would explore and patrol against enemies? This is proven by China’s silence upon Vietnam’s execution of sovereignty over the islands, even though China knew of the activities of the Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies. It is also further proven by the incident of the sunken vessels La Bellona and Imeji Maru (see section I of this paper). All these data indicate that China not only did not execute sovereignty, did not see these islands as belonging to China, but also knowingly and unknowingly admit Vietnam’s sovereignty over the islands.

2. The 1887 Agreement

China used to cite the French-Chinese agreement of 1887 to affirm that Hoang Sa and Truong Sa belonged to China. Many of its spokespeople continued to make use of this agreement to assert likewise.

In reality, this agreement was not an agreement with the purpose of dividing up the islands in the high seas between Vietnam and China, but only served to determine the border between North Vietnam and China. Today, in negotiations, China does not refer to this agreement anymore. However, even today, there are no few authors, the majority of whom are Chinese living over seas, when writing on the issue, continue to cite the 1887 Agreement as an official reason to prove that the two islands belonged to China. A number of Western writers, perhaps due to chain effect, make use of these papers in order to conclude that the Agreement effectively handed the disputed islands over to China. [58] Therefore, it is important to clarify this misunderstanding to stop the chain effect in international thinking.

A number of authors quote the following passage from the Agreement in order to affirm Chinese sovereignty:

“From Quangdong, the disputed points from the east to the north west of Mong Cai, outside the borders determined by the two sides, may be seen as belonging to China. The islands to the east of the longitude Paris 105*43’, which is the longitude going through the eastern point at the Tch’a Kou or Ouan-Chan (Tra Co) island becoming the border, also belong to China. The islands of Go-tho and other islands to the west of the longitude belong to An Nam.”

The authors argue that Hoang Sa and Truong Sa lie to the east of the longitude Paris 105*43’, and therefore, belong to China. [59]

There are authors who maintain that the Agreement must be interpreted according to the exact meanings of the words. [60] In reality, if interpreting strictly according to the words, it must be understood that the 1887 Agreement was an agreement for dividing the borders between Northern Vietnam and China only, and not related to the islands on the high seas that did not belong to northern Vietnam. By simply looking at the name of the Agreement, one can see this point. The name of the Agreement is “Convention relative a la delimitation de la frontiere entre la Chine et le Tonkin.” [61]

Moreover, the Vienna Convention on international agreements determine that an agreement must be interpreted strictly according to its words; however, if this methods leads to something absurd or unreasonable, other documents and agreements that are related to this agreement may be used in order to search for the purpose of the agreement in order to resolve points that are not clear. [62]

Based on the Vienna Convention, we can judge the 1887 Agreement by three methods: 1) strict interpretation of the words in the Agreement, 2) interpret the Agreement as a whole, and 3) look for the purpose of the Agreement.

2.1. This act is quite simple in the 1887 Agreement. As stated above, we only have to look at the name of the Agreement in original French to see that it had to do with the border between northern Vietnam and China. The French referred to northern Vietnam as “Tonkin.” During colonial era, France divided Vietnam into three regions; the North was called Tonkin, the Central region was called An Nam, and the South was called Cochinchine. The authors mentioned above thought that Tonkin was the entire country of Vietnam.

The word “frontiere” in Article 2 of the Agreement indicates clearly that the longitude Paris 105*43’ is the sea border, but only that in northern Vietnam (Tonkin), not the border of other islands on the high seas, in the region of Central and South Vietnam. The Agreement explicitly determined the direction of the border to be north-south, passing through the eastern corner of Tra Co island. Because this is the border between Tonkin and China, it must be understood that the border ends at the place where France formerly determined to be Tokin and Annam (which is the border between north and central Vietnam).

The task of determining the border between northern Vietnam and China is easy to understand if one looks at the way France divided and administered Vietnam at that time. In order to implement the policy of “divide and conquer,” France divided Vietnam into three regions with three different governments. The North was under the form of a protectorate government; the Central self-governed because the imperial system based in Hue was still functioning (even though only symbolically); and the South was under a colonial government. The three regions were considered as virtually three different entities. Therefore, the matter of determining borders as only between Tonkin (northern Vietnam) and China, and not concerning the Central or the South, is something quite easy to understand with respect to the colonial policy of Fance at that time. In short, using the method of interpretation according to the text indicates that “Tonkin” and “frontière” refer clearly to the border between northern Vietnam and China. It included both land border as well as water border in the Gulf of Tonkin. [63]

2.2. Judge the Agreement as whole

The entire Agreement does not mention Hoang Sa and Truong Sa. The document only speaks of the border between northern Vietnam and China, and determine the points where the committee on borders of France and China do not agree, which is the area between Van Nam and Quangdong.

The above authors only cite the part related to the border of Quangdong. However, before that, the Agreement states: “The points that the Committee of both sides do not agree upon, and amendments planned in Article 3 of the 9 June 1885 Agreement are determined as follows: in Quangdong, points of disputes…”

After the section on Quangdong is the part that determines the border of Van Nam: “On the border region of Van Nam, the border is determined as follows:….”[64]

Following Chinese argument, if all the islands lying to the east of longitude Paris 105*43’ belonged to China, not only Hoang Sa, Truong Sa, but all the islands along Vietnamese shore to the east of this longitude would belong to China as well. This interpretation leads to something “unreasonable or absurd”, precisely as stated in the Vienna Convention. Therefore, we can look for the purpose of the 1887 Agreement in order to take into account documents and agreements related to the 1887 Agreement.

2.3. The purpose of the 1887 Agreement

If one reads the report made by Dureau de Vaulcomte to the French Foreign Ministry explaining the 1887 Agreement, we would see even more clearly that the purpose of the Agreement was to draw the border being disputed between northern Vietnam and China. [65] The 1887 Agreement was to follow up on Article 3 of the 1885 Agreement, which was a friendship agreement between France and China. After France sent forces to Vietnam, the governors of Quangdong, Quang Tay, and Van Nam sent forces over the borders between northern Vietnam and China. Therefore, in order to cease this situation and restore the former border, France agreed with China in Article 3 of the 1885 Agreement that the two sides would establish a Committee to draw the border comprised of experts from both sides. The 1885 Agreement also determined that if there were disagreements on any point related to drawing the borders, they would refer the matter to respective governments to decide. [66] The drawing of the borders was divided into three areas: the border at Quang Tay, the border at Quang Dong, and the border at Van Nam. The determination of border at Quang Tay went smoothly, but disagreements occurred when it came to Quang Dong and Van Nam. As a result, the 1887 Agreement was needed to resolve the two regions mentioned above.

In Quang Dong, the disagreement revolved around the Paklung region and surrounding islands. Because of the presence of Chinese forces in this region, France decided to send forces to occupy the area. China then protested saying that this area belonged to China. As a result, a dispute was born. [67]

Therefore, the dispute was not related to Hoang Sa and Truong Sa. At that time, China did not pay attention to these two archipelagos, and France also did not know that Vietnam already had sovereignty over these islands. Therefore, at that time there were no dispute involving these archipelagos. Consequently, when France and China signed the 1887 Agreement, these islands did not enter their mind. In summary, the purpose of the 1887 Agreement was to draw the border in the region of Quang Dong and Van Nam; and the border in accordance with Article 2 of the 1887 Agreement only pertained to northern Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin.

On the one hand, China says that the 1887 Agreement applies to Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, which are islands on the high seas, but when discussing about the Gulf of Tonkin, China asserts that the Agreement only divides “the islands in the Gulf of Tonkin”, not the sea border. On 12 May 1973, the Vice Foreign Minister of China, Han Nian Long, declared the above mentioned point. If so, China contradicts itself. [68]

3. Declarations made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

China says that Vietnam has admitted Chinese sovereignty over the archipelago of Hoang Sa due to the following facts:

- On 16 June 1956, the Vice Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam said, “According to Vietnamese documents, historically speaking, Xisha and Nansha are Chinese territories.”

- On 4 September 1958, during the Cold War, when the U.S. began to interfere into Vietnam, fight against China, and the American forces made patrols on the Taiwan Strait, China decided to declare its territorial waters of 12 nautical miles. In this occasion, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong sent the following diplomatic note to Zhou En Lai as follows:

"Comrade Prime Minister,

We have the honour to bring to your knowledge that the Government of the DRVN acknowledges and approves the declaration dated 4th September, 1958 of the Government of the PRO fixing the width of the Chinese territorial waters. The Government of the DRVN respects this decision and will give instructions to its State bodies to respect the 12-mile width of the territorial waters of China in all their relations in the maritime field with the PRC. I address to you, comrade Prime Minister, the assurance of my distinguished consideration". [69]

- On 9 May 1965, when the U.S. was escalating the war in Vietnam and determined points of strategic conflict, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared that Xisha belonged to China.

The above declaration is not valid because before 1975, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) did not control these islands. At that time, these islands were under the control of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) who always asserted Vietnamese sovereignty over these two archipelagos. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Vietnam also made no declaration that jeopardized this sovereignty. According to the lawyer and author Monique Chemillier-Gendreau:

“In this context, declarations or any viewpoints given by the North Vietnamese government is not effective when it comes to sovereignty. This was not a government that had authority over these archipelagos. One may not renounce what one has no authority over….”[70]

A second reason from a legal perspective is that at that time North Vietnam was not a party in the conflict. Before 1975, the countries and territories involved in the conflict included: China, Taiwan, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. Therefore, declarations made by North Vietnam may be seen as declarations of a third party, which had no effect on the conflict itself.

Supposing that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) and the Republic of Vietnam (South) were one country, then based on international law, this declaration is also invalid. However, some has espoused the doctrine of “estoppels” in order to argue that this declaration has validity and Vietnam cannot go back on its words.[71]

According to international law, there is no other legal bar that creates obligation for those who make unilateral declaration other than “estoppels”. Estoppels is a principle in which a country cannot say or do in contrast to what was said or done before. In other words, “one cannot at the same time blow hot and cold.”[72] However, estoppels does not mean that a country is obligated to whatever it declares.

The estoppels doctrine had its beginning in English law, and was later brought into international law. The main purpose is to prevent countries from benefiting from its dishonest actions, and hurting other countries.[73] Therefore, estoppels must meet the following criteria:

1. The declaration or action must be taken by a representative of a country in a clear and unequivocal manner.[74]

2. The country that claims “estoppels” must prove that based on that declaration or action, there are actions or inactions being carried out by that country which constitutes “reliance”, as is called in English and American law.

3. The country claiming “estoppels” also has to prove that based on the declaration of the other country, it has suffered damage, or that the other country has benefited when making that declaration.[75]

4. Some judgments demand that this declaration must be made in a continuous manner over time. For example, the case of the Gulf of Maine, the military and semi-military activities in Nicaragua, the case of Preah Vihear…[76]

In addition, if the declaration has the characteristic of a promise, which means that the country declares that it will or will not do something, it must have true intention of wanting to be obligated by that promise, and truly wants to execute that promise.[77]

The estoppels doctrine has many precedents in international courts and countries who have made certain declarations have found to not be obligated to follow them because not all the conditions are met.

In the judgment on the case “Military and semi-military activities in Nicaragua” between Nicaragua and the U.S., the court decided that: “… ‘Estoppels’ may be deduced from an attitude, a declaration by a country, in order to accept a particular situation; the attitude and declaration not only has to be made explicitly and continuously, but also has to cause one or many countries to base on them to change their activities, and consequently suffer damage”. [78]

Applying these criteria of estoppels to the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, we can see that conditions 2 and 3 are missing. In the years 1956, 1958, and 1965, China did not have any attitude or make any changes in its attitude based on North Vietnam’s declaration. China also cannot prove that it suffered damage for relying on that declaration. North Vietnam did not benefit in any way from making that declaration. At that time, Vietnam and China saw themselves as close comrades and friends. The declaration made by PM Pham Van Dong was based on that friendship.[79] Moreover, the wording of the declaration does not clearly and unequivocally affirm Chinese ownership of the Paracel Islands. The letter only states: “The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam respects this decision (the decision to determine the 12 nautical mile territorial waters of China), and will direct the proper government agencies to respect absolutely the 12 nautical mile territorial waters of China….”

The declaration of PM Pham Van Dong may also be understood as a unilateral promise, a declaration of intention. In fact, this is a promise to respect the decision of China in its determination of sea territories, and a promise to order national agencies to respect Chinese territories.

If it is a mere promise, then it is even more difficult to obligate a country to follow that promise. The International Court has provided one more condition to make a promise obligatory: the true intention of the country making that promise. That is, whether that country really wants to be obligated to its promise or not. In order to determine this intention, the court examines every event surrounding the declaration, to see in what context and circumstances was the declaration made. Moreover, if the court sees that the country can obligate itself through signing agreements with the other country, then the declaration is not needed, and the court will conclude that the country making the declaration does not truly want to be obligated to that declaration. Therefore, the declaration does not have an obligatory characteristic.

In the judgment in the case of “Nuclear experiments” between Australia/New Zealand and France, France declared that it would stop carrying out nuclear experiments. The court decided that France was obligated to this promise because France did intend to be held to that promise. [80]

In Vietnam’s case, when PM Pham Van Dong declared that Vietnam will respect Chinese sea territories, he did not intend to speak of ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands. He made this declaration in urgent circumstances, in which the war with the United States was escalating, American Fleet 7 was carrying out activities on the Taiwan Strait threatening China. He had to immediately voice support of China in order to counter against American threat.

The 1965 declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was in the same manner. The motivation for that declaration was an urgent situation of danger in Vietnam. This is a declaration that has political not legal characteristics.

Even the condition of making declaration continuously and over time is not satisfied when it comes to the three declarations of North Vietnam. Estoppels doctrine is only applied if we consider North Vietnam and The Socialist Republic of Vietnam as one; and even France during the colonial period, and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) as the same entity as the present Vietnam. If we consider the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) as a separate country, then estoppels cannot be applied because, as stated above, the declaration will be seen as a declaration made by a country that does not have authority over territories being disputed. Therefore, if Vietnam is seen as one single entity from history until the present, then the three declarations made by North Vietnam are only statements that carry political meaning during wartimes, compared to the attitude and viewpoint of Vietnam in general from the 17th century until the present.

In summary, the declaration that we are analyzing is missing many factors that allow for estoppels to be applied. The factors of reliance and intention are very significant. If the reliance factor does not exist in order to limit the application of estoppels, countries will be prevented in making their foreign policies. They will be forced to follow out-dated ways to execute their foreign policies. When conditions change, the foreign policy of the other country changes, the foreign policy of this country must also change. It is normal for countries to be friends one moment and then turn into enemies the next.

As for unilateral promises without true intention of following, they are no more than empty promises, similar to those of politicians and candidates in political elections. In the international arena, the principle of sovereignty is very important. Outside international procedures and the articles of Jus Congens, there is no law that obligates a country contrary to its wishes, when it is not causing damage to another country. Therefore, the intention of the country has a decisive role in determining obligation of a unilateral promise.

III. Conclusion

The above analyses demonstrate that Vietnam’s arguments are stronger than those of China, because Vietnam made use of the islands continuously over three centuries, in a harmonious manner without protest from any country, including China. Not only that, but Chinese history books even admit that these archipelagos constitute the defense borders of Vietnam, and through its attitude at that time, China had also implicitly admitted Vietnamese sovereignty over these islands. If the Nguyen Lords began to exploit the islands since the beginning of the 17th century, after nearly 100 years, that historical title was completed. That historical title was reinforced further because the act of taking possession by the Emperor Gia Long and Minh Mang. At the same time, the sovereignty was executed continuously through the exploitation and administration of the Hoang Sa and Bac Hai companies, which were entities of the government.

China also put forth many documentation to prove that it was the first to discover and executed sovereignty over the islands. However, these documents demonstrate that Chinese vessels at the time traveled through the Eastern Sea, and on their way, they coincidentally saw islands with various names, but none of which were called Xisha or Nansha. Supposing China discovered these islands, it still did not execute sovereignty over them. The appearance of fishermen is not sufficient to say execution of sovereignty by the government. Therefore, the historical title which China says it has, is very weak. The majority of international law experts, with the exception of Chinese authors, all agree on this point. [84] Comparing the historical title between the two sides, we can conclude that between Vietnam and China, Vietnam is the one to have rightful sovereignty over the two archipelagos. Analysis also demonstrates that the historical title of Vietnam was completed since the 17th century, under the Nguyen Lords.

The 1887 Agreement between France and China does not hand over the two archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa to China because this agreement only determined the borders between northern Vietnam and China. Therefore, it only determined the border in the regions of Van Nam, Quang Dong, and the Gulf of Tonkin.

The declarations made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pertaining to the two archipelagos are not valid because before 1975, these two archipelagos were not under control of the DRV, but belonged to the Republic of Vietnam. The DRV at that time was not involved in the dispute; therefore, any declarations made can only be seen as those of a third unrelated party. Moreover, even if the DRV were not considered a third country, “estoppels” can also not be applied in this case, since China did not suffer damage, and the DRV also did not benefit through these declarations. The declaration made by PM Pham Van Dong was only a promise brought about by the situation of war. In the end, if the three declarations are seen as that of Vietnam in general, they also lack the characteristic of continuity through expanse of time which would make Vietnam lose its sovereignty over the islands, which it has exercised uniformly and persistently over three centuries.

In reality, China has now totally controlled Hoang Sa. It has carried out many infrastructural constructions in order to reinforce its illegal occupation. An illegal occupation, through time, if no protest comes from the other country, and if are admitted by third countries, will eventually establish sovereignty for the country doing the occupying. Because time and acceptance will “erase all sins”.[85]

In the present situation, in order to ensure that Chinese occupation does not result in sovereignty, Vietnam has to voice protest and assert its sovereignty in regards to Hoang Sa (as well as Truong Sa). Vietnam also should publicly suggest that China agree to take the matter to International Court. If China really believes that it has a strong legal basis for sovereignty on these archipelagos, there is no reason for China to refuse a legal resolution to the dispute.

As for Truong Sa, it is presently being disputed by 6 countries: Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, China, Malaysia, and Brunei. All the countries claim complete or partial ownership of the archipelago. Up to now, the problem has not only been unresolved, but seem to become more intense.

In 1988, China invaded and took over a number of islands in Truong Sa for the first time. Even though Vietnam’s boat was sunken, China prevented the Red Cross boat from making humanitarian rescues. This is a fundamental violation of the rules of war. Therefore, we can deduce that China will not hesitate to continue to use force. Since that time, China would make further invasions from time to time. On the one hand, China continues to espouse the act of following international law, call for bilateral negotiation, but words do not go along with action. [86] Therefore, it is not possible to base on the words of China to think that it will not use force. The prospect of China using violence to take over all of the islands in Truong Sa is even more probable now that the U.S. and Russia have both withdrawn from the Eastern Sea, leaving a gaping political and military hole in this region, and leaving China as the dominating party in the Eastern Sea. [87] This is a very worrisome situation. China controlling both the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos means that China controls virtually all of the Eastern Sea, which is a very important route for ships from Russia, the U.S., Japan and other countries in the world.[88]

The method of bilateral negotiation between China and other countries in the dispute cannot be implemented in a fair manner because of the difference in power between the two sides, in which China is, of course, the stronger side. It is due to this reason that up until now, China has only accepted bilateral negotiation. China wants to do this in order to force the other country to negotiate in the way that China wants. If not, China would resort to force. [89] This is only a strategy for China to buy more time to reinforce its position vis-à-vis the two archipelagos. The longer it takes, the more China benefits.

The method of joint development cannot be carried out when the issue of sovereignty has not been resolved. Therefore, as time goes on, it would reinforce the illegal occupation, and the victims will be the country that has the proper juridical title.

The most practical method presently is for the matter to be taken to ASEAN or the United Nations to resolve. The U.N. is a way that may bring about more results, because the U.N. is broader, involving the U.S., Russia, Japan and other countries. Moreover, in the case that the U.N. cannot come to a resolution or encounter some problems in the process of resolution, it still can bring the matter to International Court asking for its opinion without having to receive consent from any particular country. The consultative opinion of the International Court is not effective like a true judgment, but it still can strongly affect world opinion. The dispute in the Western Sahara also received the opinion from the court sought by the United Nations. [90]

The dispute involving the archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa need to be resolved the sooner the better. The longer time drags on, the more it threatens peace in Southeast Asia and possibly, world peace.

* This paper was presented at the Summer Conference “The Dispute in the South China Sea” in New York City, 15-16 August 1998.

[1] Doctor of Law, Sorbonne University, France.
[2] Lê Quý Đôn: Phủ biên tạp lục. Taken from Võ Long Tê, Les archipels de Hoang Sa et de Truong Sa selon les anciens ouvrages viêtnamiens d’histoire et de geographie, Sài Gòn, 1974, p. 62.
[3] Eveil economique de l’Indochine, no. 741.
[4] Nguyễn Quốc Định: Droit International Public, LIbrarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1975. pp. 401-402.
[5] Robert Jennings: The acquisition of territory in international law (New York, 1963), quote Charles de Visscher. Charles de Visscher wrote about the method of consolidations as follows:
“… Le long usage établi, qui en est le fondement, ne fait que traduire un ensemble d’interêts et de relations qui tendent par eux meme à rattacher un territoire ou un espace maritime à un état determine… elle peut être repute acquise… par une absence d’opposition suffisemment prolongée…”, see Jennings, p. 25, NB p.2.
[6] Võ Long Tê, Kes archipels de Hoàng Sa et de Trường Sa selon les anciens ouvrages viêtnamiens d’histoire et de geographie, Sài Gòn, 1974, pp. 39 and 40.
[7] Ibid., pp. 34-35.
[8] Ibid. tr. 48.
[9] Lê Quý Đôn: Phủ biên tạp lục, 1776. Bureau of Information and Newspaper of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry quote: Vietnamese Sovereignty on the two archipelagos of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, Hà Nội, 1979, p. 13.
[10] Ibid., pp. 14-15.
[11] Quần đảo Hoàng Sa và quần đảo Trường Sa, bộ phận lãnh thổ của Việt Nam, Sự thật publisher, Hà Nội, 1982, p. 13 and 14.
[12] Võ Long Tê, Ibid. p. 69.
[13] M.A. Dubois de Jancigny: Thế giới, lịch sử và sự mô tả các dân tộc, các tôn giáo của họ, Ceylan, (1830). Cited by Võ Long Tê, p. 168.
[14] J. B. Chaigneau (1769-1825): Notice sur la Cochinchine, 1820. Cited by Võ Long Tê, Ibid. p. 168.
[15] Vụ Thông tin và Báo chí Bộ Ngoại giao, p. 21.
[16] Võ Long Tê, p. 100.
[17] Vụ Thông tin và Báo chí Bộ Ngoại giao, p. 21.
[18] Ibid. p. 25.
[19] Gutzlaff: Geography of the Cochinchinese Empire in Journal of the Geographical Society of London, 1849, book XIX. Cited by Sự thật publisher, p. 16, Gutzlaff writes:
“The Annam government sees that the act of collecting taxes brings about benefit, thus established a small garrison here (i.e. Paracel Islands, which the author referred to as KatVang), in order to collect taxes from anyone who comes here….”
[20] The Clipperton case: Recueil des Sentences Arbitrales, Second edition.
[21] Teh-Kuang Chang: China’s claim of sovereignty over Spratley and Paracel Islands: a historical and legal perspective, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol. 23 (1991), p. 418.
[22] Jian-Ming Shen: International law rules and historical evidence supporting China’s title to the South China Sea islands, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 21 (1997), p. 22 & 23.
[23] The case of Palmas Island: Receuil des Sentences Arbitrales, Second editon, pp. 859-860.
[24] Monique Chemillier-Gendreau: La souveraineté sur les Paracels et Spratleys. L’Harmatan, Paris, 1996, p. 71.
[25] Võ Long Tê, p. 111.
[26] Ibid. p. 110.
[27] Gendreau, pp. 21, 23.
[28] Võ Long Tê, p. 134.
[29] Võ Long Tê, p. 61.
[30] Ibid. p. 157.
[31] Tao Cheng: The dispute over the South China Sea Islands, Texas International Law Journal, vol. 10 (1975), p. 272.
[32] Jian-Ming Shen, p.. 18.
[33] Ibid. p. 17.
[34] Elizabeth van Wie Davis: China and the Law of the Sea Convention, Follow the Sea, New York, 1995, p. 154.
See also Marwyn Samuels: Contest for the South China Sea, New York/London, 1982, p. 16.
and Shen, p. 21.
[35] Van Wie Davis,
See also Shen, p. 31.
See also Hungdah Chiu & Choon-ho Park: Legal status of the Paracels and Spratly Islands, Ocean Development and International Law Journal, 3 (1975), p. 43.
[36] Samuels, note 31, p. 38.
[37] Lưu Văn Lợi: Cuộc tranh chấp Việt-Trung về hai quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa, Công an nhân dân publisher, Hà Nội, 1995, p. 10.
[38] Shen, p. 15.
[39] Ibid. p.18.
[40] Ibid. p. 19.
[41] Ibid. p. 20.
[42] Ibid. p. 21.
[43] Ibid. p. 20 and 21. See also Teh Kuang Chang, p. 400, and Hungdah Chiu, NB. p.32, 463 and 465.
[44] Shen, p. 27.
[45] Ibid.
[46] See note 2 on p. 361, Chiu, NB p.32.
[47] “… guo Qizhou Yang, Wanlishitang…”. The word “guo” in Chinese means “through”.
[48] Shen, p. 28.
[49] Hungdah, p. 463.
[50] Lưu Văn Lợi, p. 17.
[51] Samuels, p. 21 and 22.
[52] Ibid. p. 23.
[53] Gendreau, p. 57 and 58. See also Lưu Văn Lợi, p. 14.
[54] The case of Palmas Island, p. 846. “Inchoate title must be completed within a reasonable time by effective occupation of the region…”.
[55] Samuels, pp. 30-31, 42.
[56] Ibid. p. 20.
[57] Ibid. p. 17 and 21.
[58] At least the following authors cite the 1887 Agreement:
- Hungdah, p. 464 and 467.
- Shen, p.. 119.
- Tao Cheng, p. 274.
- John Chao: South China Sea: boundary problems relating to the Nansha and Xisha Islands, Chinese Yearbook of International Law, 9 (1989-1990): p. 119ff.
- Steve Kuan Tsy Yu, Who owns the Paracel and Spratlys? An evaluation of the nature and legal basis of the conflicting territorial claims, Chinese Yearbook of International Law, vol. 9 (1989-1990): p. 5, 7 and 8.
- Choon-ho Park, The South China Sea dispute: Who owns the islands and the natural resources? Ocean Development and International Law Journal, vol. 5 (1978): p. 34.
- Marwyn Samuels, pp. 52-53.
- Brian Murphy, Dangerous ground: the Spratly Islands and international law, Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, vol. 1 (1994), p. 201.
- Elizabeth van De Wie, Sđd, tr. 52-53.
- Michael Bennet, The PRC and the use of international law in the Spratly Islands dispute, Stanford Journal of International Law, vol. 28 (1992), p. 446.
[59] Hungdah, p. 464.
[60] Shen, supra, p. 120.
[61] Receuil des Traités de la France, Tome 17 (1886- 1887). Duran & Pedone (Paris), 1891, p. 387.
[62] Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités, 1969, Art. 32.
[63] Some authors argue that the 1887 Agreement does not determine sea borders, see Elizabeth van De Wie, p. 156. However, close reading of Article 2 of the Agreement indicates clearly that the longitude Paris 105*43’ is the border between northern Vietnam and China.
“Les Iles qui sont à l’est du meridien de Paris 105°43’, … c’est à dire de la ligne Nord-Sud passant par le point oriental de l’èle de Tra Co, et formant la frontière…”
[64] Receuil des Traités, p. 387 and 388.
[65] Ibid. Rapport Vaulcomte, p. 187.
[66] Traité de Paix, d’Amitié et de Commerce conclu à Tien-Tsin le 9/6/1885 entre la France et la Chine, trong Receuil des Traités de la France, Tome 16, p. 496.
[67] Rapport Vaulcomte, p. 189-191.
[68] Shen, p. 123.
[69] Lưu Văn Lợi, p. 105.
[70] Gendreau, p. 123.
[71] Shen, p. 57.
[72] Charles Vallée: Quelqques observations sur l’estoppel en Droit des gens, Revue Générale de Droit International Publie (1973), p. 951, note 7.
[73] D. W. Bowett: Estoppel before International Tribunals and its relation to acquiescence, Bristish Yearbook of International Law, vol. 33 (1957), p. 177.
[74] Antoine Martin: L’Estoppel en droit international public Précédé d’un apercu de la théorie de l’estoppel en droit anglais, Revue Générale de Droit International Publie, vol. 32 (1979), p. 274.
[75] Ibid. pp. 286-300.
[76] Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la region du Golfe de Maine, Cour Internationale de Justice Receuil, 1984, pp. 309-310.
- Activités militaires et para-militaires au Ncarague et contre celui-ci, Cour Internationale de Justice Receuil, 1984. pp. 414-415.
- Affaire du Temple Préah Vihear, Cour Internationale de Justice Receuil, 1962, pp. 22-23, 32.
[77] Brigitte Bollecker-Stern: L’Affaire des essays nucléaires francais devant la Cour Internationale de Justice, Annuaire Francais de Droit International (1974), p. 329.
See also Megan Wagner: Jurisdiction by Estoppel in the International Court of Justice, California Law Review, vol. 74, p. 1792.
[78] Cour Internationale de Justice Receuil 1984, p. 414.
[79] Lưu Văn Lợi, p. 75.
[80] Cour Internationale de Justice Receuil, 1974, p. 267 and 269.
[81] Lưu Văn Lợi, pp. 104-110.
[82] Megan Wagner, note 64, p. 1780.
[83] Bollecker – Stern, p. 331.
[84] Among Western authors who conclude that the Chinese arguments for historical title is weak include at least the following:
- Bennett, p. 446;
- Murphy, p. 201;
- Roque Jr., p. 203;
- Chemillier – Gendreau, p. 66;
- Jean Pierre Ferrieer, see p. 182;
- Samuels, p. 40. Giáo sư Samuels does not discuss the issue of sovereignty, but analyzes the history involving China and the islands in the Eastern Sea. He writes that up until the 19th century, there is no evidence that the Qing Dynasty possessed any island:
“By the mid-19th Century, the literari cognitive map of the South China Sea had become more elaborate, but still barely touched upon the islands of the sea… There is no evidence here that the Ching State had in any sense absorbed the islands into the imperial domain.”
[85] Jean Pierre Ferrier: Le conflit des iles Paracels et le problème de la souveraineté sur les iles inhabités, Annuảie Francais de Droit International (1975), p. 178: “… quoi qu’il en soit la conquête militaire des iles par la Chine ne peut résoudre le problème juridique: pour qu’une telle occupation, ellegale dans son principe, puisse avoir des effets juridiques, il faut que la reconnaissance par les autres états intervienne et ‘purge juridiquement de ses vices’ l’annexion ainsi réalisée.”
[86] Mark Valencia: China and the South China Sea disputes, Oxford University Press, London, 1995, p. 7.
[87] Bennett, p. 427.
[88] Jeannette Greenfield: China’s practice in the Law of the Sea, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 13.
[89] Mark Valencia, p. 6 and 7. See also Murphy, p. 209 and 210.
[90] The case of Sahara Occidental, see Avis Consultatif, Cour Internationale de Justice Receuil, 1975, pp. 21-28. In these pages, the Court speaks of the authority to give opinion in accordance with Article 65, paragraph 1 in the Court Regulations.

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VietWill's T-shirt

2008-01-18T01:50:00.000+07:00

From www.VietWill.org

VietWill's T-shirt is being made and coming to you soon, possibly free of charge!! Keep your eyes out for our originally designed T-shirt with the VietWill Trống Đồng Ra Trận logo and a call to defend Vietnamese fishermen against Chinese navy's attacks on the South China Sea. Please feel free to use these images on your site and help us spread the word and raise public awareness about this issue. Thank you.

Check out VietWill's Poster

2008-01-18T01:40:00.002+07:00

Check out VietWill's Poster at http://www.VietWill.org

New Website to Defend Vietnam's Islands

2008-01-18T01:16:00.001+07:00

VietWill, a group of Vietnamese activists, has introduced its website that hopes to contribute to the effort to defend Vietnam's national territorial integrity in the face of China's increasing aggression in the South China Sea.

The website's address is:

http://www.VietWill.net
http://www.VietWill.org

Though the website is still in its initial stage, one can find a great deal of information on the issue of the South China Sea dispute as well as some of VietWill's agenda and activities.

VietWill Plans Protest at San Francisco's Olympic Torch Relay

2008-01-18T01:15:00.003+07:00

Berkeley, CA
March 14, 2008

info@vietwill.net
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VietWill Plans Protest at San Francisco's Olympic Torch Relay

A protest against China's military aggression in the South China Sea, characterized by its violent harassment of Vietnamese fishermen making a living on their own waters, is being planned by a Vietnamese American activist group Viet Will, for when the Olympic Torch passes through San Francisco on April 9th.

The group's decision to hold a protest at the upcoming event is in direct response to host China's politicization of the Olympic Games by capitalizing on the Olympic torch relay to make illegal claims on Vietnamese territories which it had seized by force and continues to control.

While the issue over China's illegal seizure of Vietnam's Paracel Islands in the South China Sea since 1974 has not been resolved, China aspires to utilize the Olympic Games as a front in order to publicize to the world its dominion over the Paracel Islands by including an enlarged and boxed off map of the archipelago in all of its torch route maps.

China has further tried to emphasize its contempt for Vietnam by forcing the Olympic torch to pass through the Paracel Islands on its way to Ho Chi Minh City on April 29th. Normal international protocol stipulates when the Olympic Games torch passes through a specific location in any particular country, permission needs to be granted from that country in order for this to occur.

In the case of the Paracel Islands, by taking advantage of the upper hand in its relationships with Vietnam, China has decided unilaterally to have the Olympic torch pass through the archipelago as a matter of national issue, despite the fact that Vietnam has never given up on its claim of rightful ownership of the islands. Historical and judicial evidence demonstrate that Vietnam's claims are well-founded.

In reality, the Paracel Islands are very small. If the islands were depicted proportionally to the rest of the relay route map, they would not be visible at all. Still, the fact that China has magnified the islands and boxed them off on all its maps indicates its intent to make territorial claims and using the high profile Olympic Games as its built-in publicity vehicle, which smacks of politicizing the sports festival.

The organizers of the protest aims to demonstrate the theme of the Olympic torch relay "Journey of Harmony" is contrary to the reality of China's actions in the South China Sea, where in the past several decades, China has been increasingly aggressive in making claims on Vietnamese territories via diplomatic coercion and outright military force.

In the process of trying to control the region, China has made the life of poor Vietnamese fishermen a nightmare by continually ordering its navy to hunt down, capture, extort money, shoot to injure and murder Vietnamese fishermen and sink Vietnamese fishing boats on the sea surrounding both the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, which China also partially controls as a result of military invasion in the 1980s and 1990s.

Countless families have lost loved ones their boats, their livelihoods and have gone bankrupt as a result of being attacked by the Chinese navy while trying to catch fish for a living on their own waters. Captured fishermen on the sea are forced to pay a monumental sum of $15,000 USD before being let go or they may face torture and execution.

The purpose of Viet Will's protest is, firstly, to highlight China's hypocrisy in taking advantage of the Olympic Games to make claims on Vietnam's Paracel Islands, and of the sea waters around the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Secondly, protestors seek to demand that China stop hunting down and murdering Vietnamese fishermen who are in their own waters as well as disputed waters, thereby preventing poor people from making an honest living.

Thirdly, protestors seek to demand that China respect the territorial integrity of its Southeast Asian neighbors (both land and sea) by giving up its unjustified claims on the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands.

This is a political issue which could mushroom into a larger conflict in Southeast Asia. No neighboring nation is going to feel safe if China can bully its way into their territorial boundaries and take over at will. This has already happened in Tibet and Taiwan, and it is happening again. Attention must be brought to China's dangerous and damaging legacy of arrogance, greed and murder. This rally held by Viet Will will amplify this matter at hand.

China opposes RP archipelagic baseline bill

2008-01-18T01:11:00.002+07:00

Thursday, March 13, 2008

MANILA -- China's tight opposition to the bill defining the Philippines' archipelagic baseline boundary has stopped the approval on the measure despite the deadline set by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (Unclos), a congressman said.

Cebu Representative Antonio Cuenco, chairman of the House committee on foreign affairs, said Beijing expressed its objection to House Bill (HB) 3216 in a "note" sent to the Philippine Embassy in Beijing last December.

"China is shocked by and gravely concerned with this negative development. We request the clarification from the Philippine side," said the letter, which was faxed to Cuenco's office by Philippine Ambassador to China Sonia Brady. The unsigned note reiterated that China "has undisputable sovereignty over Nansha islands (Kalayaan Group of Islands or KIG) including Scarborough Shoal and its adjacent waters."

It said the passage of the bill, despite the Philippines' signing of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (SCS), "will not only be conducive to the stability in the SCS but also disturb China-Philippine cooperation in the area, exerting negative impact on the healthy development of our bilateral relations."

The bill's approval would not sit well with China amid the forging of the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in the area, which critics said could be the basis to charge President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo with treason, the note added. Under HB 3216, the country's archipelagic baseline would include KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, which are also being claimed by other countries aside from China.

The Philippines has until May 2009 to inform Unclos of the extent of its archipelagic boundary. Cuenco, however, said the letter should be taken with a grain of salt because of the absence of an official attribution.

"I think it's a commentary of Beijing. But I don't doubt the authenticity of the document. But if you talk of legal and technical terms, this is just a scrap of paper," he said.

He also disclosed that the Chinese charge d'affairs has also expressed his country's opposition to the bill when he met with him last January. "It's their way of expressing dissent," Cuenco said, noting that this was just normal for China.

The lawmaker said he would ask the plenary to postpone the passage of the measure on third and final reading until the session's resumption on April 21. Congress is on a Lenten break. "We need a cooling off period," he said, noting that his committee has already decided to ask the plenary to allow further amendments to the measure.

He added: "We must be very careful with the diplomatic repercussions. We don't want to break our ties. Will we not strain our relations with China? We should be circumspect. It all boils down to judgment call: am I going to adopt a bolder view or a moderate view?"

Cuenco's panel has also decided to cancel its scheduled inquiry into the JMSU on Thursday, saying they have failed to inform the members three days before the hearing as mandated by the rules. Parañaque Representative Roilo Golez, the principal sponsor of the investigation, said: "It is very clear that there is intervention from the executive department especially on the part of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)."

In a committee hearing last December, the foreign affairs committee opted for the fourth option presented by the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority, which set the baseline territory of the country at 12-mile territorial sea, 24-mile contiguous zone and a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone.

Sources said the DFA has managed to delay the bill's passage and wants to settle for the second option, which treats disputed territories such as the KIG and Scarborough Shoal as mere "regime islands." They said the DFA does not want the House version because this would antagonize the Chinese who have been providing loans to the Philippines. China is one of the claimants in the Spratlys. (Sunstar Network)

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DFA bucks House bill on RP Spratly claim

By Jess Diaz
Philippine Star
Thursday, March 13, 2008

The House of Representatives is set to re-examine a bill on the country’s territorial baselines, which it approved on second reading but later shelved following last-minute objections from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

“We will have to take a second look at this in the light of objections from our Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA),” Speaker Prospero Nograles told reporters yesterday.

House Bill 3216 defines the country’s territory, which covers the disputed Spratly island group off Palawan and Scarborough Shoal near Zambales. The House approved the bill on second reading in December 2007.

Nograles said the DFA’s objection came as a surprise because it had originally endorsed the bill when the measure was still with the committee on foreign affairs chaired by Cebu City Rep. Antonio Cuenco.

“It (the DFA) has suddenly made a complete turnaround and communicated its objections to the committee,” Nograles said.

Cuenco told reporters during the “Ayes and Nays” forum that China sent a letter of concern after the House approved the bill on second reading.

Cuenco clarified, however, that it was not a note verbale and that it was unsigned. “It’s a dissent. I think it’s a commentary of Beijing. But I don’t doubt the authenticity of the document. But if you talk in legal and technical terms, this is just a scrap of paper,” he said.

The administration lawmaker said he had no doubt about China’s displeasure because the document dated December 2007 came from the Philippine Embassy in China through Ambassador Sonia Brady. Another proof of China’s interest in the matter was the January 2008 visit of its charges d’affaires.

Cuenco and Iloilo Rep. Janette Garin, however, downplayed insinuations that their colleagues caved in to pressures from China.

“The Chinese are objecting to it. But I don’t consider it pressure. It’s just normal. They have the right to object as we also have the right to object when there are things that would be detrimental to our interest,” Cuenco said.

But he admitted China’s communiqué could be “one of the reasons” for the delay in the passage of HB 3216, aside from the dissenting legal opinion from lawyer Estelito Mendoza.

The two chambers of Congress have to enact the measure ahead of the May 2009 deadline set by the United Nations for compliance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).

Mendoza, whom Cuenco described as an expert in international law, said the proposed map of the country’s baselines might not be in accordance with the law. Malacañang and DFA shared Mendoza’s opinion.

Cuenco said he would like the plenary approval of HB 3216 deferred until the resumption of session on April 20. “Let’s call for an all party-caucus first when we resume next month before we resume our discussions on the bill,” he said.

“Personally, I will move to defer it in time for the Holy Week break. Let’s think things over. Let’s not push it. Let’s allow a cooling off period,” he added.

“We must be very careful with the diplomatic repercussions. We don’t want to break our ties,” he said. “Will we not strain our relations with China? We should be circumspect. It all boils down to judgment call. Am I going to adopt a bolder view or a moderate view?”

For his part, former Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr. said DFA’s opposition to the bill “has the blessing of President Arroyo.”

“I’m sure of that. The President is supporting the stand taken by DFA on this issue,” he said.
Opposition Rep. Roilo Golez said the House is justified in its claims and that the DFA should not be promoting the interest of a foreign government.

He said it’s in the disputed islands covered by HB 3216 that China, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed in 2005 to conduct joint marine seismic studies preparatory to joint natural gas and oil exploration projects.

He added that the area where the studies were conducted was mostly Philippine territory. Golez, quoting reports from China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC), said data gathering in the area had been completed in 2005.

He said China Oilfield Services Limited, a CNOOC subsidiary, did the data gathering using 11,000 kilometers of sensor cables deployed on the seabed over an area of around 140,000 square kilometers.

“I reiterate my question on whether PNOC (Philippine National Oil Co.) is getting complete data on very strategic information on our natural resources, with a CNOOC subsidiary, not an independent survey group, handling the data gathering,” he added.

Golez also chided Navy vice chief Admiral Tolentino for saying that “joint exploration of the Spratlys is better than war.” He said Tolentino’s statement “is irresponsible.”

“First, Admiral Tolentino has no business getting into the debate on the Spratlys with his war freak views. Second, who said that it is an exploration or war proposition in Spratlys? Why should he be talking about war?” Golez asked.

“I think it is dangerous to have a ranking admiral with a mindset like that. I am happy that he is not the Navy chief,” Golez, a former Navy officer, said.

Nothing to hide

Malacañang maintained yesterday there was nothing to hide in the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) even as officials said details of the agreement would be revealed “at the appropriate time.”

“There is nothing hide about the JMSU and what is important is this JMSU is a scientific undertaking, not exploration,” Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita said in response to calls for the government to make public the details of JMSU.

He stressed that JMSU was only about pre-exploration activities for possible oil and gas in the vicinity of the Philippine-claimed Kalayaan Island Group.

“The issue that sovereignty is compromised is answered by the fact that it is just a scientific undertaking,” he said.

Critics of President Arroyo said JMSU violated the Constitution and might be used to justify her impeachment. Some opposition figures even said she could be held for treason for her approval of JMSU.

The joint activity is scheduled to lapse in July although PNOC-EC president Rafael del Pilar earlier said it was possible that the government would seek an extension of the agreement due to lack of time to finish Phase 2 of the project.

He noted that in 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China agreed to make the South China Sea an area of “cooperation, peace and stability rather than an area of conflict.”
Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, for his part, said the country’s claim on the disputed Spratly Islands should be resolved through dialogue.

“It’s undeniable that a mutually acceptable arrangement among all the parties in the future should evolve, I mean of course the Philippines has a claim and that should be resolved peacefully through dialogue rather than through other means,” he told reporters at Camp Aguinaldo.

He also assuaged fears that JMSU has weakened the country’s territorial claims.

“To us it’s non-diminution of Philippine territory, it’s a mere survey, it doesn’t involve exploration and exploitation,” he said. Teodoro said the issue doesn’t even bother troops stationed in the area.

“However, we cannot prevent other nations also from asserting claims of sovereignty,” he said.
Clearer definition of boundary

Senate President Manuel Villar Jr. vowed to push for the immediate passage of a law that would clearly define the boundaries of the country.

“We need to enact soonest the law that will define the country’s baselines and assess our commitments under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas,” Villar said.
Villar said aside from the issue on national territory, the Senate would make sure that JMSU and other documents involving activities in the Spratlys would be scrutinized.

The Senate chief urged Malacañang to give the public and the lawmakers access to the agreement.

Villar said “the people’s right to information is again being violated” in view of the government’s unwillingness to bare the details of JMSU.

Villar noted that a web-copy of the agreement had been removed from DFA website and other government portals.

“For the purpose of allowing a free flow of information paving the way for a healthy debate in public policy and promoting transparency and accountability in government, I urge our executive officials to present relevant documents pertaining to this agreement,” Villar said.

“Records on the Spratlys deal should be examined to ascertain whether or not this caused derogation of our sovereign rights over the Kalayaan Island Group (Spratlys),” Villar said.
“Ever since this controversy came out, many insinuations have been made. Why did the Philippines break ranks with the ASEAN and dealt with China on its own? There must be a compelling reason behind this extraordinary move,” he added.

Villar said the Senate investigation on the matter would find out whether or not the Spratlys agreement was made in exchange for loan packages to finance infrastructure projects that are now hounded by allegations of corruption.

“We intend to improve public policies on the citizens’ access to information, on transparency of governmental transactions and accountability of public officers,” Villar said. — with Paolo Romero, Delon Porcalla, Aurea Calica, and James Mananghaya